037-NLR-NLR-V-46-NALLIAH-v.-THE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.pdf
DE KBETSKB J.—Nalliah v. The Attorney-General.
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1949Present: de Kretser J.
NALLIAH v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
In re Application for Bail in M. C. Jaffna, No. 3,674.
Bail—Indictment for murder—Application for bail—Prisoner not brought totrial owing to postponements on application by Counsel for defence—Courts Ordinance, s. SI.
The accused, -who was indicted for murder with another, could not bebrought to trial at the first Criminal Sessions after the date of his commit-ment owing to postponements allowed on three occasions on theapplications of one or other of the accused's Counsel.
Held, (on an application for bail under section 31 Of the CourtsOrdinance), that the accused was not entitled to bail.
fjl HIS was an application for bail.
S.Nadesan in support.
T.S. Fernando, C.C., for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 6, 1944, de Kbetser J.—
The applicant is charged with the offence of murder and a prisonerin such circumstances is not ordinarily admitted to bail.
The first sessions at which the prisoner might have been tried openedin July, 1944, and this case was set down for trial on July 18. On thatdate the trial had to be postponed as another trial which began earlierwas still proceeding. The case was, therefore, postponed for September 4.That date did not suit Counsel for the applicant who, at some unspecifieddate, intimated this fact to Crown Counsel, who thereupon, obligedCounsel for the defence by fixing it for September 21. It is not disclosedwhy September 4, a date fixed on July 18, was found to be inconvenientfor Counsel for the defence. It is well known that Crown Counsel go toextraordinary lengths in obliging brother Counsel, sometimes to lengthsto which they should not go. The case was postponed on September 4to September 21, and that did not suit Counsel for the applicant again.It was then postponed for October 9 on which date counsel for the secondaccused sent a medical certificate stating that he was unable to appear.The result was that the sessions closed on October 14 and this casehad to stand over for the next sessions.
The present application is made under section 31 of the Courts Ordinancewhich requires that the prisoner shall be brought to trial at the firstcriminal sessions after the date of his commitment at which suchprisoner might properly be tried. It is not suggested that the prisonersmight not properly have been tried on the various dates given. CrownCounsel argues that “ properly be tried ” means “ be tried provided no otherwork is interfering. ” It is not necessary to decide this point, but I wouldnot give the words “ properly be tried ” such a – narrow significance.However, the section goes on to say that the prisoner should be admittedto bail, unless good cause is shown to the contrary, or unless the trialshall have been postponed on the application of the prisoner. The
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KEUNEMAN JPabilU Appuhamy and Petris.
circumstances which I have detailed furnish sufficient good cause to-the contrary, and the alternative also applies as the trial was postponedon three occasions on the application of one or other of the prisoners''Counsel, who obviously were making those applications in the interestsof the prisoners.
Applicant’s Counsel stresses the singular, “ such prisoner ”, but in-view of the Interpretation Ordinance it must be taken to mean ” suchprisoners ”, and since the trial could not proceed with each accusedindependently, any application made on behalf -of' one prisoner led-necessarily to a postponement of the whole trial. I think the alt-emative-also, therefore, applies. The application is therefore, refused.
Application rejustd.