006-NLR-NLR-V-52-DIAS-Appellant-and-PERIES-Respondent.pdf
1990Present.- Jayetileke C.J. and Swan J.DIAS, Appellant, and PERIES, RespondentS. C. 537—D. G. Mannar, 10,457
Bent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948—Sections 1 and 8—Prohibition of excessiveadvance of rent—Scope of such prohibition.
Bent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942—Authorised rent—Section 3—Meaningof “ any period ".
The provision in section 8 of the Sent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948,that a landlord cannot retain in his hands, ns an advance of rent, any amountexceeding the authorised rent for a period 'of three months is not applicableto an advance of rent received under a contract of tenancy entered into priorto the date of commencement of the operation of the Act, viz., January 1, 1949.
Where an indenture of lease, which was entered into a few months beforethe Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, came into operation, providedthat the yearly rental should be paid in monthly instalments—
Held, that the provisions of section 8 would be applicable in respect of theperiod of the lease subsequent to the date/* when the Ordinance came intooperation and the lessor, therefore, was not entitled to recover any rent in excessof the authorised rent from that date.
A PPEAXi from a judgment of the District Court, Mannar.
II. V. Per era, K.C., with J..M. Jay amarine, for plaintiff appellant.
E: B. Wikramanayahe, K.O., -with V. K. Kandaswamy, for defendantrespondent.':
'Cur. adv. vult.
August 4, 1950. Jayetileke C.J.—
On March 30, 1947, the plaintiff sold by public auction the lease of a•tiled boutique for a period of four years commencing from July 1, 1947,and the defendant purchased it at Us. 2,150 a year. Thereafter theplaintiff and the defendant entered into an indenture of lease bearing_NTo. 360 dated April 7, 1947 (PI). At the execution of PI the defendantpaid to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,433.33 in advance. PI providesthat the yearly rental of Us. 2,150 should be paid in monthly instal-ments of Rs. 179.16 and that the 1st instalment should be paid on orbefore June 30, 1947, and the other instalments on or before the lastday of each month. In view of this provision in the lease the advancemust be treated as a deposit made to secure the payment of the rent.The defendant paid the instalment that fell due on June 30, 1947, butfailed to pay the instalments that fell due thereafter. On June 2, 1948,the plaintiff instituted this action for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 370.76ns balance rent after giving the defendant credit for the deposit, for•ejectment and damages.
The defendant resisted the plaintiff's claim for ejectment on theground (1) that under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942,he was not entitled to recover Rs. 179.16 as rent and (2) that under theRent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, he was not entitled to retain in his“hands more than three months’ rent as an advance.
The Rent Restriction Ordinance came into operation in the District•of Mannar on July 10, 1947. It is admitted that the authorised rent ofthe premises is Rs. 50 a month. The learned District Judge held thatthe plaintiff could not recover more than the authorised rent from July 10,1947. He held further that under s. 8 of the Rent Restriction Act,No. 29 of 1948, the plaintiff could not retain in his hands as an advanceof rent any amount exceeding the authorised rent for a period of threemonths, and that the defendant was entitled to set off the balance- sumof Rs. 1,220 against the rent that accrued between July 30, 1947, and thedate of the institution of the action. Giving the plaintiff credit forRs. 660 being the rent, he was entitled to recover from July 1, 1947, upto the date of action he held that there was an excess amount in theplaintiff’s hands. He dismissed the plaintiff’s action and enteredjudgment for the defendant in reconvention for a sum of Rs. 788.33.At the argument before us two points were raised by Counsel for theappellant: —.
that the Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, came into operationafter the institution*of this action and therefore it did not applyto this case.
S. 3 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance does not apply to a periodwhich has already commenced to run.
S. 1 of the Rent Restriction Act provides that it will come into operationnn such date as may be appointed by the Minister by order publishedin the Gazette. The appointed date is January 1, 1949, and it appearsIn Gazette Xo. 9,932 dated December 23, 1948. S. 8 reads:-
*' No person shall, as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuanceof the tenancy of any premises to which this Act applies,demand or receive or pay or offer to pay—
as an advance of rent atiy amount exceeding the authorisedrent for a period of three months or ”''
There is no section in the Rent Restriction Ordinance which corres-ponds with s. 8. The words “ no person, shall demand or receive ”
contemplate an act done when the Act is in operation. Mr. Wickrema-nayake stated frankly that he could not rely on that part of the judgment.
The second point taken by Mr. Perera turns on the interpretation ofs. 3 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. It reads :’
“ (1) It shall not be lawful for the landlord of any premises to whichthis Ordinance applies—
(а)to demand, receive or recover as the rent of suchpremises, in respect of any period commencing on or after theappointed date, any amount in excess of the authorised rentof such premises as defined for the purposes of this Ordinance insection 4; or
(б)to increase the rent of such premises in respect of anysuch period to an amount in excess of such authorised rent.”
Mr. Perera argued that according to PI the unit period of occupationis a year and that as such period had commenced to run when the Ordi-nance came into operation s. 3 does not apply..
Some light is thrown upon the construction of s. 3 by the preamble.It is as follows : —
“An Ordinance to restrict the increase" of rent and to provide formatters incidental to such restriction ”.
The scheme of the Ordinance is as the name suggests to benefit a tenant"by tying a landlord’s hands in cases to which the Ordinance applies byforbidding him to demand, receive or recover as rent any amount in excessof the authorised rent where under the eommoh. law he had theopportunity of doing so. The Legislature has undoubtedly been econo-mical of words but the words used must be read according to the subjectto which they refer. The contention put forward by Mr. Perera doesnot seem to be in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the languageused. The ordinary meaning of the words “ any period ” would be “ anyportion of time ”. According to Mr. Perera’s argument if before theRent Restriction Ordinance came into operation A had leased to Ra house for a period of 99 years for Rs. 100,000 and the indenture providedthat the rent for the whole period should be paid in 1,188 equal monthlyinstalments section 3 would not apply, I can find nothing either in thelanguage or in the policy of the legislation that it was so intended. Thisview is supported by the proviso to section 5 (1) which is the only excep-tion to the standard arbitrarily laid down in the Ordinance. It providesthat in the case of any premises let at a progressive rent payable underthe terms of a lease executed prior to the 1st day of November, 1941,the standard rent of the premises in respect of any period shall be therent payable in respect of that period tmder the terms of the lease.
We are of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any rentin excess of the authorised rent from July 10, 1947. We would sendthe case back for inquiry as to the exact amount due to the plaintiff asrent up to the date of decree, after giving the defendant credit for thedeposit and the rent paid by him on June 30, 1947. After such inquirythe District Judge will enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff for suchamount, for ejectment and for damages which we fix at Its. 100 a month.The plaintiff will be entitled to costs here and in the Court below.
Swan J.—I agree.
Appeal allowed.