065-NLR-NLR-V-18-SAMARASINHE-v.-PONNIAH.pdf
1915.
( 286 )
Present: Wood Renton C.J. and Pereira J.SAMARASINHE v. PONNIAH.
209—P. C. Colombo, 51,886.
Information to police against another—Failure to prosecute the charge
farther—Police Ordinance No. 16 of 1865, s. 64.
Where a person gave information to the police against a specifiedperson, and thereafter failed to further prosecute the charge,—
is ‘•
Held, that be was liable to be convicted under section 54 of thePolice Ordinance.
' Wood Benton C.J.—Section 54 of the Police Ordinance penalizesthe' barelaying of an informationor making of acomplaint which
is "not further prosecuted. The section is permissive, and the Courtsmay. be: depended upon not to put the law into motion except incasfs where punishment is necessary.
PebhIba . J.—The giving by anybody of information to a policeofficer ofthe mere fact that anoffence has been'committed, and
oven ' thata particular individual issuspected as theoffender, . so as
id" invoke the aid of . the police in making inquiry, and the omissionchvieafterto prosecute anybody inCourt, can- hardlybe said to be
a case, falling within the purview of section 54.
( 287 )
T
HIS case was reserved for argument before It bench of twoJudges by Ennis J. The facts appear from the judgment.
Artdanandam, for accused, appellant.—The construction placedon section 64 of the Police Ordinance by the Police Magistrate willreduce the law to an absurdity. A man who lays informationagainst a person may subsequently find out that his accusation wasgroundless. If he desists from prosecuting the man, is he to befined under section 54 ?
Surely a man must be acquitted if he can establish that he hadexercised reasonable care in making his charge to the police, orin other words, that he had sufficient grounds for laying theinformation.
1815.
Samara-singhe v.Ponniah
Counsel also referred to I Br. 108, 18 N. L. R. 159, 8 N. L. B. 262.
Grenier, for respondent.—Section 54 is part of the living lawof the Colony, and must be given effect to. According to the letterof the law, omitting to prosecute a case further is an offence underany circumstance.
Cun. adv. vult.
March 81, 1915.' Wood Benton C.J.—
This case raises an interesting and a fresh point in the constructionof an extremely difficult enactment, namely, section 54 of the PoliceOrdinance (No. 16 of 1865). The accused-appellant was chargedunder that section with having given information to the police againstone Uduman, which he thereafter, failed to further prosecute. Thelearned Police Magistrate convicted him and fined him Bs. 50. Thepetition of appeal alleges that the Police Magistrate had refused topermit the accused to cite witnesses to prove that he had sufficientgrounds for making the charge. The learned Police Magistrate in aletter to the Begistrar of this Court states that he had permitted thewitnesses in the list tendered to him in Court by the accused’sproctor to be summoned; that he refused summons on a subsequent 'list handed into the office by the accused because it did not bear hisproctor’s signature, and did not disclose how the evidence of thewitnesses named was material to the case; and that at the trial theadvocate for the accused did not wish to call any witnesses, butcontented himself with the argument that the offence was a technicalone. I see no reason to differ from the finding of the learnedPolice Magistrate on the evidence before him. The reason given bythe accused for his failure to proceed with the prosecution, namely,that, his witnesses had been intimidated, was not satisfactoryone, and if the circumstances disclosed an offence at all, it deservessubstantial punishment. The question remains', however whetherthe mere laying of an information or making of a complaint to apolice officer without its further prosecution is an offence withinthe meaning of section 54 of the Police Ordinance, 1865 (No. 16of 1865), or whether it is open to an. informant or complainant,
1915.
Wodi>
Renton C. J.
Samara-singht v.Potttoiah
( 238 )
against whom a charge under section 54 is brought, to show thathe had sufficient grounds lor laying the information or makingthe complaint as a justification, and not merely an extenuationof his conduct. The learned Police Magistrate has interpreted thesection in the former sense, and after careful consideration I amof opinion that he has come to a right conclusion. The cleareffect of the language of the section is to penalize the barelaying of an information or making of a complaint which isnot further prosecuted, and I think that the Legislature mustbe taken to have meant what it said. The section is permissive,and the Courts may be depended upon not to pub the law intomotion except in cases where punishment is necessary. Thelearned Police Magistrate observes that the conduct of the accusedin this case belongs to a type too frequently met with, “ the objectbeing to get the police to act in cases in which they would not- other-wise interfere, and to get the person accused arrested and lockedup for the night in the police station, after which the accusedquietly drops the matter.”
It is very desirable that such a tendency should be checked, andthat formal complaints should not be made except upon materialswhich the complainant is prepared to submit to the judgment of acourt of law. If the information at his disposal does not warranthim in doing this, his proper course is to communicate his suspicionsto the police and ask them to make father inquiry.
I would dismiss the appeal.
Perkjra J.—
The question in this case concerns the exact meaning to be assignedto the words ” In every case in which any information or complaintshall be laid or made before a police officer and shall not be furtherprosecuted ” in section 54 of the Police Ordinance. Is it intendedby these words that the laying of any information, or the making ofany complaint, however vague and indefinite, before a police officer,and the omission to prosecute it further, should be regarded as anoffence ? I do not think so. The laying of any information or themaking of any complaint before any person connotes the fact ofthere being a particular individual against whom the informationis laid or the complaint is made; indeed, the words “ against anyperson ” appearing in the section immediately before the wordsquoted above were, I think, intended to be. read into those words.And, thus, what was intended by the section was that the omission toprosecute any specific information laid or any specific complaintmade before a police officer against a particular individual shouldbe regarded as an offence. The giving by anybody of informationto a police officer of the mere fact that an offence has beeu com-mitted, and even that a particular individual is suspected as theoffender, so as to invoke the aid of the police in malting inquiry,
and tiie omission thereafter to prosecute anybody in Court, canhardly be said to be a case falling within the purview of the wordsquoted above.
In the present case specific complaint was made by tiie accusedto the police against one Uduman, and therefore, I think, that the1conviction is right, and that the appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
191&
Pimara*’!.
Samara*einghe v«Ponniah