140-NLR-NLR-V-56-DON-CARTHELIS-Appellant-and-B.-D.-IBRAHIM-Sub-Inspector-of-Police-Respond.pdf
ORATZAENJv—Don Oarthciia v. Ibrahim581
1855Present: Graflaen J.D*ON CARTHELIS, Appellant, and B. D. IBRAHIM (Sub.Inspector of Police), Respondent8. C. 370—M. C. Balapitiya, 10,434
Motor Traffic Act, Xo. 11 of 1951—Section 153 (I)—■“ Driving when under the influence
of alcohol.
By section 153 (1) of the Motor Traffic Act—
“ No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway when he is under theinfluence of alcohol or any drug. ”
Hell, that no offence is committed unless the person driving the vohiclo hasbrought himself under the influence of alcohol or drugs-to such an extent thathe cannot safely be entrusted with its comrol while in that condition.
PPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Balapitiya.
K..4. G. de Silva, for the accused appellant.
P.Weerasinghe, Crown-Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
July 19, 195f>. Gratiaen J.—The appellant drove a motor ambulance in which a patient was conveyedfrom the Balapitiya Hospital to the Civil Hospital at Galle on the nightof 12th October, 1954. On the return journey the ambulance knockeddown a pedestrian called Daimon. The injured man was removed inthe samo vehicle to Balapitiya where,: having first reported the accidentto the Police, the appellant took him promptly to the hospital for medicalattention. The appellant was in due course charged with having driventhe ambulance recklessly and dangerously or alternatively in a negligentmaimer so as to cause injury to Daimon. On those charges ho wasacquitted. He was, however, found guilty on another count, whereinhe was alleged to have contravened Section 153 (1) of the Motor TrafficAct, Xo. 14 of 1951, by driving the vehicle on a highway “ under thoinfluence of alcohol ”…'
The ovidenco in support of the' convict ion under Section 153 (1) wasto the effect that the appellant was spelling of liquor when ho arrivedwith the injured pedestrian at . the’Balapitiya Police Station. Thisevidonce was confirmed by the doctor tjdio pronounced that tho appellantwas “ under the influence of liquor . The doctor did not explain whatprecisely he meant by that phrase, Or on what groumls he drow thisinference. On the other hand, it was conceded that tho appellant drovethe vehicle quite competently after tho accident'. Nor is thoro anyevidence from which a Court could fairly conclude that ho was not in afit condition to undertake the responsibility of driving a motor vehiclealong the public highway. 'Can it then be said that, in this state of thoevidence, a contravention of Section 153 (1) was established by the more
582
GRA.TIAEN J.—Don Oarthetia v. Ibrahim
fact that the appellant was undoubtedly smelling of liquor after theaccident and had (on his own admission) partaken of some alcoholicrefreshment at Galle shortly before the accident occurred ?
I understand that Section 153 (1) of the new Act has not previouslyreceived judicial interpretation. Section 60 (2) of the repealed Motor(Jar Ordinance (Cap. 156) penalised, as an aggravated offence, the rocklossor negligent driving of a vehicle when “ under the influence of alcoholor of drugs ”. At that time, a driver, though “ under the influence ofalcohol or of drugs ”, did not commit an offence unless he was in additionproved to have driven the vehicle in his charge dangerously, negligentlyor at an excessive spoed.
Section 153 (1), by way of contrast, penalises driving “ under thoinfluonce of alcohol or drugs ” without proof of dangerous or carelessdriving. This now offence is equated for purposes of punislnneftt toreckless or. dangerous driving (prohibited by sub-section 2) and negligentdriving (prohibited by sub-section 3). In this context, two alternativemeanings of Section 153 (1) may be suggested :
(a) that, as it is medically true to say that a person is in some slightdegree “ influenced ” if he has partaken of even a very smalldose of alcoholic stimulant, Parliament now insists upontotal abstinence from Ceylon motorists ;or (6) that “ under the influence of alcohol or of drugs ” is a relativoterm, and no offence is committed unless the person drivingthe vehicle has brought himself under the influence of alcoholor drugs to such an extent that he cannot safely be entrustedwith its control while in that condition.
In my opinion, the latter interpretation is to be preferred. The corres-ponding legislation in England is quite explicit and Section 15 (1) ofthe Road Traffic Act, 1930, is to the following effect :
“ Any person who, when driving or attempting to drive, or whenin charge of, a motor vehicle on a road or other public place is underthe influence of liquor or a drug to such an extent as to be incapable ofhaving proper control of the vehicle ” shall be liablo to certain penalties.
This section aims at a motorist who is in control of a vehicle while hois “in a self-induced, state of incapacity, whether that incapacity was duoto drink or drugs ”. Thomson v. Knightsl. A conviction based onlyon a finding that the prisoner was under the influence of drink wasquashed because he was not also held to have been incapable of havingproper control of the vehicle at the relevant time. R. v. Haivkes 2.
It might, of course, be argued that the absence in Soction 153 (1) ofour local Act of the qualifying words found in Section 15 (1) of tho EnglishAct indicates that Parliament intended absolutely to penalise a driverwho, though perfectly fit to have control of a vehicle, has partaken ofa little alcohol. But an intention to change, the law so drastically inCeylon could, and should, he expressed in much clearer terms. *
(1947) 1 K.B. 336.
* (1931) 22 C. A. li. 172.
Theobald v. Arambtpola
503
In my opinion, a man cannot be convicted under Section 153 (1) of thelocal Act unless the evidence justifies t-lie inference tliat the accusedperson was under the influence of drink or a drug to the same extent aswould justify a conviction in England. The operative words are “ drivenunder the influence of alcohol or drugs ”, indicating that some stimulantlias had a prejudicial effect on the man’s capacity to drive a car withnormal efficiency because, for instance, it has impaired his powers ofco-ordination and orientation. In such a condition, the motorist is asource of potential danger to himself and others, and is guilty of anoffence even if he has not actually been involved in an accident.
In some cases, a man may be so intoxicated that his incapacity to haveproper control of a vehicle is demonstrable. But as a general rule, expertevidence ought to be led on this issue, and the medical expert should informthe Court of the tests which he carried out and his reasons for reachingliis conclusions—so that the Court may ultimately form its own deoisionus to whether the accused person’s condition rendered it unsafe to allowhim to drive a motor vehicle along a public highway. In the presentcase, there was no evidence on this vital issue. I therefore allow theAppeal and acquit the appellant.
Appeal allowed.