006-NLR-NLR-V-24-WICKREMASURIYA-v.-MARY-NONA.pdf
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1922.
Present: De Sampayo J.
WICKREMASURIYA d. MAHY KONA.
18&—-P. C. Kandy, 8,024.
Ordinance No. 5 of 1889—Meaning of the term ’* brothel. "
A place to which men resorted for purposes of prostitution withwomen who were to be found in the house is a brothel within themeaning of the term as used in Ordinance No. 5 of 1889.- Theoccupation of a house or room "by a single' prostitute may; not.constitute it a brothel. It is not necessary to make a house ci ill-fame a brothel that women should resort to it from outside; it issufficient if prostitutes reside in the house and men visit them therefor immoral purposes.
fjp HE facta appear from the judgment.
Hayley, for accused, appellant.
✓
• 10 A : C. 74.. * S Term Rep. 003
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May 22, 1922. De Sampayo J.—Iwa»
The accused, Mary Nona, has been chai'ged under section 1 (1) ofOrdinance No. 5 of 1889 with having kept and managed a brothel at Mary NanaMahaiyawa in Kandy on March 10, 1922. The complainant is thePolice Inspector of Kandy,, and he called as . his witness the Rev.
Mr. Dant of the Baptist Mission. The defence was. that this was acase of mistaken identity, and that the 'accused was at the time inquestion at Purijjala, about thirteen miles away from Mahaiyawa.
The Police Magistrate, however, held that the evidence failed toestablish to his satisfaction that the accused was not at Mahaiyawaat the time mentioned by Mr. Dant, viz., 9.45 p:.m. I have no reasonto disagree with this finding. As regards idehtity, Mr.Danfc wasquite sure that the accused was the woman-jvhom he met at thehouse. The Police Magistrate discusses this matter also, and issatisfied with Mr. Dant's evidence, and I am unable to say that heis wrong.
Mr. Hayley, for the accused, has raised another objection in appeal;namely, that the evidence does not '"prove that–the house was abrothel. In the Ordinance there is no definition of the term, but inPieris v. Magrida Fernando,1 Withers J., relying on an English case{Singleton v. Ellison 2), said that a brothel was a place to whichpersons of both sexes resorted for the purpose of prostitution. Imyself followed that case in Morris v. Cornelia.3 But in a more recentcase Schneider J. enunciated a view which makes the matter worthyof reconsideration, and which at all events appears to me to render theOrdinance more effective' in its operation. Por in Silva v. Suppu *the learned Judge expresses the opinion that the Ordinance, used- theword “ brothel,” not in the strict English law sense, but as com-monly understood locally, that is to say, it is a place ** to which menresorted for purposes of prostitution with women who were to befound in the house.” The particular language of Singleton v. Ellison{supra}, which discusses the meaning of the word, appears to me to be.due to the peculiar circumstances of that case, for there a womanwho used to receive men into her rooms for the purpose of sexualintercourse-with herself alone was held not liable to be convicted for** keeping a brothel.” The occupation of a house or room by a singleprostitute may not constitute it a brothel, but I do not myself seethat' the exigency of language or of law requires that, in order toamake a house of ill-fame a brothel, women should resort to it fromoutside1, and that, it is not sufficient if prostitutes reside in the houseand men visit them there for immoral purposes. The note toSingleton v. Ellison given in the Laws of England, vol. 9, p. 542,shows that a good deal turned in that case on the nature of thecharge made against the woman.
cc4
1 (1895) 1 N. L. B. 212.
* (1895) L. R. 1 Q. B. 607.
» 3 Bal. N. C. 48.
‘ (1919) 21 N. L. B. 119.
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1028.] think that the evidence in the present case, though not volu-
DbS^Tpayo niinous, is sufficient to show that the accused’s house was a brothel.
J. Mr. Bant was accosted by a young man, and taken to the house,Wictirenut- where the accused received him and conducted him to a'room. SheHHriya v. there introduced him to a young woman, prepared a bed for use forMary Nona, himself and the girl, and told him that the fee was Rs. 10. Mv. Bant,-syho had been engaged in vigilance work, and, of course, bad allowedhimself to be taken inside the house only for the purpose of obser-vation, left the house on the plea that the fee demunded wasexcessive. There were altogether about eight women in the house,evidently kept there for the purpose of prostitution, and one of themcautioned Mr. Bant to be careful how he left as people might bewatching- Mr. Bant had gone on a motor cycle, which got disablednear the house/and the accused instructed the young man who hadaccosted Mr. Bant to r '.move the cycle as the Police might see it.What is the reasons1 e inference to be drawn from all these facts ?It is clear that the .omen, whether they resorted to the house thatday, or whether they were living there, were prostitutes; that ifmen resorted to the house,-they would have been introduced, to thewomen for the purpose of immoral intercourse, just as Mr. Bant was,and that the secrecy and caution exercised by the inmates, especiallythe accused, who undoubtedly ran the whole concern, are indicativeof the character of the hovse. It is true that there was no evidenceof other incidents such as that which happened in the case of Mr. Baht,but, as I have pointed out in Morris v. Cornells (supra), one instanceis sufficient, if it proves the purpcse for which the house is used. Inmy opinion a primd facie case was established by Mr. Bant’sevidence. . It is significant that the accused, who called severalwitnesses to prove the alibi which she set up, did not give evidenceherself at all, and did not in any way attempt to meet the charge sofar as it characterized her house os a brothel.
The appeal is dismissed.
'Appeal dismissed.