057-NLR-NLR-V-06-ROLT-v.MUTTUSWAMY.pdf
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1902.
September IS.
ROLT v. MUTTUSWAMY.P. C., AviaaweUa, 8,361.
Labour Ordinance, No. 11 of 1865, s. 11—Quitting service without notice—Ordinance No. 18 of 1889, s. 6 (1)—Payment of wages due—“ Sixty days—" Able and willing to work. ”
In section 6, sub-section 1, of the Ordinance No. 13 of 1889, the firstclause of the sentence deals with the payment of wages, and the secondclause with the computation, and not the payment, of the wages, wherethe labourer has not worked every day of the week, either because hisemployer did not provide him with work or because he himself wasnot able or willing to work.
The labourer who quits the service of his master is not to be punishedif he has not been paid his wages within sixty days from the expirationof the month during which he earned the wages.
T
HE following case was stated by Mr. M. S. Pinto, the PoliceMagistrate of Avisawella, under the provisions of section 353
of “ The Criminal Procedure Code, 1897—
“On or about the 12th of August, 1902, at Atherfield estate,within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused being a monthlypaid servant under a verbal contract of hire and service for theperiod of one month and renewable from month to month, quittedthe service of his employer, W. F. C. Holt, without leave or reason-able cause, before the end of his term of service or previouswarning of his intention to determine such contract, and punish-able under section 11 of Ordinance No. 11 of 1865.
“ At the hearing of the said charge it was proved that theaccused’s wages had been paid up to the end of April last.
“ It therefore occurred to me that it might have been urged onthe part of the accused that, at the time of quitting, the wages dueto him had not been paid within sixty days from the expiration ofthe month during which such wages had been earned. But Ibeing of the opinion that the words “ sixty days ’’ in section 6 (1) ofOrdinance No. 13 of 1889 must be taken to mean sixty days duringwhich the labourer was willing to work, held that the accused wa6guilty of the offence he was charged with, and sentenced him tothree months’ rigorous imprisonment.
“ The question for the opinion of the Supreme Court is, whetherthe said determination was correct in point of law, and whatshould be done in the premises.’’
The case was argued on 15th September, 1902.
– Rdmandthan, 8.-G., for the Crown.—There is no liability forquitting service if, at the time of such offence, the monthlywages earned by him shall not have been paid in full within the
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sixty days from the expiry of the month during which such wages 1902.shall have been earned.*September IS.
The Ord. No. 13 of 1889, sections 7 and 6 (1), as amended bysection 2 of Ordinance No. 7 of 1890, requires the labourer to bedebited with all advances of money made to him, and with valueof all food, clothes, Ac., supplied to him during such period. Thereis no proof of advances made, and the Police Magistrate has mis-applied the words “ able and willing to work ” in Ord. No. 13 of1889, sec. 6 (1). Sinclair v. Ramasami Kankani (1 N. L. R. '43).
15th September, 1902. Moncreiff, A.C.J.—
This is a point which has been reserved for the consideration ofthis Court by the Police Magistrate of Avisawella. A cooly, whowas proved to have been under a contract of monthly service atAtherfield estate was charged under Ordinance No. 11 of 1865,section 11, with quitting his service without giving due notice,without leave, and without reasonable cause. The Magistrateconvicted him and sentenced him to three months’ rigorousimprisonment. For the cooly it is said that the Magistrate had nopower under the circumstances of the case to convict him. Threepoints have been raised on behalf of the accused, but I think itwill be sufficient if 1 deal with the first. It is said that the cooly,or rather his kangany, received his wages up to the end of April.
The kangany was indebted to the estate for advances, and, as Iunderstand, the superintendent instead of handing over the moneydue to the cooly kept it and credited his kangany with the amount.
The accused remained on the estate during the months of May,
June, and July, and on the 12th August he quitted his service.
Now, section 7 of Ordinance No. 13 of 1889 provides that alabourer shall not be liable to punishment fra* quitting servicewithout leave or reasonable cause, if at the time of such allegedoffence the monthly wages earned by him shall not have been paidin full within the period specified in sub-section (1) of section 6.
That sub-section provides that “ the wages of a labourer shall bepayble monthly within sixty days from the expiration of the monthduring which such wages shall have been earned, and when suchwages shall be payable at a daily rate, the monthly wages shall becomputed according to the number of days on which the labourershall have been able and willing to work, whether the employermay or may not have been able to provide him with work.” TheMagistrate seems to have taken a view of the correlation of thetwo provisions of that sentence which I think is not exact. Thefirst clause of the sentence deals with the payment of wages; thesecond clause deals with the computation, and not with the payment
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1002. of wages. The Magistrate seems to have thought that, as oneSeptember is. would naturally have expected, the second clause would deal alsoMomobbitv, with payment of wages, but under different circumstances. ThatA-.C.J. however is not so. The labourer is not to be punished for quittingservice if he is not paid his wages within sixty days from theexpiration of the month during which he earned the wages. Thatis clear; but the remainder of the sentence simply provides howthe monthly wages are to be computed, where the labourer has notworked every day of the week, either because his employer didnot provide him with work or because he himself was not ableand willing to work. Between the end of May and the 12thAugust seventy-three days elapsed—that gives the accused a marginof thirteen days. According to the view which I take of theprovisions to which the Magistrate has drawn the attention of thisCourt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the terms containedin section 7 of Ordinance No. 13 of 1889. The result is that theconviction will be set aside, and the accused acquitted.
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