118-NLR-NLR-V-58-RATNASINGHAM-and-another-Appellant-and-CATHERASWAMY-Respondent.pdf
1956Present :Basnayake, C.J., and K. D. de Silva, J.
RATHASINGHAM and another, Ajipellants, andCATHERASWAMY, Respondent
S. C. 472—D. O. Colombo, 470jZ
Rent Restriction .-let, A’o. 39 of 194S—Sub-letting—Sale of premises—Right of purchaserto evict tenant and sub-tenant—Sections 9 (1) and (3), 27.
Where the tenant, of any promises sub-lets thorn in contravention ofsection 9 (1) of tho Rent Restriction Act and the premises are thereafter soldby tho landlord to a third party, the purchaser is entitled to maintain an. actionunder section 9 (2) for the ejectment of tho tenant and tho sub-tenant.
A.PPEAL from a judgment of the District Court, Colombo.
Pengatiatlian, for Defendants- Ajjpellants.
H. IF. Jai/etcardene, Q.G., with E. P. S. P. Coomarasuamy- andP. PanasingJte, for Plaintiff-Respondent.
December 19, 19oG. Basnayake, C.J.—
This is an action instituted by the plaintiff, ono Catheraswamy, thepurchaser of premises JSTo. 11, Fernando Road, YFellawattc, from oneEdwin Silva on 7th June, 1954. The learned trial Judge has held, andit is not disputed in appeal, that the 1st defendant who was the tenantunder Edwin Silva sub-let the premises to the 2nd defendant whenEdwin Silva was his landlord. He has also held that the rights of EdwinSilva were transferred to the present plaintiff by virtue of the sale ofthe premises to him.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends that an action underSection 9 (2) of the Rent Restriction Act Ho. 29 of 1948 is availableonly to a landlord who is the landlord at the time of the breach of the' provisions of Section 9 (1) of the Rent Restriction Act. He submitsthat the present plaintiff was not the landlord of the premises in questionat the time the 1st defendant sub-let them, and that he is not entitledto maintain this action. W’e are unable to uphold this contention.Section 9 (1) provides that "the tenant of any premises to which tin'sAct applies shall not, without the prior consent in writing of the landlord,sub-let the premises or any pai-t thereof to any other person ”. In thiscase it is not disputed that the 1st defendant did not obtain the consentof Edwin Silva prior to sub-letting the premises. The question then isas to the meaning of the word “ landlord ” in Section 9 (2) of the Rent. Restriction Act.
That Sub-section reads as follows :—
** Where any premises or anj- part thereof is sub-let in contra-vention of the provisions of Sub-section (1), the landlord shall, not-withstanding the provisions of Section 13, bo entitled in an actioninstituted in a Coui't of competent jurisdiction to a decree for theejectment from the premises of his tenant, and of the person or eachof the persons to whom the premises or any part thereof has beenso sub-let. ”
Teamed counsel for the appellant contends that the word “ landlord ”in the context means the landlord of the premises at the-time the premisesnere sub-let. Learned counsel’s interpretation requires the interpolationof words into the section. Such an interpolation would be a violationof the canons of interpretation of statutes. The expression “ landlord ”is defined in Section 27 of the Rent Restriction Act, and in relation toany j^remises it means the person for the time being entitled to receivethe rent of such premises and includes any tenant who lets the premisesor any part thereof to any sub-tenant. There is nothing in the contextof Section 9 (1) which excludes the application of that definition to thatSection. The word “ landlord ” in the context of Section 9 (2) therefore'means the person for the time being entitled to receive the rent, who,in the instant case, is the plaintiff. He is therefore entitled to maintainthis action. The learned trial Judge is right in his finding and we dismissthe appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
de Silva, J.—I agree.