020-NLR-NLR-V-56-C.-V.-S.-CORERA-Appellant-and-S.-MUTTUCUMARU-et-al-Respondents.pdf
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Got era v. bfuttttcumarti
1954Present : Gunasekara J.C. V. S. CORERA, Appellant, and S. ' MUTTUCUMARU et ah,Respondents
S. C. 7—G. R. Colombo, 46,054
Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948—Joint landlords—“ Reasonable requirement"of premises for some only of them—Tenant's liability then to be ejected—Sections13 (7) (c), 27—Interpretation Ordinance {Cap. 2), s. 2.
Where there are two joint landlords, they cannot obtain possession of premisesunder proviso (c) of Section 13 (1) of the Kent Restriction Act »n1eM they provethat the premises ere reasonably required for occupation as a residence for bothof them. The tenant cannot be ejected if there is proof of reasonablerequirement of the premises for only one of them. *
* (1799) 8 T. R. 300.
GUNASEKARA J.—Cor era v. Aluttucumaru
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iiPPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Colombo.
H. V. Perera, Q.C., with M. L. de Silva, for the defendant-appellant.
Thiagalingam, Q.C., with H. W. Tambiah, S. Sharvananda andT. Parathalingam, for the plaintiffs-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 11, 1954. Gunaskkara J.—
This is an appeal from an order of the Commissioner of Requests,Colombo, for the ejectment of a tenant from premises to which the RentRestriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, applies. They had been let to theappellant by the two respondents, who are co-owners, and the tenancyhad been duly terminated. The learned commissioner has held that thepremises are reasonably required for occupation as a residence for one ofthe landlords. The question for decision is whether this finding issufficient to bring the case within paragraph (c) of the proviso to section13 (1) or whether the landlords have to prove that the premises arereasonably required for occupation as a residence for both of them.
The subsection provides that no action for the ejectment of the tenantof any premises to which the Act applies shall be instituted in any courtunless the Rent Control Board has authorized its institution. It isenacted by the proviso that the authorization of the Board shall not benecessary in any case where “ (c) the premises are, in the opinion of theCourt, reasonably required for occupation as a residence for the landlordor any member of the family of the landlord, or for the purposes of thetrade, business, profession, vocation or employment of tho landlord ”.It is contended for the appellant that by reason of the provisions ofsection 2 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 2) tho word “ landlord ”must be read as -t landlords ”, where there are more landlords than one,and therefore the respondents must prove that the premises are reasonablyrequired for occupation as a residence for both of them.
In the English case of McIntyre v. Hardcaslle *, where two landlordsclaimed possession of a house on the ground that one of them requiredit for occupation as a residence-lor herself, tho Court of Appeal consideredthe effect of a provision which is somewhat similar to paragraph (c) ofthe proviso to section 13 (1) of our Act. That provision, which is inschedule L paragraph (A) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions(Amendment) Act, 1933, empowers the court to make an order for theejectment of a tenant from a dwelling house if “ the dwelling house isreasonably required by the landlord …. for occupation as aresidence for (i) himself; or (ii) any son or daughter of his over 18 years of*ge ; or (iii) his father or mother ”. In the case of Baker v. Lewis 2 it1 [1948i] 1 All E. B. 696.* [1946] 2 AU E. R. 592; [1947] 1 K. B. 186.
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QUNABEKARA J.—Corera. v.^MuUuoumaru
had been held that by reason of the provisions of the Interpretation Act,1880, section 1, the word “ landlord "■ in tins passage includes the pluralwhere there is more than one landlord, and Asquith, L. J., had said :
Where there are two or more joint beneficial owners, (i), (ii) and (iii)of (A) should, I think, be read as follows : in (i) for “ himself” read“ themselves ”, in (ii) for “ any son or daughter of his ” read “ anyson or daughter of theirs” and in (iii) read “ their father or mother ”.Where, read in this way, neither (i), (ii) nor (iii) has any applicationsuch beneficial owners would fail, for instance, if they proceed under
and are not a married couple with a child, or if they proceed under
and have not got a parent in common ; but they would fail inthat case not because there are several cf them or because they arenot a ” landlord ” within the opening words of the section, but becausethey could not bring themselves within the language of (i), (ii) or (iii),construed in the way I suggest.
In McIntyre v. Hardcastle 1 Tucker, L.J., who delivered the judgment-of the court, quoted these words and said :
All kinds of difficulties have been suggested as likely to followwhichever interpretation is accepted by us. I do not think that thelegislature contemplated this situation at all when this paragraphwas framed, and, therefore, I feel driven to interpret it merely in thelight of the actual language used. Looking at it in that way, I feelconvinced that the interpretation put on it by Asquith, L.J., was thecorrect one and I do not desire to attempt to put into better languagethat which he so clearly expressed in the judgment which I have justread.'
For these reasons it was held that where there were two landlords theycould obtain possession of the house under this provision only if it wasrequired for occupation as a residence for both of them.
I do not think that a situation such as the one which has arisen in thepresent case was contemplated by our legislature any more than by® theBritish Parliament. The observation that the enactment must beinterpreted merely in the light of the actual language used appears to bejust as applicable in the present case as in McIntyre v. Hardcastle 1.Though the language that is construed in that case is not quite the sameas the language of our enactment, there is sufficient similarity to yieldthe same result. It seems to me, moreover/that the same result is alsoreached upon a consideration of the definition of “ landlord ” in section27 of the Act, which provides that; “ * landlord ’, in relation to anypremises, means the person for the time being entitled to receive the rentof such premises ”. It follows that, by reason of the provision in theInterpretation Ordinance that unless there be something repugnant inthe subject or context words in the singular number shall include theplural, the word “ person ” in the definition.of “ landlord ” must be read
* [JSrfS] 1 AU E. B. 696.
Sedarahamy v. Abubuclcer
S3
aa “ persons ” ; and it must therefore be proved that the premises arerequired for occupation as a residence for the persons for the time beingentitled to receive the rent.
For these reasons I set aside the order made by the learnedcommissioner and I dismiss the action with costs in this court and the courtbelow.
Appeal allowed.