034-SLLR-SLLR-1993-2-IBRAHIM-RAHUMATHUMA-v.-PEOPLES-BANK-AND-OTHER.pdf
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Ibrahim Rahumathuma v. Peoples Bank and Other
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IBRAHIM RAHUMATHUMA
v.PEOPLES BANK AND OTHER
COURT OF APPEALS. N. SILVA J.
C. A. APPLICATION NO. 1187/85.
FEBRUARY 21. DECEMBER 03 AND 12. 1991, May 13 AND July 23, 1992.
Certiorari and Prohibition – Conditional Transfer – Lapse of terminal date forretransfer – application for Acquisition by Bank – Applicability of time limit topending applications to the Bank introduced by Act No. 19 of 1984 certified on02 May 1984 amending Finance Act No. 11 of 1963 – Sections 71, 71(2) 71(2)sub paragraph (aa) of Finance Act – Reprospective operation of amending act- Rule of literal Construction.
The 3rd respondent executed a conditional transfer of the land and premisesdescribed in the schedule to the petition to the petitioner subject to the rightto obtain a re-transfer on re-payment of the consideration with interest in twoyears. The deed was executed on 12.01.1964 and the time limit for obtainingthe re-transfer ended on 12.01.1966. The 3rd respondent defaulted and thepetitioner sued her in D. C. 803/L Kalmunai for declaration of title and ejectmentand obtained judgment which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 18.7.1985.
While the appeal to the Court of Appeal was pending, the 3rd respondent on10.7.1979 applied to the Peoples Bank for acquisition by the Bank of the landand premises in question. The Act No. 19 of 1984 amending the Finance Actnewly introduced a time limit of ten years from the date of expiry of the timelimit fixed in the deed, for such applications to the Bank. Hence such periodof ten years lapsed on 12.01.1976 with the amending Act of 1984 fixing the timebar of ten years applying reprospectively to pending applications made after tenyears from the date of expiry of the period for obtaining the retransfer.
Held :
Although the amendment made by the Finance Act No 19 of 1984 tothe Finance Act No. 11 of 1963 (as amended by Law No. 16 of 1973)introduced subparagraph (aa) to section 71 (2), as a fetter on the jurisdictionof the Bank to acquire premises, the subparagraph in effect operates asa time bar, within which an application for acquisition may be made bya person seeking relief from the Bank.
The proper focus of section 71(2)(aa), as amended, is not to the timeat which a decision is made by the Bank for acquisition but to the timeat which an application is made by a person seeking such acquisition.
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The provisions of section 71(2)(aa) introducing the time bar will apply inrespect of any application that is made to the Bank for acquisition after02.5.1984 being the date on which the amending Act No. 19 of 1984came into force. However, the period of time that has lapsed prior to theamendment coming into force will be taken into account in computing thetime bar in respect of such applications.
The provisions of section 71(2)(aa) will not apply in relation to anyapplication made prior to 2nd May 1984 in respect of which no decisionhad been made by the Bank for acquisition as at that date.
Per S. N. Silva J.
"the new paragraph (aa) has been inserted to an existing provision
which deals with a variety of matters that have to be satisfied as pre-requisitesto the exercise of jurisdiction of the Bank to acquire land and premises inrespect of which an application is made. These pre-requisites range from adescription of the applicant, his income, the extent of other land owned byhim in the case of agricultural premises and whether the present owner isin occupation of the premises to be acquired, in the case of residentialpremises. I have to observe that the insertion of a time bar into an existingprovision dealing with such a wide array of matters, some of which have tobe necessarily considered at an inquiry on material adduced by the otherparty, is most inappropriate. Ordinarily a time bar is placed as fettering theright of an applicant or a party instituting proceedings."
2." There are two main aspects of (this definition of a
retrospective statute). The first is-in relation to vested rights acquired underexisting law, that is taken away or impaired by the retrospective statute. Herewe are not concerned with this aspect, since limitation of time within whicha proceeding may be instituted is a matter of procedure and no vested rightmay ordinarily be acquired in relation to procedure. The second aspect dealswith transactions or considerations already past. A retrospective statute, attactsa new obligation or new duty or new disability, in respect of such pasttransactions or considerations ".
Cases referred to :
Supramaniam Chettiar v. Wahid 58 NLR 140.
R. V. Inhabitants of Christ Church (1848) 12 QB 149.
Premasiri v. University of Sri Lanka 78 NLR 505.
Application for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
Faiz Mustapha, P. C. with H. Withanachchi for petitioner.
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N. R. M. Daluwatte, P. C. with Miss S. Abeyjeewa for 1st and 2nd respondents.
S.Mahenthiran for 3rd respondent.
Cur.adv.vult.
October 02, 1992.
S. N. SILVA J.
The 3rd respondent to this application transferred the land andpremises described in the schedule to the petition, to the Petitionerupon deed 5977 dated 12-01-1964 attested by Mr. K. Thambapillai,Notary Public. The transfer was subject to a condition that if theconsideration with interest is repaid within a specified period, thePetitioner will re-transfer the land to the 3rd Respondent (conditionaltransfer). The 3rd Respondent defaulted in making payment on theconditional transfer and the Petitioner filed action in District CourtKalmunai (case number 803/L) for declaration of title and possession.Decree was entered in favour of the Petitioner which was affirmedby this Court in appeal on 18-07-1985. Whilst the appeal was pending,the 3rd Respondent made an application to the 1st Respondent(Peoples Bank) that the premises be acquired by the Bank in termsof section 71 of the Finance Act No. 11 of 1963 as amended byLaw No. 16 of 1973. When the inquiry into the application was pendingbefore the Bank, the Finance Act was further amended by Act No.19 of 1984 which was certified on 2-5-1984. By this Act, section 71(2)was amended by the addition, inter alia of, subparagraph (aa) whichprovides that no premises shall be acquired by the Bank unless anapplication for such acquisition is made within ten years of certainoperative dates (time bar). In relation to a conditional transfer theoperative date is the date of expiry of the period within which aretransfer may be secured upon payment. According to deed No. 5977a retransfer may have been secured within two years. Therefore, theoperative date is 12-1-1966 and the period of ten years lapsed on12-1-1976. The application was made by the 3rd respondent to theBank on 10-7-1979. However, as noted above, the amending Act No.19 of 1984 which introduced the time bar of ten years was certifiedon 2-5-1984, when the inquiry was pending.
The application of the 3rd Respondent came for inquiry beforeMr. Rohan Sahabandu, the then Manager of the Land Redemption
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Branch of the Bank, on 16-9-1985. An objection was raised bycounsel appearing at the inquiry for the Petitioner, on the ground thatthe application was not made within the period of ten years statedin the amending Act. Having considered submissions of both counsel,Mr. Sahabandu overruled the objection on the basis that there is nospecific provision in the amending Act that gives it retrospective effectand that the time bar will apply only in relation to applications madeafter the date of certification namely 2-5-1984. He accordingly decidedto proceed with the inquiry. The Petitioner thereupon filed this applicationfor a Writ of Certiorari to quash the said order and for a Writ ofProhibition to restrain the Bank from proceeding to grant relief onthe application of the 3rd Respondent.
The principal issue that comes up for consideration in thisapplication is whether the time bar imposed by the amending ActNo. of 19 of 1984 will affect pending applications made previousto the amending Act coming into operation. The same issue arisesin other applications before this Court and it was submitted that alarge number of applications have been laid by at the Bank pendinga final decision regarding this issue. In the circumstances I permittedcounsel appearing in the other applications as well to make submis-sions on this issue. Accordingly, Mr. S. Sivarasa, Senior Counsel forthe Bank in other applications and Mr. Jayantha Almidea Gunaratnealso made submissions regarding this matter.
Mr. Faiz Musthapa, President's Counsel, appearing for the Peti-tioner submitted that he is not contending that the amending Act of1984 should be given retrospective effect. He submitted that if theamendment is construed prospectively, it will affect pending applica-tions, since the power of the Bank to acquire premises, where theapplication is not made within the period of ten years from any ofthe operative dates is removed with effect from the date of operationof the amendment viz, 2-5-1984. He also submitted that such aconstruction will advance the legislative purpose of the amendmentwhich is to prevent the Bank from acquiring premises upon appli-cations that have become stale. Learned Counsel for the Respondentson the other hand submitted that if such a construction is giventhe amendment will necessarily have retrospective effect since it willdeprive the applicants who made their applications at a time whenthere was no such time bar, from securing relief on their applications.It was submitted that such a construction will result in manifest
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injustice to that class of applicants. Therefore, the amendment shouldnot be held to apply in relation to pending applications in the absenceof express statutory provision to that effect.
The submissions of learned President's Counsel is based on thepremise that the amendment of 1984 introduced the time bar, by wayof an additional subparagraph to section 71(2). Therefore the newsubparagraph (aa) has to be read together with the existing provisionsof section 71(2). When the amendment is inserted to the existingprovisions, the relevant portions of section 71 (2) will read as follows:
" No premises shall be acquired under subsection (1) –
unless an application in that behalf has been made to theBank by the original owner of such premises or, where suchoriginal owner is dead or is of unsound mind or otherwise
incapable of acting by the spouse or;
or
(aa) unless such application is made within ten years –
from the date on which such premises was sold in
execution of a mortgage decree; or
from the date on which such premises were transferredby the original owner of such premises in any of the circum-stances referred to in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of.sub-section (1); or
from the date of the expiry of the specified periodreferred to in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) ;
if an application in that behalf had earlier been made
to the Ceylon State Mortgage Bank under Chapter 5(a)of the Ceylon State Mortgage Bank Ordinance ;
or
unless the Bank is satisfied that the average statutoryincome of the person making the application and of the othermembers of the family computed under the provisions of thewritten law does not exceed a sum of 25,000 Rupees (this sumwas increased from 10,000 by the amending Act of 1984 ; or
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if the Bank is satisfied that the premises to which the
application relates are reasonably required for occupation asa residence for the owner ; or
unless, in the case of an application relating to any ag-
ricultural premises, the Bank is satisfied that the applicant isnot the owner of any other agricultural premises exceeding 10acres in extent
It is thus seen that the new paragraph (aa) has been insertedto an existing provision which deals with a variety of matters thathave to be satisfied as pre-requisites to the exercise of the jurisdictionof the Bank to acquire land and premises in respect of which anapplication is made. These pre-requisites range from a descriptionof the applicant, his income, the extent of other land owned by himin the case of agricultural premises and whether the present owneris in occupation of the premises to be acquired, in the case ofresidential premises. I have to observe that the insertion of a timebar into an existing provision dealing with such a wide array ofmatters, some of which have to be necessarily considered at aninquiry on material adduced by the other party, is most inappropriate.Ordinarily, a time bar is placed as fettering the right of an applicantor a party instituting proceedings. For instance, in the PrescriptionOrdinance, the provisions of sections 5,6,7,8,9 and 10 begin with thewords "no action shall be maintainable". Thereby a party institutingproceedings is precluded from maintaining an action unless the actionis brought within the specified period of time. Similarly section 31(b) (7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amended by Law No. 53of 1973, provides that every application to a Labour Tribunal shallbe made within a period of six months from the date of terminationof the services of a workman. In this instance although subparagraph(aa) has the familiar words "unless such application is made within
", the opening words of subsection (2) read as "no
premises shall be acquired under subsection (1)". It is in view ofthese opening words that have to be read with subparagraph (aa),learned President's Counsel submits that the time bar is simply afetter on the jurisdiction of the Bank to acquire premises and thatit should be applied prospectively to all applications, considered afterthe amendment comes into force, whether or not they have beenmade prior to the amendment. The submission of Counsel forRespondents is that such a construction gives subparagraph (aa)
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retrospective operation, which is not warranted in the absence ofexpress statutory provision to that effect. Thus learned President'sCounsel relies upon the primary rule of interpretation being the ruleof literal construction supported by the legislative purpose in effectingthe amendment whereas learned Counsel for Respondents rely ona specific rule of interpretation that retrospective effect should notbe given unless it is clearly intended by the legislature. Hence, thefirst aspect to be considered is whether the submission of learnedPresident's Counsel results in the amendment of Act No. 19 of 1984introducing subparagraph (aa) to section 71 (2) being given retrospec-tive effect.
The basis rule of interpretation governing the retrospectiveoperation of statutes is stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes(12th Edition page 215) as follows:
"Upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend whatis unjust rests the learning against giving certain statutes aretrospective operation. They are construed as operating only incases or on facts which come into existence after the statuteswere passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. Itis a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall beconstrued to have a retrospective operation unless such aconstruction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arisesby necessary and distinct implication."
The learned Editor of Maxwell has observed that this statementof law has been "so frequently quoted with approval that it now itselfenjoys almost judicial authority". (P 216). Thus an amendment willordinarily apply "in cases or on facts which come into existence afterthe amendment is passed. In this instance, the application of the 3rdRespondent was in existence before the appropriate authority, theBank, before the amendment was passed. Therefore, the amendmentwill not ordinarily operate in relation to it, if the amendment is appliedprospectively.
Learned President's Counsel focussed on the time at which theappropriate authority, the Bank, exercises its jurisdiction. But, theprimary fact in subparagraph (aa) is the date of making the applicationand what has to be considered is whether that date is within tenyears of any of the operative dates. Therefore the proper focus should
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not be to the time at which the appropriate authority, the Bank,exercises its jurisdiction but the time at which the primary fact cameinto existence i.e.., the date on which the application is made. Here,the primary fact was in existence at the time the amendment waspassed. If the rule of interpretation stated in Maxwell is applied,section 71 (2) (aa) will operate only in relation to applications madeafter the amendment No. 19 of 1984 was certified namely 2-5-1984unless retrospective effect to the amendment is clearly intended bythe legislature. Therefore, the submission of learned President's Counselthat if the amendment is construed prospectively it will operate inrelation to applications that are pending, is without basis.
In the preceding paragraph I considered the submission of learnedPresident's Counsel in relation to the rule of prospective operationof statutes and expressed the view that the construction contendedfor by learned Counsel cannot be given if the amendment is appliedprospectively. The fact that learned Counsel is in effect seeking toapply the amendment retrospectively is seen from what is generallyconsidered as the attributes of a retrospective statute. Craies onStatute Law (7th Edition p387) states the attributes of a retrospectivestatute as follows:
" A statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takesaway or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws,or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attachesa new disability in respect to transactions or considerations alreadypast. But a statute is not properly called a retrospective statutebecause a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from atime antecedent to its passing. ”
The foregoing statement of Craies may be considered a usefuldefinition of a retrospective statute. It is also cited in Maxwell (12thEdition p216). There are two main aspects of this definition. The firstis in relation to vested rights acquired under existing law, that is takenaway or impaired by the retrospective statute. Here, we are notconcerned with this aspect, since limitation of time within which aproceeding may be instituted is a matter of procedure and no vestedright may ordinarily be acquired in relation to procedure. The secondaspect deals with transactions or considerations already past. Aretrospective statute, attaches a new obligation or new duty or newdisability, in respect of such past transactions or considerations. In
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this instance, the transaction or consideration, understood in the senseof an event, to which subparagraph (aa) is focussed, is the makingof an application to the Bank. If the submission of learned President'sCounsel is adopted, a new duty is imposed in respect of this pastevent, on the applicant; that he should have made the applicationwithin ten years of the operative date. If it has not been so made,a new disability is attached in respect of that past event for then,the applicant is precluded from obtaining relief on that ground alone.Thus it is seen, that from whatever perspective the submission oflearned President's Counsel is examined, the inescapable inferenceis that, the submission if adopted, results in the amendment beinggiven retrospective effect.
I will now examine the position as to the extent to which newlegislation will ordinarily affect pending proceedings. In the case ofSupramaniam Chettiar vs. Wahid (,) T. S. Fernando J consideredthe question whether the inclusion of section 218(m) to the CivilProcedure Code made by Act No. 20 of 1954 will affect execution,in a proceeding that was pending at the time the amendment waspassed. The amendment exempted from seizure, the salary andallowances of an employee in a shop or office, if such salary andallowances do not exceed Rs. 500/- per mensem. The action waspending at the time the amendment was passed and the original courtruled that the plaintiff had not acquired a right to seize the salaryunder existing law. T. S. Fernando J held that this conclusion waserroneous. He held that the presumption that the legislature intendsa statute to be prospective only, has not been rebutted. On that basis,it was held that the exemption from seizure will not operate in relationto a pending action. T. S. Fernando J cited a passage from Maxwellwhich deals with the effect of alterations in the law in relation topending actions. It is seen that the passage cited by T. S. FernandoJ is modified in the current edition of Maxwell. In the current edition,the effect of alterations in the law in relation to pending actions isdealt with under two limbs. Firstly, in relation to substantive law, theposition is stated as follows (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes,12th Edition at p 220) :
" In general when the substantive law is altered during thependency of an action, the rights of the parties are decidedaccording to the law as it existed when the action was begun,unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights."
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Secondly, as regards procedural statutes the position is stated asfollows (p22) :
" The presumption against retrospective construction has noapplication to amendmends which affect only the procedure andpractice of the courts. No person has a vested right in any courseof procedure. "
" The limitation of time within which a proceeding may be instituted,is generally regarded as a matter of procedure and not of substantivelaw. (Bindra on Interpretation of Statutes. 7th Edition p888). Asobserved by Lord Denman CJ in the case of R vs. Inhabitants ofChrist Church (2)," a statute of limitation or prescription is not classedas retrospective mainly because the space of time which is essentialfor its operation may consist in part of time passed before the statutecomes into force. However, the statute is applied only in respect ofproceedings instituted after it comes into force. This position is madeclear by Bindra in the following passage (p888 & 889) :
" As a rule statutes of limitation being procedural laws mustbe given a retrospective effect in the sense suits filed after theycame into force. “
The word 'retrospective' is used in relation to the period of timethat has lapsed prior to the statute coming into force. This use ofthe word may be inappropriate considering the view expressed byDenman CJ in the case cited above and the definition of a retro-spective statute as given by Craies. Whatever be the word used, theeffect of the new legislation goes only so far as to take into accountthe period of time that has lapsed prior to its coming into force butthe firm view is, that it will be applied only to suits filed after thelegislation comes into force.
Learned author has made a further clarification in the followingform:
" This general rule has got to be read with one importantqualification and that is that if the statute of limitation, if givenretrospective effect, destroys a cause of action which was vestedin a party or makes it impossible for that party for the exerciseof his vested right of action, then the courts would not give
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retrospective effect to the statute of limitation The reason forthis qualification is that it would inflict such hardship and suchinjustice on parties that the courts would hesitate to attribute tothe legislature an intention to do something which was obviouslywrong (p889)
In the case of Premasiri Vs University of Sri Lanka<3> the SupremeCourt held that the period of limitation within which an applicationmay be filed in the Labour Tribunal, as introduced by law No. 53of 1973, will not affect applications that were instituted prior to theamendment coming into force. Learned President's Counsel soughtto distinguish this decision on the basis that section 31 B(7) of theIndustrial Disputes Act introduced by the amendment is worded asa bar to the making of an application and not as a fetter on theexercise of jurisdiction. That, there are also provisions of the amend-ment which support the view that the time bar should be appliedprospectively to applications filed after the amendment comes intoforce. However, as a general proposition of interpretation, the decisionof the Supreme Court is consistent with the views expressed by thelearned authors referred above.
On the basis of the preceding review of the rules of interpretationand the authorities cited, I am of the view, that where legislativeprovision is made introducing a period of limitation within which anapplication may be made or a proceeding instituted, in a court orbefore any other authority, such limitation will apply only in relationto applications made or proceedings instituted after the legislationcomes into force. However, in computing the period of limitation, timethat has lapsed prior to the legislation coming into force, will in theabsence of provision to the contrary, be taken into account. This beingthe general rule of interpretation, the period of limitation introducedby new legislation will be held as affecting proceedings that arepending at the time the legislation comes into force only if thatconsequence is clearly intended by such legislation.
I will now move over to a consideration of the submissions oflearned Counsel with regard to the specific words used in the relevantprovisions. Learned President’s Counsel for the Petitioner submittedthat subparagraph (aa) to section 71(2) introduced by the amendmentNo. 19 of 1984 should be construed as being applicable to pendingapplications in view of the words "unless an application in that behalf
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has been made to the Bank", appearing in sub-paragraph (a). Hesubmitted that the past participle used in subparagraph (a) is carriedover to sub-paragraph (aa) as well, since the words “ such application"are found in subparagraph (aa). Thus it was submitted thatsubparagraph (aa) will apply in relation to an application that hasbeen made, at the time the subparagraph came into force.
In considering these two subparagraphs, it has to be borne inmind that they are linked with a disjunctive "or". Subparagraph (a)gives a description of the persons who may make an application tothe Bank for acquisition. The words “ such application “ are usedin the the new subparagraph (aa) as a method of drafting, toincorporate in subparagraph (aa) the description of persons who maymake an application in terms of subparagraph (a). Subparagraph(aa) uses the words " unless such application is made within ten
years". Therefore, the words " such application " as appearing
in subparagraph (aa) does not have the effect of introducing tosubparagraph (aa) the past participle used in subparagraph (a). I aminclined to accept the submission of learned Counsel for the Respond-ents that the operative tense in subparagraph (aa) is the present tensewhich is specifically used and on a proper grammatical construction,the subparagraph will apply prospectively, to any application that ismade after the amendment comes into force. The words used linsubparagraph (aa) when read in the context of the provisions ofsection 71(2) do not yield to the subparagraph being applied retro-spectively nor does such construction arise by necessary and distinctimplication.
The submission of learned President's Counsel for the Petitioneras regards the legislative object of the amendment is well founded.Undoubtedly, the legislature introduced the amendment with a limi-tation of time within which an application may be made for acquisition,to prevent applications from being made beyond the period of tenyears, of any of the operative dates. However, as submitted by learnedCounsel for the Respondents there was no limitation of time withinwhich an application may have been made prior to the amendmentintroduced by Act No. 19 of 1984. The only limitation was containedin section 71 (1) which authorized the Bank to acquire premises soldin execution of a mortgage decree or transferred in the mannerprovided, not earlier than 01-01-1952. Therefore, I am inclined toagree with the submission of learned Counsel for the Respondents
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that if the construction advanced by learned President’s Counsel forthe Petitioner is given it would cause serious injustice and hardshipto persons who had made applications in.the full belief that therewas no time limit within which such application may be made to theBank. The legislative purpose of introducing a time bar can well beachieved by giving a prospective construction to sub-paragraph (aa)so that it will apply in relation to applications that are made afterthe amending Act No. 19 of 1984 comes into force. Thereby, theinjustice and hardship referred above, could well be avoided.
Submissions of learned Counsel also dealt with certain otheraspects of injustice and hardship that may be caused, if the inter-pretation contended for by learned President's Counsel is given tothe amendment in question. The 3rd Respondent made her appli-cation to the Bank on 10-07-1979, nearly five years before theamendment of 1984 came into force. There was a delay in processingher application and by the time the matter finally came up for inquiry,the amendment of 1984 had come into force. This delay, enabledthe Petitioner to raise the objection of time bar. If the application hadbeen processed expeditiously, a decision to acquire may have beenmade prior to the amendment coming into force. In these circum-stances, it would surely be an injustice, to strike down the applicationof the 3rd Respondent on the basis of a new factor in the form ofan amendment, which came into force during the period of delay,for which the 3rd Respondent was not responsible. On the other hand,if there was another applicant, who was similarly circumstancedas the 3rd Respondent but whose application was expeditiouslyprocessed and a decision made to acquire prior to the amendment;would not such an applicant have an undue advantage over the 3rdRespondent? In my view law should be interpreted so that its applicationwill avoid such injustice and discriminatory treatment amongst per-sons, similarly circumstanced. These matters too, weigh against theinterpretation contended for by learned President's Counsel for thePetitioner.
For the reasons stated above, I hold
(I) that although the amendment made by the Finance Act No.19 of 1984 to the Finance Act No. 11 of 1963 (as amended by LawNo. 16 of 1973) introduced subparagraph (aa) to section 71 (2), as
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a fetter on the jurisdiction of the Bank to acquire premises, thesubparagraph in effect operates as a time bar, within which anapplication for aquisition may be made by a person seeking relieffrom the Bank ;
that the proper focus of section 71(2) (aa), as amended, isnot to the time at which a decision is made by the Bank for acquisitionbut to the time at which an application is made by a person seekingsuch acquisition ;
that the provisions of section 71(2) (aa) introducing the timebar will apply in respect of any application that is made to the Bankfor acquisition after 02-05-1984 being the date on which the amendingAct No. 19 of 1984 came into force. However, the period of timethat has lapsed prior to the amendment coming into force will betaken into account in computing the time bar in respect of suchapplications ;
That the provisions of section 71(2)(aa) will not apply inrelation to any application made prior to 02-05-1984 in respect ofwhich no decision had been made by the Bank for acquisition asat that date.
In view of the foregoing findings I do not see any error in theorder made by the 2nd Respondent and accordingly the applicationof the Petitioner is dismissed. The Petitioner will pay a sum ofRs. 1500/- as costs to the 1st and 2nd Respondents and a sumof Rs. 1000/- as costs to the 3rd Respondent.
Application dismissed