005-NLR-NLR-V-59-WILLIAM-SINGHO-.-et-al.Appellants-and-EDWIN-SINGHO-Respondent.pdf
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"William Singho v. Edwin Singho
Present : L. W. de Silva, A.J.
WILLIAM SINGHO cl ah, Appellants, and EDWIN SINGHORespondent
S. C. 200—C. R., Avissawella, 600
■Jurisdiction—Debt, damage or demand not exceeding Rs. 100—Exclusive jurisdictionoj Rural Court—Rural Courts Ordinance, Ko. 12 of 104S, ss. 0 (/) (a), 11, 12—Civil Procedure Code, s. 636.•
Plaintiff bona fide and without any intention of evading the jurisdiction ofthe Rural Court instituted action in tho Court of Requests for tho recovery of asum of Rs. 125, After trial, tho Commissioner entered judgment in a sum ofRs. 6G in favour of tho plaintiff.
Held, that, under.sections 9 (1) (a), 11 and 12 of tho Rural Courts Ordinance,read with section 63G of tho Civil Procedure Code, tho Court of Requests hadno jurisdiction to enter judgment for a sum which fell within tho exclusivejurisdiction of tho Rural Court.
1 (1030) A. C. 603.5 11021) 1 K. R. 055.
do SILVA, A-T.— n'l’/L’am. Singho v. Edwin Singho
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_^^_PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Avissawella.O'. T. Sameraicickrcme, for defendants-appellants.•
N. Samarakoon, with S. Sharvanandct, for plaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
July 31, 1957. L. W. de Silva, A..J.—
The only point taken at the hearing of this appeal is that the debtdue to the plaint iff-respondent from the defendants-appellants fellwithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rural Court, and the Court ofRequests had no jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. Theaction was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 125 alleged to be the respon-dent’s share of the value of timber sold and appropriated by theappellants. After trial, the learned Commissioner of Requests enteredjudgment in a sum of Rs. GG in favour of the respondent.
Learned counsel for the appellants relied on section 636 of the CivilProcedure Code and sections 11 and 12 of the Rural Courts OrdinanceRo. 12 of 1915 and contended that the Commissioner should havedismissed the action or referred the parties to the Rural Court sincethe ease came within its exclusive jurisdiction. Learned counsel forthe respondent, however, maintained that the Commissioner hadjurisdiction and was not obliged to transfer the trial to the Rural Courtsince the respondent had made his claim bona fide and without anyintention of evading the jurisdiction of the Rural Court. In supportof this argument, learned counsel for the respondent referred me to thefollowing decisions: Lok u- Banda el al. v. Yahapela Veda el aid, Carolisand another v. Siyadoris and others 2, and Komale v. Pelha el al.3. Theprovisions of section 63G of the Civil Procedure Code do not appearto have been considered in these cases. Learned counsel for theappellants argued that the decisions relied on by the respondent haveno application to the Rural Courts Ordinance now in force, and I haveno difficulty in agreeing with him.
In Loku Banda's case1, which was followed in the two later cases,Laseelles C. J. considered the construction of sections 2S and 31 of■'■'The Village Communities Ordinance, 1SS9”. Section 28 assignedto the Village Tribunal all eases in which the debt, damage, or demand-shall not exceed twenty rupees. Section 34, after declaring that thejurisdiction conferred on Village Tribunals is exclusive, and shall not boexercised by any other tribunal on any plea or pretext •whatsoever,enacted :—
“ And, in order to prevent the jurisdiction of these tribunals being evaded,it shall be the duty of any court, civil or criminal, whenever it shall
1 {1912) la N. L. It. 4S7.- (191C) 2 O. V. It. 1ST.
3 (1921) 23 N. E. It. 251.
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de SILVA, A.J.—William Singho t>. Edwin Singho
appear to them that any case brought before them is one properlycognizable by the Village Tribunal established in any place (andit shall be competent to a Commissioner of Requests or PoliceMagistrate to examine the parties at any stage of the case in orderto ascertain this), to stop the further progress of such case, and to-refer the parties to the Village Tribunals, and to condemn the parties;in costs as to such court shall seem fit.”
. Laseelles C.J. held that, where a plaintiff bona fide and without anyintention of evading the jurisdiction of the Village Tribunal, claimsmore than Its. 20 in the Court of Requests, but is able to make goodhis claim to a part only of his demand, the Commissioner is not boundto transfer the case to the-Village Tribunal. He enunciated this asthe principle on which two other cases of this Court had been decided.Ennis J., who agreed with the Chief Justice, stated, however, that“ the facts of the case show that it did not fall exclusively within thejurisdiction of the Village Tribunal.”
The conclusion reached by Laseelles C.J. was influenced by the language-of section 34—“ and in order to -prevent the jurisdiction of these tribunalsbeing evaded ” &c. This was interpreted to mean that there was a dulyimposed on the Commissioner to prevent the jurisdiction of the VillageTribunal being evaded by intentionally increasing the amount of the debt,damage, or demand, 15 H. L. R. at-4S9. In Komalev. Peiha el al;1, Shaw J.felt that he ought not to depart from the rulings of the Court, but said“ it certainly appears somewhat startling that the intention of the plaintiffcan affect the jurisdiction of the Court.” It is unnecessary to sa3' anymore about those rulings since they have no bearing on the provisionsof the Rural Courts Ordinance Ho. 12 of 1945.
Section 11 of the Rural Courts Ordinance Ho. 12 of 1945 which,together with section 12, governs this appeal, declares that the jurisdic-tion conferred by this Ordinance on Rural Courts shall he exclusive,and cases within that jurisdiction shall not be entertained, tried ordetermined by any Court established under the provisions of the CourtsOrdinance. Section 12 is as follows :—
Where in any case, whether civil or criminal, instituted beforeany Court established under the Courts Ordinance, it appears tosuch Court at anjT stage of the proceedings that the case is one withinthe exclusive jurisdiction of a Rural Court, the Court shall stop thefurther progress of the case and refer the parties to such Rural Court,and, where such case is a civil case, may make such order as to costsas may seem just.”
The proviso to this section is not material to this appeal. It is to benoted that the provisions of the Rural Courts Ordinance have no referencewhatever to an evasion, intentional or otherwise, of the jurisdictionof the Court. The provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Rural CourtsOrdinance are plainly more stringent than those of section 34 of theVillage Communities Ordinance.
1 (1932) 23 fv. L. Jl. 231.
Pigera v. ^tackecn
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Tlie want of jurisdiction seems to have escaped the notice of thelearned Commissioner probably because the matter was not raised .atthe trial. But the problem lias to be considered also in the light of theimperative requirements of section G36 of the Civil Procedure Code(Cap. S6) :—
“ When the want of jurisdiction is caused by reason of the exclusivejurisdiction of any Village Tribunal, the averment in the plaint madein pursuance of section 45 shall be considered as traversed, whetherthe defendant in his answer is silent in reference to it or not ; andit shall be the duty of the court to dismiss the action on this preliminaryissue in bar at the earliest stage of the action whereat, by the admissionof the parties or other evidence, it. appears to the court that suchVillage Tribunal lias exclusive jurisdiction.”
By Ordinance Xo. 12 of 1945, existing Village Tribunals have beendeclared to be Rural Courts. Section 9 (1) («), read in the contextof sections II and 12, makes it clear that all actions in which the debt,damage or demand does not exceed one hundred rupees come withinthe exclusive jursidiction of a Rural Court. It was thus incumbent onthe learned Commissioner to take into consideration the provisionsof section 636 of the Civil Procedure Code and sections 11 and 12of the Rural Courts Ordinance No. 12 of 1945 in view of his findingthat the amount due to the respondent, was only Rs. G6. Since he hasacted without jurisdiction in entering judgment for the respondent,
I set aside the judgment and decree and dismiss the plaintiff-respondent’saction. Each party must bear the costs of the trial in the Court below.The appellants are entitled to the costs of appeal.
Judgment set aside.