PEDRIS v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. LTD.

083-NLR-NLR-V-19-PEDRIS–v.-THE-MANUFACTURERS-LIFE-INSURANCE-CO.-LTD..pdf


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Present : Wood Renton C.J. and Shaw J.
PEDRIS v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFEINSURANCE CO., LTD.
447—D. C., Colombo, 44,368.
JAfe msurance—Action for – recovery of amount due on a policy—Convictionofperson insuredfortreason by FieldGeneralCourt-Martial-—
Execution of personinsured—CeylonIndemnity. OrderinCouncil—:
May plaintiff provethatthe person insuredteas not guilty of
treason f—Record of conviction prim! facie proof of guilt.
Theadministratoroftheestate ofone Pedrisbrought this
action to recover fromthedefendantcompanymoneydueupon a
policyof life insurance.Theundertakingtopay inthe event of
deathwas a generalone,andnot limitedtodeath inany particular
manner. Pedris was convicted by a Field General Court-Martial. of treason and shot.The CeylonIndemnity OrderinCouncil
(section 4) provided asfollows:—" Theseveral sentences and
orders pronounced by Military Courtsduring the con-
tinuance of martial law are hereby confirmed, and all persons triedby such Courts and confined in any prisonsnfrn.11 continue
Iiable__ to be confined thereuntil the expiration of the
sentencesand such sentences shall be deemed to be
sentences passed by duly and legally constituted Courts*'
Held, (1) .that section 4 of the Order in Council prevented anyquestion being raisedfor anypurpose aB to the jurisdiction of
the Court by which the sentence was pronounced either overcharges on which the trial proceeded or • over the person tried; (2)that the effect of the Order in Council did not' amount to a declara-tion by statute that Pedris was guilty of treason; .. (3) that the merefact that Pedris died at the hands of justice did not prevent hisadministrator from recovering on the ' policy;(4) that it was open
to tha. plaintiff to lead evidence to prove that Pedris was not infact guilty of treason;(6) that the record of the conviction of
Pedris was primd fade evidence of his guilt.
fyi HE facts are fully set out in the judgment.
Bawa, K.C. (with him E. W. Jayewardene, L. H. de Altois, andShelton de Saram), for the appellant.
Drieberg (with him Samaravnchreme), for the respondents.
Cur. adv. Vult.
February 6, 1917. Wood Renton C.J.—
This case, which was argued before us with very high ability onboth sides, and in which we have had the advantage of a most carefuland exhaustive judgment by ./Mr. Wadsworth, then Acting AdditionalDistrict Judge of Colombo, raises questions of great public interest' 11—XIX.
1917
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1917.; and importance. The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of/Wood Diyunuge Edward Henry Pedris, sues the defendants, the Manu-Rbktok C.J. facturers Life Insurance Company, for the recovery of a sum ofp&lria v. The 25,000 on a policy of insurance effected by Pedris with them ofMamtfac- his own life on April 80, 1907. The amount of the insurance was^iMuran^ payable to Pedris on April 1, 1927, if he should then be alive, or toVo., Ltd. his executors, administrators, or assigns in the event of his deathbefore that date. Pedris was, in the beginning of July, 1915, triedin Colombo by a Field General Court-Martial upon charges of (i)treason by levying war against the King contrary to section 41 ofthe Army Act, 1881,1 (ii) shop breaking, (iii) attempting to murder,<(iv) wounding with intent to murder, and (v) wounding withIntent to do grievouB bodily harm. These offences were alleged toliave been committed on the 1st of the preceding June, in connectionwith the riots which had then broken out in the Colony. Pedriswas found guilty on charges (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), and not guiltyon the fifth charge. He was sentenced to death. The sentence wasconfirmed by Brigadier-General Malcolm, who was then the General-Officer Commanding 'the Troops in Ceylon, and, in pursuance of-it,Pedris was shot in jail on the morning of 7th July, 1915. The questioninvolved in the present appeal is whether the execution of Pedris isan answer to an action by his administrator on his insurance policy,which does not, it should be observed, contain any conditionforfeiting the policy money, if the assured should die at the hands ofjustice. The learned District Judge has decided this issue in favourof the defendants, and has dismissed the action with costs. Theadministrator appeals.
The argument ranged over a great variety of topics. We wereinvited to consider numerous questions * as to the jurisdiction of theField General Court-Martial by which Pedris was tried, arisingunder the Army Act, 1881,1 and the provision in section III, c. l,vof an Order in Council dated October 26, 1896, applied in this Colonyby a Proclamation by the Governor of 5th August, 1914, that—
“ every person who shall for the time being be within the limitsof the Colony shall be subject to military law for the purposes ofthe Army Act, and the said Act shall, subject to the provisions ofthis Order, be deemed to apply to such person in the same manneras if such person had been a person accompanying His Majesty’stroops, or some portion thereof, when employed in active servicebeyond the seas, and such person shall, for the purposes ofthe said Act, be deemed to be under the command of the OfficerCommanding His Majesty’s Troops. ”'
It is, however, in my opinion, unnecessary for, us to deal withthis part of the case at all. On 12th August, 1915, the ImperialCeylon Indemnity Order in Council, 1915, was introduced by
1 44 and 46 Viet., c. 68.
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Proclamation into the Colony. Section 4 of that enactment is in ***7:these terms:—Wood
“ The several sentences and orders pronounced by Military Rkntok Q.J>Courts held in the Colony during the continuance of martial law pedris v. Theare hereby confirmed, and all persons tried by such Courts andconfined in any prisons or other legal places of confinement in the inawrones-Colony under or by virtue of such sentences shall continue liable Co,> &**-to be confined there or elsewhere as the Governor may direct, untilthe expiration of the sentences respectively passed upon them'or until their discharge by lawful authority; and such sentenceB-shall be deemed to be sentences passed by duly * and legally con-stituted Courts of the Colony, and shall be carried out or otherwise-dealt with in the same manner as the sentences of duly constitutedCourts of Law of the Colony.’*
I think that the effect of thifc provision, which is applicable tothe case, inasmuch as Pedris was tried and sentenced during thecontinuance of martial law, is to prevent any question being raisedfor any purpose now as to the jurisdiction of the Court by whichthe sentence was pronounced either over the charges on which thetrial proceededor over the persontried.The section provides in
effect that thesentence passed onPedrisis to be deemedto have
been imposed by a “ duly and legally constituted Court.” Thecontext, in my opinion, demonstrates that the word ” deemed ” inthis connection means 1 ‘ shall be conclusively taken to be.” Wewere urged by counsel for the administrator to hold that, even ifthis were so, the language of section 4 of the Order in Council itselfshows that the jurisdiction of the Military Courts, whose sentencesare confirmed, was validated only for the purpose of enabling thesentences to be carried into effect. The words of the section, it wascontended, are“ deemed to be, ”not “deemed to havebeen.
This argumentbrings me to the incidental consideration ofa point
with which it will be necessary to deal later on. It is obvious thatsection 4 of the Order in Council cannot be construed in the restrictedsense just mentioned, if it applies to sentences that have alreadybeen executed. I have no doubt but that it does. The confirmationin the first clause of the “ several sentences ” passed by Military'
Courts during the continuance of martial law makes this quiteclear. The sentence imposed by the Field General Court-Martialupon Pedris is placed by-the Order in Council on the same basis asif it had been a sentence of the Supreme Court on an indictmentagainst him for levying war against the King within the meaningof section 114 of the Penal Code.
There remains, however, the not less important and more difficultquestion whether in spite of his conviction of, and execution for,treason, it is still competent for his administrator to prove in thepresent action that he did not, in fact, commit the offence of treason.This question has to be considered from the point of view, in the
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191?.:first place, ofsection' 4 of the Ceylon Indemnity Order in 'Council.
* _‘ *1915, and, inthe next place,, of the general law apart from that
H|3n»f!.T. enactment. Do the words “ the several sentences and ordersTiufrinr The Pronounced by Military Courts in the Colony during the continuanceMcmufac- of martial law are hereby confirmed" legalise not only the sen-*Tnj jut! *ences themselves, but the findings on which those sentences are<Jb„ Ltd. based? As I have already indicated, X think that the language justquoted confirms sentences that have been carried out as well as thosethat are^ Btillcurrent, and if it were permissible, to speculate as to
the intentionof the framers of the Order in Council, there would
be much to be said for the view that they meant to draw a politic •veil of oblivion over the entire episode, with which the Order inCouncil is concerned, for all purposes. But we have to deed herewith an enactment which not merely is retrospective in character,but was brought into operation after the right sought to be assertedin this action had accrued. It is clear, both on authority and onprinciple, that before the language of section 4 is construed so asto debar, the legal representative of Pedris from enforcing a rightalready vested, we must be satisfied that the words actually used inthe section are sufficient for the purpose. The points in favour of■the defendants in this connection are these. The section, in myopinion,_does deal with sentences that have been completely under-gone, and applies, therefore, to the case of Pedris, There was noneed for a statutory confirmation of sucfi a sentence, unless withthe view of preventing any of the steps, that led up to' it frombeing questioned in any future proceeding, civil or criminal'. Theconsiderations that have to be taken. account of on the other sideare these. In the law administered by Military Courts, an expressdistinction is drawn between the findings ” of those tribunals andthe " sentences " passed by them. If the framers of the Order inCouncil had intended to validate the former as well as the latter,
– nothing would have been easier than for them to have said so.Moreover, even if section 4 of the Order m Council covers executedsentences as well as those which are still in progress, the primary, asopposed to the subsidiary, purpose of the section was to enablecurrent sentences to be carried out. Applying to the enactment in >■question the well-established rule of law as to the interpretation oflegislation of this character, I am not prepared to hold that "thereis anything in it which precludes Pedris’ administrator fromchallenging the propriety of his conviction on the merits.
I proceed now to an examination of the other aspect of thequestion. If the guilt of Pedris has not been conclusively establishedby the Ceylon Indemnity Order in Council, 1915, is it so establishedby the production of the record of his conviction? An argumentab mconvenienti arises, in this connection, in favour alike of thfedefendants and of the administrator.. A person accused of murderis tried by a Judge of the Supreme Court with a jury at Criminal
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Sessions, is convicted, and sentenced to death. On a case reserved 1017.on certain points of law, the propriety of this conviction is affirmed woodby the Supreme Court. If the contention of the administrator in Bkntow C.J.this case is upheld, the legal representative of the convict may pedns v. Thereopen the whole question of his guilt or innocence and have the Manufaa-charge of murder incidentally re-tried in an action on an insurancepolicy. On the other hand, human justice is fallible. Bet us Co., Ltd.suppose that, after the execution of a person convicted of murder,conclusive proof is forthcoming that he was not the murderer. Isthere any rule of public policy which makes it necessary to debarhis relatives from proving his innocence for the purpbse of recoveringa sum of money for which his life had been insured? If we mustchoose between the inconvenience of reopening a criminal trial asa collateral issue in civil proceedings, and the injustice of preventingthe relatives of a person, who has been wrongfully condemned andexecuted, from proving that fact in such an action as this, I preferto incur the risk involved in the former alternative.
The law on the subject up to a certain point is clear. Neither jnEngland nor under section 41 of the Evidence Ordinance is thejudgment of a Criminal Court a judgment in rent. According toall the older English authorities,1 the record of a conviction wasinadmissible as evidence of the same fact coming into controversyin a civil suit. This rule was no doubt based to some extent on thedifference between the rules of practice and of procedure in criminaland in civil cases. But it survived the abolition of many of thesedifferences, and, particularly since persons accused of offences havebeen fully enabled by statute to give evidence in their own behalf,a tendency, which has proceeded, I venture to think, upon reasonablegrounds, has been manifested by the' Courts in England to relaxthe old rule of law to the extent of making the record of a convictionprima facie evidence of guilt. In In re Crippen,2 Sir Samuel Evansgave an express ruling to this effect, declining to follow a decisionof Hall Y.C. in Yates v. Kyffin-Taylor and Wark,* and a dictum ofBramwell L. J. in Leytnan v. Latimer 4 to the contrary. But, so faras I am aware, the law has as yet undergone no further relaxation.
In nonfe of the cases in which an action on an insurance policy hasbeen met by the plea that the policy was void by reason of the factthat the person insured had died by . the liands of justice, has itever been held that the production of the record of the convictionwas conclusive proof of guilt, Amicable Society v. Holland,*which is better known as Fauntleroy's Case, it appears fromthe pleadings that the record of the conviction was admitted, by1 See Gibson v. McCarthy (10 George 3 (1899) W. N. 141.
11.), Cas. t. Hard. S14; March v. * (1878) 8 Ex. D. 368.
March, (1858) 88 L. J. P. A M. 3 (1830) 8 Dow S Clark 1 and 4 Bli.
30; and Castrique ©. Imrie, (1870)N. S. 194; and cf. in the Court of
L. B. 4 H. L. 434.Chancery, 8 Buss. 361.
* (1911) P. 108.
26-
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1M7.:agreement 6f the parties, without further proof. Amicable Society t>.
/Wood Bolland 1 is a decision by the House of Lords, and s inconceivableRBoneoKCJT. that if it had introduced such a wide deviation from/the law as there-Ptdrio r The tofore understood, Lord Blackburn would have onj^ted to digeuss itMam/fac- in Castrique v. Imrie,2 which is, of course, a debhnon-of much laterdate. Moreover, in none of the text books vin which the ^egalGo-, Ltd- position of judgments of Criminal Courts is. discussed, is '"AmicableSociety v. Bolland 1 .cited in that oonnectaon.*..-4iL,Cleaver vrMutualReserve Fund Life Association 2—Mrs. Maybricffs ■ Case—-the pointwas not raised. The most recent authority on the question is thedecision of the Court of Appeal in Hall v. Knight and Baxtert* inwhich a legatee, who had been convicted of the manslaughter ofher testator, was held to have been rightly dismissed from -an hotionfor probate of the will, on the ground that the principle accordingto which a person, who. is guilty of feloniously killing another,cannot take any benefit under that person's will, is based on (publicpolicy, and applies equally to a case of manslaughter as to. a case ofmurder. There are statements in the report of Hall v. Knight and■Baxter * and dicta in the judgments of the Court of Appeal whichseem at first sight to support the contention of the defendants inthis matter. The summons, taken out by the plaintiff before theBegistrar to dismiss the legatee from the action, alleged as a groundfor her'removal that “ she having been convicted of the> man-slaughter of the testator could take no beneficial interest under hiswill.” The President held ” that a person who had been foundguilty of feloniously killing another was not entitled to take anybenefit under that other person’s will,” and dismissed the legateefrom the case accordingly. Cozens-Hardy M.B. made use of thefollowing language: —‘ ‘ The death of the testator was due to theact of the (legatee). That is a fact which has been proved, and isnow incontestable. She was found guilty of occasioning the death,
' and a verdict of manslaughter was given. The case was taken tothe Court of Criminal Appeal and the decision was upheld,, and,therefore, that is a fact which is conclusively proved.” But, on theother hand, the President, from whose decision the appeal was taken,was Sir Samuel Evans, the very Judge who, in In re Crippen,s had heldthat the record of the conviction was primd facie evidence of guilt.If he had intended in Hall v. Knight and Baxter 4 to hold that therecord of a conviction was conclusive proof of guilt, he wouldcertainly have said so in express terms, and, if the Court of Appealhad meant to lay down any such proposition, the learned Judgeswould not have failed to refer to the decision in In re Crippen.6Moreover, in other parts of the judgments in Hall v. Knight ^ aridBaxter * there are passages that modifythe viewsuggestedbythe
i (1830) 2 Dow d Clark 1 and 4 Bit. N. S.194;3(1892)1 Q.B.%47.
and of. in the Court of Chancery, 3 Russ.361.4(1914)P. 1.
a (1870) L. R. 4 H. L. 434.3(1911)P. 108.
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observations of Cozens-Hardy M.B. cited above. 11 X think it 1917.would be shocking, " said the Master of the Rolls, if (the legatee)Wood
who was the cause of the death of this man, and was convicted; ofOJ.
felony in respect of that, could come before the Court and claim 'an pedris v. Theinterest under any will made in. her favour by the testator." “ Why Manvfae-shouTd the legatee," said Hamilton B.J., " be excluded from taking ir^unmoethe bounty when he can be hanged, and not be excluded when.he Co., Ltd.can only be sent to penal servitude for life? The distinction seemsto me either to rely unduly upon legal classification, or else toencourage what, I cun sure, would be very noxious—a sentimentalspeculation as to the motives and degree of moral guilt of a personwho has been justly convicted and sent to prison." “ It is againstpublic policy," said Swinfen Eady Ij.J., " that a person committinga crime should directly benefit in the way that it is claimed that(the legatee) should benefit." I cannot but think that in Hall v.
Knight and Baxter,1 as in Amicable Society v. BoUand,* the guilt ofthe convict was not contested. But the decision of the Court ofAppeal in the former case involves a direct recognition of the■ principle enunciated by Sir Samuel Evans in In re Crippen 3 thatin civil proceedings, such as the present, the record of a convictionshould be admitted as primd facie, although not as conclusive,evidence of guilt. The record of the conviction of Pedris wasadmitted without question in this action. The point in dispute inthis connection was whether or not the administrator is entitled tochallenge its propriety on the merits.
I would set aside the decree of the District Judge dismissing theplaintiff’s action, and send the case back for further inquiry andadjudication in the District Court. The record of the conviction ofPedris has already been admitted, and is admissible as primd facieevidence of his guilt. It will, however, be open to the plaintiff torebut that evidence by proving, if he is in a position to do so, that,in spite of his conviction, Pedris did not in fact commit treason bywaging war against the King. I agree with the learned DistrictJudge that no evidence is admissible under issue 6 (a), for thepurpose of showing that in any event Pedris could not have hadany reasonable belief that he was committing an offence punishablewith death. It is quite immaterial what his belief on that point was,if he in fact committed such an offence. ^For the reasons given above,no question as to the jurisdiction of the Field General Court-Martialover the charges on which Pedris was tried or over Pedris himselfcan be raised now. The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of thisappeal in any event. The costs of the original and of the subse-quent proceedings will be in the discretion of the learned DistrictJudge. The evidence already recorded may stand quantum valeat.
(1914) P. l.
(1830) 9 Dow & Clark 1 and. 4 Bit N. S. 194; and cf. in the Court of
Chancery, 3 Russ. 8S1.
2 (1911) P. 108.,
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iMT. ' Sbaw J.—
Pedris t>. i'he. This action is brought by the administrator of the estate of one(wewltfe D. E. Pedris to recover from the defendant company the sum ofInsurance Bs. 25,000 upon a policy of insurance dated April 30, .1907, wherebyC°., Ltd. the defendant company promised to pay the amount insured tothe said D. E. Pedris on April 1, 1927, or in the event; of,his deathbefore that date, then upon the happening of such death to hisrepresentatives. The undertaking to pay in the event of death wasa general one, and not limited to death in any particular manner.
Pedris died on July 7, 1915, having been executed at the WelikadaJail in pursuance of the sentence of a Field General Court-Martialheld on July 1, 1915, and. delivered by the Court-Martial upon afinding by the Court that Pedris was guilty of treason, in that hedid on or about June 1, 1915, levy war against our Lord the King.
1 do not propose to set out the numerous issues which were beforethe Judge, or to deal with his findings upon all of them, because, inview of the opinion I have arrived at as to the effect of the Order inCouncil of August 12, 1915, the decision of many of these issuesbecomes unnecessary."
The Judge has held that Pedris having met with his death atthe hands of justice, the policy on his life cannot be enforced^ andhas refused to allow evidence to be called with the object of show-ing that the finding of the- Court-Martial was Wrong. He hasalso held that^ the Order in Council of August 12, 1915, amounts toa statutory enactment declaring that Pedris was. guilty of theoffence in respect of which he was convicted, and has, in addition,decided several objections to the validity of the proceedings of theCourt-Martial and the execution of the sentence in favour of thedefendants, and has dismissed the action with costs.
From his decision the plaintiff appeals.
I am unable to agree with the finding of the District Judge thatthe effect of the Order in Council of August 12, 1915, amounts to adeclaration by statute that Pedris was guilty of the offence in respectof which he was convicted.s ■
The Order in Council, called “ The Ceylon Indemnity Order inCouncil," is admittedly part of the law of this Colony, and wasproclaimed in Ceylon on August 30, 1915. As its name implies, itspurpose was mainly to indemnify persons for acts done in good faithin suppressing the riots that had occurred in the previous; June.This object is achieved by the earlier sections of the Order, which Ineed not set out. Section 4 then provides as follows:-—‘‘.The-several sentences and orders pronounced by Military Courts heldiin the Colony during the continuance of martial law are herebyconfirmed, and all persons tried by such Courts and confined inany prisons or other legal places of confinement in the Colony underor by virtue of such sentences shall continue liable to be confinedthere or elsewhere as the Governor may direct, until the expiration
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of the sentences respectively passed upon them or until theirdischarge by lawful authority; and such sentences shall be deemedto be sentences passed by duly and legally constituted Courts of theColony, an<fshall be carried out or otherwise dealt with in the samemanner as the sentences of duly constituted Courts of Law of- theColony." i
This is a legislative enactment of a very unusual character, madein a very unusual way, and one that must be strictly construed, andnot extended beyond the scope that/ its wording necessitates. 1cannot agree that it in any way amounts to a legislative enactmentthat Pedris and the other persons convicted by the Military Courtswere guilty of the offences for which they have been convicted andsentenced. ■)
The enaotinent confirms " the several, sentences and orders." Itdoes not purport to confirm the " findings " of the Courts, which arequite different to, and precede, the " sentences and orders. " Thesection then., goes on to provide that the sentences shall be deemedto be sentenfe.es passed by duly and legally constituted Courts ofthe Colony and carried out' as such.
The meaning of the enactment seems to me to be clearly apparentfrom its wording. It is to place the sentences and orders of MilitaryCourts on exactly the same footing as those of the Civil Courts ofthe Colony, and to make such of the sentences and orders as havenot been fully'enforced enforceable in the same way as sentencesof . the Civil Cot&ts.
The decision of. the District Judge on this point has been influencedby consideration of what he thought were the objects of the enact-ment and the Requirements of public policy. In the absence of anyambiguity in th^’ language used, I cannot see that any inquiry intothe. intention of .the legislative authority is admissible, but, even ifit were, there is ‘no reason to suppose that the object of the enact-ment was to give to the findings of the Military Courts any greatereffect than those of the Civil Courts of the Colony, which weresitting and trying very similar cases at the' same time, and I amunable to see that any principle of public policy requires the .findingof a Military Court not to be open to challenge in subsequent civilproceedings in cases, where such challenge would be permissible hadthe finding been onq of a Civil Court.
The construction, however, that should, in my opinion expressedabove, be placed on the Order in Council of August 12, 1915, disposesof many, of the points taken by the appellant. The legislativeconfirmation of the sentences, and the placing of them on the footingof sentences of the duly constituted Courts of the Colony, appearsto me to cure any irregularity in the constitution of the MilitaryCourts, and any defects in the confirmation of the sentences by theGovernor or Officer Commanding, and prevents any question beingraised as to the capacity of the Military Courts to try and sentence
1917.
Sbaw J.
Pedris v. TheManufac-turers JAfeInsurantsCo., Ltd.
11*
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*•17.'
Skaw J.
Fedria v. TheManufac-tures LifeTneurance
Go., Ltd.
any particular class of persons. I, therefore, think that it is unneces-sary to go into the question whether any irregularities or want ofjurisdiction existed or not.
There remain for consideration the important questions whetherthe mere fact that Pedris died at the hand of justice preventshis administrator recovering on the policy, irrespective of -the-question whether he was in fact guilty of the treason in respectof which he was sentenced or not, and whether the conviction isconclusive of his guilt and not open to challenge in a subsequentcivil suit.
In the case of The Amicable Society v. Bolland,1 one HenryFauntleroy, who had effected an insurance on his life in the Society,was convicted of felony, and executed in pursuance of the sentencepassed upon him. The Vice-Chancellor directed the Society to payto Fauntleroy’s assignees the amount due on the policy, but onappeal to the House of Lords the judgment was reversed, and the.money was held not to be recoverable; The reason given by theLord Chancellor for the decision was that it would be contrary topublic policy to insure a person a benefit in the event of his com-mitting a capital felony and being tried, convicted, and executedfor that felony; and, as it would be contrary to public policy forany such express contract to be made, so no contract can be impliedin a policy to pay the money in such an event. In that case noevidence was given that Fauntleroy had actually committed thefelony for which he had suffered death beyond putting in a. copy ofthe conviction by consent of the parties, but it is clear that thequestion of Fauntleroy’s guilt was never disputed in the case, andthe judgment of Lord Brougham throughout proceeded on theassumption of his guilt. The question,, says the Lord Chancellor,is this, ‘‘ .whether the assignee can recover against the insurancecompany the amount of this insurance; that is to say, whether aparty, effecting with an insurance company an insurance upon hislife and afterwards committing a capital felony, being tried, convicted,and finally executed, whether, under such circumstances, the partiesrepresenting him and claiming under him can recover the suminsured in the policy so effected.” The Lord Chancellor did nothold, and, in my opinion, did not intend to hold, that the mere factthat the insured was convicted of felony- and executed preventedthe assignees from recovering, but only that if an insured actuallycommitted felony and was executed for it the money was notrecoverable.
The principle of the decision in Fauntleroy’s Case is the sameas that of Cleaver, v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assurance,i 2 In reCrippen,a and Hall v. Knight and Baxter/ and is well set out in the
i (1880) 4 Bligh N. S. 194.
a (1892) 1 Q. B. 147.
s (1911) P. 108.* (1914) P. 1.
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Pedrie v. TheManu/aorturers LifeInsuranceGo., Ltd,
judgment of Sir Samuel Evans In In re Crippen,1 where he says: “ Itis clear that the law is that no person can obtain or enforce any &xZwJ#
right resulting to him from his own crime; neither can his repre-sentative claiming under him obtain or enforce any such rights. Thehuman mind revolts at the very idea that any other doctrinecould be possible in our system of jurisprudence. ”
If none of the cases I have mentioned was any question raised asto the guilt of the eonvioted person, and none of them can, in myopinion, be considered as an authority for the proposition that mereconviction and execution of a person for a felony will prevent hisassignees or representatives recovering on a policy, on his life, if hAbe in fact innocent of the offence in respect of which he has beenoonvioted. It is worthy of note that neither in Taylor on Evidence orin Roaooe’s Nisi Prius Evidence is Fauntleroy*s Case referred to as anauthority for the admissibility or conolusiveness of judgments ofCriminal Courts in subsequent civil proceedings, nor is it mentionedin the subsequent leading case on the subject, Caetrique v. Imrie,which I shall refer to later. In Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund' Life Assurance * the question of law to be decided was ‘ ‘ whether, if itwere proved that James Maybrick died from poison intentionallyadministered to him by Florence E. Maybrick, that would offer adefence to the action, ” and the judgment of the Lords Justices allproceed on the assumption that she was in fact guilty. In Hall v.
Knight and Baxter 9 the Master of the Bolls says in his judgment:
" If there were any possibility of a question as to whether JeanBarter had been guilty of the crime, that would be a matter whichought to have been tried in Court, but when the fact is perfectlyindisputable and beyond contest, I know nothing whatever whichprevents the Court, in a case of this kind, dealing with what is apure question of law on an application to stay proceedings. ” Soalso Hamilton L.J. says it is against public policy that a person4‘ committing a crime " should benefit thereby.
The doubt that has been raised as to the effect of the decision inFauntleroy’s Case seems to have principally arisen from the some-what loose language employed by text book writers, who cite that caseas an authority for the proposition that death at tCe hands ofjustice ” prevents a policy being enforced, an error that Vice-Chancellor Wood falls into in Horne v. Anglo-Australian Life
Assurance Co. 9
I can see no reason on grounds of public policy why the representa-tive of an innocent person, who has been convicted and executed,should not recover the amount of an insurance on his life, his deathwould have been just as much^ an accident as if he had been killedby a chance shot of the military when firing on rioters, and I can seeno public policy that demands that a conviction for crime resulting
» (1911) P. 108.9 (1914) P. 1.
a (1892) 1 Q. B. 147.* (1881) 80 L. J. Ch. 517.
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– .1917.' in sentence of death should have any different effect, or be in anyj way less open to question in subsequent civil proceedings, than any other criminal conviction.
That a conviction for crime is not so conclusive has been held in■turners Life an unbroken chain of authorities from the earliest times down to thepresent day. In Caatrique v. Imrie,1 Blackburn J., in giving theopinions of himself and four other Judges to the House of Lords,said:“ A judgment in an English Court is not conclusive as to
anything but the point decided, and therefore a judgment of con-viction on an indictment for forging a bill of exchange, thoughconclusive as to the prisoner being a convicted felon, is not only notconclusive, but is not even admissible evidence of the forgery in anaction on the bill, though the conviction must have proceededon the ground that the bill was forged. ' ’ Bo also in Layman v.Latimer2 Bramwell L.J. says: “ It is plain from the numerouscases cited in 2 Taylor on Evidence 8 that a conviction for felony isres inter alios acta, and of itself is no evidence in any civil proceedingthat the person convicted has committed felony. ’’
One of the more recent cases on the subject is Caine v. PalaceSteam Shipping Co.,* where it was held that the conviction of certainseamen for refusing to proceed to sea was not conclusive againstthem in a subsequent civil suit brought for their wages.
It has also been held in several cases in the Indian Courts, of whichI will mention Ram Lai v. Tula Ram,5 that a judgment of a CriminalCourt is not conclusive in subsequent civil proceedings, and in thisColony a similar opinion was expressed by Berwick D.J. in the caseof Gould v. Ferguson.6
Whether the opinion expressed by the Judges in Castrique v,Imrie and in the text books that a conviction is not only not con-clusive, but even inadmissible, in a subsequent civil suit does not gotoo far is open to some doubt. Sir Samuel Evans in In re Crippenexpressed His dissent from a decision of Hall V.C. given in a caseof Yates v. Kyffin-Taylor and Wark,7 where the Vice-Chancellor, afterreviewing all the cases, held that the conviction of the defendantWark for the murder of a testatrix, under whose will he was claiminga benefit, was not only not conclusive against him, but altogetherinadmissible.
The reasons-^given by Sir- Samuel Evans in the case abovementioned appear to me to be deserving of much weight, and Ishould not be prepared to hold, whatever may have been consideredto be the law at one time, that a conviction in a criminal case isnow altogether inadmissible in a subsequent civil suit to which theconvicted person or his representative is a party.
I (1870) L. R. 4 if. h. 414.
(1878) L. R. 3 Ex. Die. 362.
Pt. 3, ch. IV., par. 1698, p. 1416 (7th ed.). <
* (1899) W. N. 141.
(1907) 1 K. B. 670.
(1881) 1 L. R. 4 All. 97.
(1880) 1 Br. App. B IX.
( 333 )
This question has, however, no great importance in the presentease, for the conviction of Pedris was put in evidence at the trialunobjected to by the plaintiff, and both sides were prepared tolead evidence on the issue of the guilt of the accused had theDistrict Judge not decided that no evidence could be given to showthat the finding of the Couff-Martial was wrong.
In my opinion ■ the mere fact that Pedris was executed in con-sequence of his conviction by Court-Martial does not prevent hisadministrator recovering on the policy, and, notwithstanding thatconviction, it is still open to the plaintiff to satisfy the Court byevidence, if he is in a position to do so, that the .insured was not infact guilty of the crime of treason.
The plaintiff desired also to lead evidence on issue 0 (a), viz.: —“ Were the circumstances in which the acts for which Pedris wassentenced to death were committed such that he could not have hadany reasonable belief that he was committing an offence punishablewith death? *’
1917.
Shaw J.
Pedris v. TheManufac-turers LifeInsuranceCo., Ltd.
I think the Judge rightly excluded evidence on this issue, for, ifPedris in fact committed treason and was executed for it, his beliefas to the possible punishment for his acts is entirely immaterial.
1 would set aside the order dismissing the action, and remit thecase to-the District Court to enable both sides to lead evidence onissue 4 (&). The appellant having succeeded in getting the decreeagainst him set aside should have the costs of this appeal.
Sent back.