003-NLR-NLR-V-34-PARIYAGAM-PILLAI-v.-CADER-MEERA.pdf
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GARVIN S.P.J.—Pariyagam Pillai v. Cader Meera.
1932Present: Garvin S.P.J. and Maartensz A.J.
PARIYAGAM PILLAI v. CADER MEERA37—D. C. Colombo, 1,275
Jurisdiction—Order for delivery of possession—Resistance offered by bonafideclaimant—Land situate outside Court’s jurisdiction—Civil
Procedure Code, s. 327.
Where in a proceeding under section 327 of the Civil Procedure Codethe subject-matter of the claim is proved to be outside the limits ofthe jurisdiction of the Court, monetary, local or otherwise, the Courthas no right to determine the claim.
^ PPEAL from an order of the District Judge of Colombo.
Weerasooria, for plaintiff, appellant.
V. Perera, for defendants, respondents.
January 22, 1932. Garvin S.P.J.—
In execution of a money decree obtained in this case certain premisesoutside the jurisdiction of this Court were seized and sold at the instanceof the substituted plaintiff to whom the original plaintiff had assignedthe decree. At the sale the substituted plaintiff became the purchaser.'He then obtained an order for delivery and possession under the pro-visions of section 287 of the Civil Procedure Code but was resisted andcould not get possession. Proceedings were then taken under theprovisions of section 325 and the Court on being satisfied that the personswho resisted were other than the'judgment-debtor and were claimingto be in possession of the property on their own account directed thatthe petition of the substituted plaintiff be numbered and registered asa plaint as provided for. by section 327 of the Code. The defendants,filed answer and took the objection that the Court had no jurisdictionto entertain and determine the contest which arose between them andthe plaintiff purchaser. At the hearing a preliminary issue as to juris-diction was framed aii<i tried and the learned District Judge upheld theplea and dismissed the action.
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GARVIN S.P.J.—Pariyagam Pillai v. Cader Meera.
The parties are agreed that if the question of the Court’s jurisdictionto entertain this proceeding must be determined in accordance withthe rules for ascertaining the jurisdiction of the Court prescribed bysection 9 of the Civil Procedure Code then this matter would clearlybe outside, the jurisdiction of the Court. It was urged, however, thatthe language of section 327 must be construed to mean that a specialjurisdiction has been vested in the Court which issued the order forpossession to hear and investigate this contest as to possession andtitle whether the matter came within the ordinary limits of its jurisdictionor not.
In the case of Fernando v. Fernando1 it was held that section 327did not enlarge the ordinary limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, and thisdecision was followed by me in the case of Daniel v. Rasiah2. In eachof the two cases referred to the question arose in connection with aproceeding in the Court of Requests, and in each case the question fordecision was whether the Court of Requests had jurisdiction to determinethe matters which fell for decision in a proceeding under section 327 orsection 328 where the matter was manifestly in excess of the monetarylimits set to its jurisdiction. This case differs from those referred to,in that being a proceeding in a District Court there is no question of amonetary limit. It is difficult, however, upon principle to holdconsistently with those two rulings that although section 327 does notgive a Court jurisdiction to determine a matter which is outside themonetary limits set to its jurisdiction that it nevertheless has jurisdictionto deal with matters which are definitely outside other limits set to itsjurisdiction. The language of section 327 if it is not capable of theinterpretation that the Court, whatever that Court may be, is vestedwith a special and unlimited jurisdiction to deal with the matter irre-spective of the pecuniary or other limitations of its ordinary jurisdiction,is not capable of any , other interpretation save that a Court may onlyinvestigate claims which fall within the limits of its jurisdiction.
Now, the words we are called upon to construe are these “.. ..
the Court shall direct the petition of complaint to be numbered andregistered as a plaint in an action between the decree holder as plaintiffand the claimant as defendant, and the Courtshall without prejudice toany proceeding under which the claimant may be liable for punishmentfor such resistance or obstruction proceed to investigate the claim in thesame manner and with the like power as if an action for the propertyhad been instituted by the decree holder against the claimant, and shallpass such order as it shall think fit for executing or staying the executionof the decree ”. There is, no doubt, in this section and in the wholegroup of sections of which this is one, an indication that it was assumedthat any claim made to property in respect of which the Court in theoriginal suit granted a decree for possession would fall within the ordinarylimits of the jurisdiction of the Court. In the case of Daniel v. Rasiah(supra) I expressed the opinion that that apparently was the impression inthe mind of the draftsman. The section deals expressly with decrees forpossession of property which would necessarily imply that the property
1 24 N. L. R. 502.
2 31 N. L. R. 438.
GARVIN S.P.J.—Pariyagam Pillai v. Cader Meera.
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had been the subject of a suit in respect of which the Court had exercisedjurisdiction. This would naturally give rise to the impression thatany subsequent claim to the property would also be within the limitsof its jurisdiction. Nevertheless cases may arise where a stranger tothe proceedings might claim that the subject-matter of the claim wasoutside the jurisdiction of the Court. Such cases are rare and mightwell have been lost sight of. The effect of the extension of these sectionsto resistance to the delivery of possession under an order for possessionhas infinitely multiplied the occasions upon which the matter of theclaim falls outside the ordinary limits of the Court’s jurisdiction. Inthe case of a Court of Requests the monetary limits of its jurisdiction isRs. 300 and a judgment for a small money claim may result in the seizurein execution of that decree of property worth several thousands ofrupees ; and so also in the District Court the execution of a moneydecree must frequently result in the seizure of property outside thejurisdiction of the Court.
However that may be, we are bound by the decision in the case of• Silva v. de Mel1 though we are inclined respectfully to differ from theconclusion arrived at in that case. The case immediately before us issuch a case in that it arises in the course of the execution of a decree formoney. We have been pressed, however, to accept the view that thelanguage of section 327 would justify the Court in assuming jurisdictionand proceeding to adjudicate upon this claim. I do not feel, however,that we should be justified in placing upon the words of this section suchan interpretation as would enlarge its jurisdiction and enable a Courtto try and determine any claim arising out of the resistance to the officercharged with the execution of a decree or order for possession. Itwould be reasonable to expect that if such was the intention of thelegislature there would have been words in the section which wouldunmistakably indicate its intention. It is urged, however, that inasmuchas a Court is directed to number and register the complaint as a plaintin an action between the decree holder as the plaintiff and the claimantas defendant and to investigate the claim that it must be assumed thatthe legislature intended to direct the Court to hear and determine theclaim irrespective of whether it came within the ordinary limits of itsjurisdiction or not. I do not think that ali this can be fairly gatheredfrom the use of the word “ shall ” and moreover it must be rememberedthat the Court is directed to investigate the claim “ in the same mannerand with the like power as if an action for property had been instituted ”.The Court is not vested with an unlimited jurisdiction but is directedto exercise in respect of this matter the same powers that it would haveif the action had been instituted regularly and in the ordinary way andno more. The section read as a whole appears to me to do no more thanenable a Court which had jurisdiction to entertain and decide a matterwhich but for this provision could only have been brought before it byway of a regular action. 1 It does not extend its ordinary jurisdictionbut it merely prescribes a special procedure for the disposal of matterswithin the limits of its jurisdiction which but for this section it could onlyentertain and dispose of if brought before it by way of a regular action.
M8 N. L. R. 164.
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GARVIN S.P.J.—Pariyagam Pillai v. Cader Meera.
A search for Indian authority has not produced many decisions upon .the corresponding provisions of the Indian Act, but the case of Muttammalv. Chinnana Gounden1 is exactly in point. There a bench of two Judgestook the same view as I have indicated above. “ It seems to me ” saidone of the presiding. Judges “ that section 229 (which corresponds toour section 327) gives a special jurisdiction only in those cases in whichthe value of the property claimed is not at the date of the claim in excessof the ordinary power or the. pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of theCourt that passes the decree.” The only question in that case waswhether the matter was beyond the monetary limits of the Court’sjurisdiction. In the case of Sithalakshmi v. Vythilinga2 the majorityof the Court appear to have been disposed to give the section a widerinterpretation and to hold that the words “ in the same manner andwith the like power ” receive their full meaning if they be taken toexpress that the Court has the same power to enforce the attendance ofparties and witnesses as in a regular action. I should have hardlythought it necessary to insert these words in the section for that purposealone, for if a Court be directed to inquire into a matter we must assumethat it would be entitled to exercise in respect of that matter its ordinarypowers of summoning and. examining witnesses. I prefer the view ofthe minority in th<*L case which is in accordance with the view expressedin the earlier Indian case—Muttammal v. Chinnana Gounden (supra), andwhich is in accordance with the view taken by this Court in the two casesreferred to by me.
• As I have already said, if this section is to be. interpreted as I thinkit must be interpreted as meaning that the Court is empowered withinthe limits of its jurisdiction to number and register a complaint as ifit were a plaint and then proceed with the matter in the manner in whichit would have proceeded had it been brought before it in a regular action,t it follows necessarily that the jurisdiction of the Court remains exactlywhere it was before section 327 was enacted and that if in any instancethe matter of the claim is proved to be outside the limits of that juris-diction whether the limits be monetary, local or otherwise, the Courthas not the jurisdiction to determine the claim.-
We were invited by counsel to refer this case to a full bench with aview to the reconsideration of the law as laid down in Silva v. de Mel (supra)
I am not prepared to take this course. Whatever decision be taken bythis Court on the point, there are other difficulties which can onlyadequately be dealt with by legislation.
For these reasons I think that the judgment under appeal must beaffirmed. The appeal is dismissed with costs
Maartensz A.J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
11. L. R. 4 Mad. 220.
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 548.