L. DE S. A. GUNASEKARA, Appellant, and THE QUEEN, Respondent

096-NLR-NLR-V-70-L.-DE-S.-A.-GUNASEKARA-Appellant-and-THE-QUEEN-Respondent.pdf


Gunasekara v. The Queen
457
1967Present: H. N. G. Fernando, C.J., and Alles, J.L. DES. A. GUNASEKARA, Appellant, and THE QUEEN, RespondentS. C. 6j67—I).Colombo, 21 j Bribery
Bribery Act (Cap. 26)—Sections 14 and 20—*' In his capacity as a Member of Parlia-ment “ Procuring any grant or benefit for another person ”—Meaning of
words “ procure ”, “ grant ” and “ benefit ”.
The accused-appellant va9 charged on three counts. On the first count hewas charged under s. 14 of the Bribery Act with having accepted, in his capacityas a Member of Parliament, a gratification of Rs. 3,000 as an inducement orreward for doing a certain act, namely, procuring for one Dharmasena alicence for the sale of liquor. Count No. 2 charged the appellant under s. 20 ofthe Bribery Act w'ith having accepted the said sum as an inducement or rewardfor procuring for Dharmasena a grant from the Government, namely, a grant ofa licence for the sale of liquor. The third count was an alternative to count 2,that he accepted the gratification as an inducement or reward for procuring forDharmasena a benefit from the Government, namely, a licence for the sale ofliquor, in breach of s. 20 of .the Bribery Act.
The evidence established the fact that the accused solicited a gratification ofRs. 3,000 from Dharmasena on a promise that he would get the licence issued toDharmasena, and on the pretext that the money was to be given as a bribe tothe Minister for Home Affairs for the issuing of the licence. The Minister,whose evidence was believed in toto by the trial Judge, testified that theaccused, as a Member of Parliament of the Government Party, had direct accessto him and often saw him in his office on various matters. He said also thatMembers of Parliament often mention to him such matters as applications forliquor licences, but that such matters would not be matters of record. Hestated that the only reason urged by the accused in connection with the appli-cation of a man from Eheliyagoda for a liquor licence was that the man hadbeen a strong supporter of the accused at his election. That reason hadnothing to do with the accused’s constituency or with the interests of goodGovernment. Further, the Minister denied that he had requested or taken anymoney from the accused in connection with the matter of an application for aIi quor licence.
Held, (i) that the evidence failed to establish one element required by s. 14 ofthe Bribery Act, viz., that the gratification was accepted as an inducementfor the accused doing an act in hie capacity as a Member of Parliament. Theundertaking that the accused would get a liquor licence for Dharmasena wrasnot an undertaking to do any act in his capacity as a Member of Parliament.
that the word “ procure ” in s. 20 of the Bribery Act means obtaining foranother person by one’s care or efforts.
that s. 20 (1) (a) (vi) of the Bribery Act does not refer only to a grant ofsome proprietary right or interest enjoyed by the Crown. The expression“ grant or benefit " in this context must be widely construed. Further, theoperative word is the word “ benefit ”, the ordinary wide meaning of which isnot narrowed by its association with the words “ grant ” or ‘‘ lease ” whichprecede it.
j.xx—20
14716 (6 '88)
458
H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—-Q-utuisckara v. The Queen
,^^.PPEAL from a judgment of the District Court, Colombo.
G. E. Chitty, Q.C., with P. Nagendran, V. E. Selva rajah and Gam iniDissanayake, for Accused-Appellant.
Vincent T. Thantotherant, Deputy Solicitor-General, Math lianjithGoonetillake, Crown Counsel, for the Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 20, 1967. H. N. G. Fernando, C.J.—
The appellant in this case, who at the relevant time was a Member ofParliament, was charged on three counts : first that he did accept fromone Dharmasena a gratification of Rs. 3,000 as an inducement or rewardfor doing an act in his capacity as a Member of Parliament, to wit,procuring for Dharmasena a licence for the sale of liquor and that hothereby committed an offence punishable under section 14 of the BriberyAct. The second count charged the appellant with accepting the saidsum from Dharmasena as an inducement or reward for liis procuringfor Dharmasena a grant from the Government, to wit, a grant of alicence for the sale of liquor and that he thereby committed an offencepunishable under section 20 of the Bribery Act. The third count wasan alternative to count 2, that he accepted the gratification as an induce-ment or reward for procuring for Dharmasena a benefit from the Govern-ment, to wit, a licence for the sale of liquor and he thereby committed anoffence punishable under section 20 of the Bribery Act.
In order to examine the arguments of Counsel at the appeal, it isnecessary to refer to some of tho relevant evidence much of which consistsof Dharmasena’s testimony. Dharmasena desired to obtain a licencefor the sale of liquor at a hotel run by him at Eheliyagoda and he made anapplication to the Government Agent, Ratnapura. His application wasnot successful, and he apparently was told that he could get a liquorlicence if he made contact with a Government Member of Parliamentfor that purpose. Presumably because Dharmasena did not know anM.P., he requested the help of one Rajapakse, Mho introduced him to hisbrother-in-laMr Harischandra, said to be a friend of this Accused, M'howas then the M.P. for KalaM-ana. Dharmasena, Rajapakse and Haris-chandra visited the Accused—at his house in Ratnapura and spoke tohim there. According to Dharmasena he asked the Accused to obtaina licence for him, and the -Accused said that he Mrould first speak to theCommissioner of Excise about the matter. The next Meek the samethree people again met the Accused at his house, and Dharmasena wasthen told to come on a subsequent occasion to Sravasti, tho hostel inColombo for Members of Parliament. He took a written application in
H. N. G. FERNANDO. C.J.—Gunasekara v. The Queen459
the name of his brother to Sravasti and he met the Accused. Thereafterthe Accused accompanied him to the office of the Commissioner ofExcise. After going into the office, the Accused returned and statedthat he had handed the application to the Commissioner, that it would besent to the Minister, and that, after the Minister signed, Dharmasenawould get the licence. On the same occasion the party went to the HomeMinistry after the Accused had telephoned the Minister, and the Accusedwas in the Ministry for half an hour. On his return the Accused statedthat he spoke to the Minister and that Dharmasena will get the licence.
Subsequently, Dharmasena apparently offered to pay Rs. 10,000 orRs. 5,000 to the Accused when he got the licence, but the Accused saidthat he did not want any money. Thereafter, however, at anothermeeting the Accused said “ that money had to be given before the workis done and the Minister will not do it without accepting the money”.The Accused wanted the money to be given to him for him to pay it tothe Minister. At this stage Dharmasena agreed to pay Rs. 3,000 andto pay a further sum of Rs. 2,000 after obtaining the licence. TheAccused had said that the Minister had wanted Rs. 5.000 down andRs. 5,000 sometime later.
Dharmasena made arrangements to raise the money by sale of his landto one Suwanda for Rs. 6,000. Suwanda himself had to withdraw themoney from the General Post Office. On the 24th of October 1962Dharmasena, Rajapakse and Suwanda met the Accused at Sravastiwith the appropriate form for the withdrawal of Rs. 6,000 from the PostOffice Savings Bank. The Accused had. according to an officer of thePostal Department, identified Suwanda and requested that officerto expedite the withdrawal and this was accordingly done.
Tho party thereafter went to the Home Ministry and outside the officeDharmasena handed Rs. 3,000 in cash to the accused. The Accusedentered the Ministry and on his return said that Dharmasena will get thelicence very soon.
The evidence thus far recited is corroborated in ample respects byRajapakse and Suwanda, particularly in regard to the fact that theaccused asked for the money outside the Home IVIinistry and then wentinto the Ministry. The prosecution produced at the trial the con-veyance of Dharmasena’s land to Suwanda, and it was established thatwhen this deed was signed on 25th October 1962 the vendor acknowledgedthat a part consideration of Rs. 3.000 had already been paid.
Dharmasena did not get his liquor licence despite frequent calls on theAccused, and ultimately the Accused delivered to him at Sravasti on 10thApril 1963 a cheque for Rs. 3,000 bearing the same date. On thatoccasion the Accused told Dharmasena not to credit his cheque becausehe had no money in the Bank, that he gave the cheque only becauseDharmasena did not trust him, and that somehow or other he will get the
460H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—Ghmaaekara v. The Queen
licence for Dharmasena. That the cheque was given as a sort of securityis confirmed, by the fact that the cheque was not presented until verymuch later.
There was no explanation from the defence of the fact that a chequefor Rs. 3,000 drawn by the Accused to bearer had been presented byDharmasena for payment through his bank. There was nothing in theevidence to indicate any business transaction between the two men andnothing to contradict the version that the cheque was given either for thepurpose of repaying the Rs. 3,000 given to the Accused on 25th April1962, or as a sort of security for the keeping of the Accused’s promise toobtain a liquor licence for Dharmasena.
The then Minister of Home Affairs gave evidence at the trial.According to him, the Accused saw him sometime in 1962 and requestedhim to issue a licence to run a liquor bar to a person said to bo fromEheliyagoda who was a supporter of the Accused. The Minister in replysaid that no liquor licences were being issued pending a Cabinet decisionand that the application could be made after that decision.
It is relevant to note certain other evidence given by the formerMinister. As a Member of Parliament of the Government Party, theAccused had direct access to the Minister and often saw him in his officeon various matters. He said also that other Members of Parliamentoften mention to him such matters as applications for liquor licences, butthat such matters would not be matters of record. Further, the Ministerdenied that he had requested or taken any money from the Accused inconnection with the matter of an application for a liquor licence. Thetrial Judge accepted in toto the evidence of the Minister.
Counsel has complained, perhaps rightly, that the judgment of tiielearned District Judge contains a mere narrative of the evidence, andlittle or no statement of reasons. But it is clear to me that it wouldhave been unreasonable to reject the substantial allegations in theevidence of Dharmasena, which were corroborated in important respectsby other witnesses and in one respect by the Minister. The absence of anyexplanation for the payment into Dharmasena’s account of a cheque forRs. 3,000 drawn by the Accused fortifies Dharmasena’s testimony. TheDefence could make no reasonable suggestion as to why Dharmasena,Suwanda and Rajapakse should have implicated the accused falsely inan offence of an unusually grave nature. The evidence established thefact that the Accused solicited a gratification of Rs. 3,000 from Dharma-sena on a promise that he would get the licence issued to Dharmasena,and on the pretext that the money was to be given as a bribe to theMinister for the issuing of the licence.
Counsel for the Accused in appeal has argued that the facts of this casedo not establish one element required by s. 14 of the Bribery act, viz.that the gratification was accepted as an inducement for the Accuseddoing an act in his capacity as a Member of Parliament. In considering
H. N. G. FERNANDO, O.J.—Q^nasekara v. The Queen
461
this argument, I have derived valuable and sufficient assistance from thejudgment of Viscount Radcliffe in the case of Attorney-General v. de Livera 1and it is useful to cite freely from that judgment:—
“It would be misleading therefore to confine the idea of a
member’s capacity entirely within the limit of those activities whichthe written Constitution specifically notices as falling within hisconstitutional function, in effect the sole activity of voting uponmotions or resolutions of his Chamber. The Standing Ordersthemselves envisage a wider range of action as appropriate to anindividual member, as, for instance, the presentation of petitions tothe Chamber, the institution of motions and the putting of questionsfor answer by the Prime Minister, Minister or Parliamentary Secretary.All these specific activities are certainly tied to what takes place inproceedings on the floor of the House : but Their Lordships are satisfiedthat in determining what a member does in his “ capacity as such ”within the meaning of those words in the Bribery Act the answer mustbe found in what can be learnt of the constitutional conventions andpractices of the day rather than by exclusive reference to the wordingof the Constitution or the Standing Orders of the House or any similardocument.”
* * * *
“They recognise that there are many things which a member
may be invited to do because he is a member and enjoys as such astatus and prestige which supply the motive of the invitation but indoing which he would not be acting in his capacity as a member. But,with this recognition made, they are of opinion that the circumstancesof any particular case may show that in the light of prevailing practicesor conventions observed by members of the House some act for whichan inducement has been offered is sufficiently closely bound up withand analogous to a proceeding in the House as to be properly describedas done by a member in his capacity as such.”
In Livera's case an offer of a bribe was made to the then Member ofParliament for Chilaw in the following circumstances. The M. P. hadstrongly recommended in writing the acquisition of an estate for aliena-tion to persons of certain villages in his constituency who had beendisplaced from their homes as a result of floods. The Minister there-upon directed the Land Commissioner that the M. P. had asked for theestate for alienation and that acquisition proceedings should be takenimmediately. When Livera, the owner of the estate, interviewed theGovernment Agent with the object of stopping the acquisition, theGovernment Agent referred Livera to the M. P. There was evidencefrom the Land Commissioner that it was the practice to consult theM. P. of the area before acquiring land for alienation. In these circum-stances it is perfectly clear that when Livera approached the M. P. with
» (1962) 64 N. L. R. 409.
—R 14715 (8/68)
402
H. If. G. FERNANDO^ C.J.—Qunaaekara v. The Queen
faia request for the cancellation of the acquisition, he approached a personwho according to the prevailing practice could well have secured thecancellation by a request made in that behalf in his capacity as the M. P.for Chilaw. On these proved facts their Lordships were able to holdthus :
“ Where the facts show clearly, as they do here, that a Member ofParliament has come into or been brought into a matter of Govern-ment action that affects his constituency, that his intervention isattributable to his membership and that it is the recognised andprevailing practice that the Government Department concerned shouldconsult the local M. P. and invite his views, Their Lordships thinkthat the action that he takes in approaching the Minister or hisDepartment is taken by him ‘ in his capacity as such Member ’within the meaning of Section 14 (a) of the Bribery Act.”
Having regard to the earlier statement in the judgment of ViscountRadcliffe that “ the circumstances of any particular case may show that
some act for which an inducement has been offered is sufficiently
closely bound up with and analogous to a proceeding in the House as tobe properly described as done by a member in his capacity as such ”,Their Lordships in fact decided that the function of the M. P. for Chilawin such a matter as the acquisition of land in his constituency foralienation was analogous to a proceeding in the House. Although TheirLordships did not explain precisely where the analogy lay, it is safe toassume that in their opinion the part played by the Member of Parlia-ment in connection with such a decision was merely an alternative toraising by way of question or motion in Parliament a matter of generalimportance to his constituency. Their Lordships were however carefulto emphasize the distinction between something done by a member ofParliament merely because he is a member, and something done by himin his capacity as a member. This matter is referred to in the followingpassage :—
"It is plain from this account that Mr. Munasinghe played adominating part in the proposal to acquire the Vincent Estate for theaccommodation of the flood victims in the Chilaw District. It was hewho initiated the proposal by his letter to the Minister of Lands andLand Development dated 28th October 1958. He might indeed havetaken this step from more than one standpoint of his personal positionas a prominent local man, as an active politician, general secretary ofthe Sri Lanka Freedom Party, even perhaps as Chief Government Whip.In fact, however, it is to be noted that his letter was headed c House ofRepresentatives ’ and his signature at the foot had added to it thewords ‘ M. P. Chilaw *. ” I
I can see no resemblance between the facts established in Liver a'8case, and those proved in the instant case. There is no question that inLivera’s case the Minister ordered the acquisition only because he approved
H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—Ounasekara v. The Queen
463
a request for acquisition formally made by the Member of Parliamentfor Chilaw who signed as such. The member must according to the practicebe consulted before the acquisition ; that being so, his direct request forthe acquisition was at least equivalent to and in fact more effectivethan his being consulted by the Land Commissioner on a proposal mootedby someone else. Their Lordships were confidently able to reject thealternative possibilities that the Member of Parliament in that case wasmerely acting by virtue of his personal prominence or influence. Forpresent purposes it is sufficient to note that they were thus able to rejectthe alternative that the member was merely attempting to exploit hisinfluence as a member of the Government Party. That alternative Iam quite unable to reject in the case of this accused. According to theevidence of the Minister, the only reason urged by this Accused inconnection with the application of a man from Eheliyagoda for a liquorlicence, was that the man had been a strong supporter of the Accusedat his election. That reason had nothing to do with the Accused’sconstituency or with the interests of good Government. Dharmasenahimself must have realized that no such interests were involved in thematter of his application for a liquor licence.
In the concluding paragraphs of the judgment in Livera’s case, TheirLordships referred to three distinct matters which established that themember in that case was acting in his capacity as such member : firstly,that the member is brought into a matter of Government action thataffects his constituency ; secondly, that his intervention is attributableto his membership ; and thirdly, that it is the recognised and prevailingpractice that the department concerned should consult the local M. P.on the matter involved. The evidence in the instant case fails toestablish to any extent whatsoever any of these characteristics whichserve to bring a member’s action within the scope of s. 14 of the Act.
The learned trial Judge does not appear to have realized the importanceof this particular element of s. 14 which I have thus far discussed. Thereis therefore nothing in the judgment which needs to be considered inthis connection. I would hold that the undertaking that the accusedwould get a liquor licence for Dharmasena was not an undertaking todo any act in his capacity as a Member of Parliament. The convictionand sentence on the first count of the indictment is therefore quashed andthe accused is acquitted of the charge stated in that count.
The arguments relating to the second and third counts were threefold.Mr. Chitty’s first contention was that the prosecution had not proved thatthe accused accepted a gratification for his “ ‘procuring any grant or anybenefit from the Government ” for Dharmasena. One ground of thisargument was that in s. 20, the word “ procure ” does not mean merelygetting or obtaining, but involves an element of control or authority in thematter of getting or obtaining a grant or relief. In other words, merelymaking a request that something be granted is not “ procuring ”, unlessthe person making the request has because of some special capacity or
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H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—Ounasekara v. The Queen
interest a function to perform in connection with the decision whetheror not the request is to be granted. Mr. Chitty was unable to refer to anyactual instances where, under the law or practice now prevailing in regardto the transaction of Government business, a person might have such afunction to perform. Instead he thought that perhaps the Legislaturewhen referring in several paragraphs of s. 20 to “ procuring ” or“ preventing ” various matters was merely legislating in anticipation ofthe establishment in the future of certain somewhat unusual Governmentprocedures.
I am unable to agree that any such special connotation attaches to theword “ procure ” when used in s. 20, or that the word has any meaningdifferent from its ordinary Dictionary meaning “ to bring about by careor pains ” or “ to obtain by care or effort ”.
In the present case, the evidence as accepted by the trial Judge is thatin the first instance, the accused, after interviewing or pretending tointerview the Excise Commissioner and the Minister, told Dharmasena“ I will get you the licence This was a simple assurance to Dharma-sena that the licence would be granted because the accused made a requestin that behalf to the two officials concerned. Had the licence then beenissued, undoubtedly it would have been correct to say that the licencewas obtained for Dharmasena by the care or effort of the Accused.
At a later stage, the accused informed Dharmasena that a furthereffort was necossary, viz., that a sum of Rs. 5,000 must be paid to theMinister, and that thereupon the Minister would issue a licence. Evenin April 1963 when the Accused gave his cheque to Dharmasena he stillmaintained “ somehow or other I will get you the licence ”. Mr. Chittyargued that the fact that the money was given by Dharmasena to satisfythe Minister showed that what the Accused at this stage undertook to dowas only to act as a sort of messenger in delivering the money to theMinister ; further that since the Minister might fail to grant the licencein his discretion there was no undertaking by the Accused to procure sucha licenoe.
It is in my opinion misleading to take too much account of the accused’sfalse statement that he was going to bribe the Minister. In fact he tookthe money for himself and the learned trial Judge found with much justi-fication that Dharmasena knew this all the time. That being so, Dharma-sena was relying, not on a decision of the Minister which might or mightnot be favourable to him, but instead on the Accused’s frequentprotestations that he will get the licence for Dharmasena.
Let me suppose that the Accused had nothing to do with Dharmasena,and that Dharmasena himself had made his application, interviewed theExcise Commissioner and the Minister, and had even (I say this for thesake of argument only) paid some money to the Minister or someone of theMinistry, and had then been granted his licence. In those circumstancessurely it would be correct to say that Dharmasena “ procured the lioenoe
H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.-mOunasekara v. The Queen
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for himself”. When in fact the Accused undertook to make all thesenecessary efforts, he was agreeing to procure the licence, and if havingmade the efforts, the licence was in fact granted, it -would have been aperfectly correct statement of fact to say that the accused had procuredthe licence for Dharmasena.
In my opinion the expression “ procuring a grant or relief for anotherperson ” in s. 20 means obtaining it for another person by one’s care orefforts.
Mr. Chitty urged that the accused only undertook to assist Dharmasenato obtain the licence, and that therefore the correct charge if any shouldhave been one of accepting the gratification as an inducement “ forfurthering the procuring of a grant or benefit He argued that whenthe taker of the gratification has no power or control in the matter of thegiving the contemplated grant or benefit, he does no more than “ furtherthe procuring My reasons have already been stated for the conclusionthat, according to the evidence in this case, the Accused undertook todo much more than to assist Dharmasena ; the language in which theundertaking was expressed (vide the summary in the early part of thisjudgment) definitely establishes that Dharmasena was assured that theaccused would get the licence for him.
Moreover I do not agree that the distinction between an undertakingto procure something, and an undertaking to further the procuring ofsomething, depends on the question whether or not the undertaker hasa control over the matter of the conferment of the thing. A person willproperly be said to “ further a procuring ” if what he undertakes to do issomething short of actually obtaining the grant or benefit. A charge of“ furthering ” would have been appropriate if for instance the Accusedhad only said that he would speak to the Minister or that he would deliverDharmasena’s application to the Commissioner of Excise. Similarly itwould be a case of only furthering the procurement of employment if aperson merely agrees to recommend another for employment without anassurance that the employment would actually be obtained. No doubtthe conduct of the accused in this case rendered him guilty of accepting aninducement for furthering the procuring of a licence for Dharmasena.But since he in fact undertook “ to get the licence ” he also committedthe offence of accepting a gratification as an inducement for procuring thelicence.
Mr. Chitty’s second objection to counts 2 and 3 was that a liquor licenceis not a grant or a benefit contemplated in paragraph (vi) of section 20 ofthe Act. He relied in this connection on the English Case of Heap v.Hartley 1 in which a distinction was drawn between a grant and a licence.That case -was not one which called for consideration of a statutoryprovision like s. 20 (1) (a) (vi) of the Bribery Act, which refers to theprocuring of “any grant or benefit from the Government”. Even
1 42 Chancery Division, p. 461.
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H. N. G. FERNANDO, C-J-—Gunaaekctra v. The Queen
if it be correct that in English Property Law, the word “ grant,rordinarily connotes the surrender or transfer by the grant or of somethingpreviously ovmed or enjoyed by the grantor, I am unable to agree thatthe word was intended in our Bribery Act to have that same specialconnotation. The word “ grant ” with its grammatical variations, occursin our Statute Law in the Excise Ordinance itself in connection withthe issue of liquor licences, in the Citizenship Act in connection with theconferment of the status of citizenship, and in the Royal Letters Potentin reference to the Prerogative of Pardon. There are I am sureother provisions of our Statute Law in which the word is issued incontexts in which there is not involved any question of the surrenderor transfer by the Crown or the Government of any right to property orany right having a direct financial value.
The contention that the Legislature intended, in s. 20 (1) (a) (vi), torefer only to a grant of some proprietary right or interest enjoyed by theCrown, is with respect contrary to common sense. The contention isbased on the supposition that the Legislature was, in enacting paragraph
of s. 20, concerned only to prevent and punish corruption in thematter of the surrender or transfer of property or of rights enjoyed by theCrown or the Government. Any such supposition is negatived whenaccount is taken of the purpose of the Legislature as evidenced in theBribery Act. Sections 14 to 19 of the Act, speaking generally, are designedagainst the taking or offering of gratifications by or to “ officials ”, inconnection with acts which are either official acts or done or to be done inan official capacity. The benefits or favours or advantages in considera-tion of the obtaining or giving of which bribery is penalised by thosesections are varied and even multitudinous. Those sections are followedby s. 20, which is not restricted to and does not even refer to, the offeringor taking of gratifications to or by public officers ; any person who acceptsa gratification as an inducement for procuring employment under theGovernment or a public Corporation, or for procuring a grant or benefitfrom the Government or such a Corporation is guilty of bribery. In thisway s. 20 is designed to punish those who use the advantage of personalor family position for the actual or pretended purpose of influencing thecommission by “ officials ” of offences under other sections of the Act.It is obvious that if ordinary citizens are deterred from using their positionin that way, there is less likelihood that “ officials ” can be bribed. Again,although it may be very difficult to prove a direct act of bribery by or toan “ official ”, it may be well easy to prove the taking of a gratification bya person who is only an actual or pretended intermediary. I am satisfiedthat the Legislature intended as far as possible to prevent or punish evenordinary citizens who accept gratifications as inducements to influencepublic officials with a view to acting or not acting in a particular way inthe discharge of the official functions. Common sense therefore requiresthat in paragraph (vi) of s. 20 the expression " grant or benefit ” mustbe widely construed.
4*7
RamancUhan v. Perera
•
Mr. Chitty rightly pointed out that since counts 2 and 3 were in thealternative, the accused should not have been convicted on both thosecounts. I have stated my reasons for the opinion that the term “ grant ”in paragraph (vi) does not bear the special meaning contended for byMr. Chitty. But even if the correctness of that opinion be doubtful, theissue of a licence is quite clearly a benefit referred to in that paragraph.I accept the submission of the learned Deputy Solicitor-General that theoperative word in paragraph (vi) is the word “ benefit ”, and that itsordinary wide meaning is not narrowed by its association with the words“ grant ” or “ lease ” which precede it. Since therefore the counts wereframed in the alternative, I would set aside the conviction and sentenceon count 2, and affirm the conviction on count 3, and impose on theAccused on that count a sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment.
Axles, J.—I agree.
Convictions on counts 1 and 2 set aside.Conviction on count 3 affirmed.