017-NLR-NLR-V-27-ANDIRS-v.-SIRIYA-et-al.pdf
C 70 )
1924.
Present: Jayewardene A.J.ANDRIS t*. SIRIYA et al.
185—C* R. Gampola, 6,12 .
Jurisdiction—Valuesubject-matter stated in plaint not questioned—
—Plea of res judicata—Compentency of Court—Evidence Act,ss. 44 and 50*
Where, in a case in which the question of jurisdiction dependedon the value of the property, no objection was raised as to thevaluation of the subject-matter given in the plaint, the competencyof the Court in respect of its monetary jurisdiction cannot bechallenged in a subsequent action between the parties.
The principle that parties cannot by consent give jurisdiction,where none exists, applies only where the law confers no jurisdic-tion.
It does not prevent parties from waiving inquiry by the Courtas to facts necessary for the determination of the question ofjurisdiction, when that question depends on facts to be proved.
1 {1905) 1 Leem, 15.
( 71 )
A CTION by the plaintiff for declaration of title to the half shareof a land called Kandehena against the defendants, appellants.It would appear that the present plaintiff sued the defendantsin case No. 4,731 of the same Court for a declaration of title to thesame land. There the plaintiff valued the interest he claimed atRs. 200. The defendants denied the local but not the monetaryjurisdiction of the Court. Eventually, a decree was entered in favourof the plaintiff to what, in effect, amounted to a one-fourth shareas against the first defendant. The present action was broughtby the same plaintiff against the same defendants, and it was con-tended that the decision in the previous action was res judicata.The first defendant attempted to get over the binding effect of thedecree in the previous action against him by alleging that the shareclaimed by the plaintiff was worth more than Rs. 300, and that theCourt of Requests had no jurisdiction to try and determine thataction. The Commissioner of Requests held that the previous decreewas res judicata as against the first defendant.
Navaratnam, for first and second defendants, appellants.
Garviny for plaintiff, respondent.
September 19, 1924. Jayewabdene A.J.—
I have had the advantage of a full argument in this case,and I have decided on the course which I ought to follow withrespect to its disposal. The action raises questions relating to thejurisdiction of the Court and to res judicata. It would appear thatthe present plaintiff sued the defendants, appellants, in case No. 4,731of the Court of Requests of Gampola to be declared entitled to ahalf share of a land called Kandehena. The appellants deniedthe title of the plaintiff, and asked that his claim be dismissed.There the plaintiff valued the interest he claimed at Rs. 200.This value was given not in the numbered paragraphs of the plaint,but in the first paragraph of the prayer. The defendants deniedthe jurisdiction of the Court as stated in paragraph 1 of the plaint.That statement referred to the local jurisdiction of the Court andnot to its monetary jurisdiction. On May 27,1921, according to thejournal entry of that date, the Court was informed that the seconddefendant’s interest in the land, namely, an undivided three-fourthshare, had been sold by the Fiscal. In view of this fact, the casewas ordered to proceed in respect of the remaining undivided one-fourth share. According to my reading of this journal entry, afterMay 27, 1921, the second defendant ceased to be a party to theaction, and the case proceeded only with regard to the one-fourtbinterest which the first defendant claimed. On October 31 the casecame up for trial. The first defendant was present, the seconddefendant was absent; and Mr. Halangoda. who was a partner of the
1924.
Andris v.Siriya
( 72 )
1924.
Jatjewar-DKKB A.J.
Andrit v.f*iriya
proctors who had filed a proxy from the first and second defendants,was present for the defendants according to the entry in the record.On the day of trial after some discussion, the details of which areentered in the journal, the Court said that the only issue waswhether Gunamala had any interest in the land in claim, andthat the burden of proving that issue was on the defendants, whoseproctor said he was not prepared to lead evidence. Thereupon,the learned Commissioner answered the issue in the negative, andmade the following entry :—“ At this stage defendants consentto judgment being entered for plaintiff as prayed for with costs,but without damages. If Rs. 25 is paid full satisfaction as regardscosts to be entered.** On this order a decree has been drawn updeclaring the plaintiff entitled to a half share as against theappellants, that is, the first and second defendants, and a partycalled Babee, the third defendant in the case, who however neverappeared. Now, I do not think that in view of the order made onMay 27, 1921, and in the absence of the second defendant onOctober 31, 1921, the Court had any right to adjudicate on theclaim of the second defendant, a claim which had been expresslyexcluded from consideration by the Court. No doubt Mr.Halangoda is recorded as appearing for the defendants, but thatmust be attributed to the fact that Mr. Halangoda was appearingfor the first defendant also. I am unable to hold that this decreein any way binds the second defendant. The decree, in myopinion, only affects the first defendant, and only entitles theplaintiff to claim a one-fourth share of the land. The presentaction has been brought by the same plaintiff against the samedefendants (the appellants) and also against the third party, Babee,and the plaintiff claims to be entitled to a half share of the landon the ground that the previous decision is res judicata as againstboth defendants. In the view which I take of the decree in the firstcase No. 4,731, that decree is not res judicata as against the seconddefendant. It is, in my opinion, open to the second defendantto assert his rights in this action.
As regards the first defendant the decree is binding on him,but he tries to get over the effect of that decree by alleging thatthe share which the plaintiff claims in the present action isworth more than Rs. 300, and that the Court of Requests had nojurisdiction to try and determine that' action. The learned Com-missioner has refused to go into the question of the value ofthe land at the time the first action was brought, and has heldthat the previous decree is res judicata. In support of his conten-tion, Mr. Navaratnam, who appears for the defendants, appellants,has relied upon various cases. Two of the cases cited by himrelate to the effect of judgments in Village Tribunals. One isthe case of Puncha v. Sethuhamy1 and the other case is Pusama v.
1 U9161 19 N. L. i?. 217.
( 73 )
Senddiya.1 It must be borne in mind in considering these cases thatthe Village Tribunals Ordinance makes no provision for pleadings,and it would not be safe to treat the proceedings had beforethese tribunals with the strictness with which proceedings beforeCourts of Bequests and District Courts are treated. In boththose cases it was held that a judgment given by a Village Tribunalwas not res judicata where title to the same land is disputed ina case before the Court of Bequests, on the ground that the valueof the land exceeded the jurisdiction of the Village Tribunals.The Village Tribunals are tribunals of extremely limited juris-diction, and in my humble opinion the judgments in these twocases must be taken as applying to the peculiar facts arising fordecision there. He also relies upon the case of NeelakiUty v.Alvar,2 where it was held that a partition decree entered by aCourt of Requests with reference to a piece of land exceeding Rs. 300in value is not binding on a person claiming an interest in theproperty, but who was not a party to the action. This is a judgmentof two Judges, and Bertram C. J. in the course of his judgment said—
“ It is a recognized principle of law that a decree purporting tobe made by a Court of limited jurisdiction withregard to a matter outside its jurisdiction is a nullity (seeAttomey-Oeneral v. Lord Hotham3). The jurisdiction ofa Court may be limited either in respect of area, or inrespect of value, or in respect of subject-matter, or inrespect of a combination of all or any of these matters.It does not seem to me that the authorities justify anydistinction being drawn between these various sorts oflimitations. It may be taken therefore, that, in viewof the limitation of the Courts of Requests jurisdictionwith respect to value, the decree in a partition actionmade by a Court of Requests affecting immovable propertyexceeding Rs. 300 in value is of no legal force.”
Then proceeding to deal with section 44 of the Evidence Ordinancethe learned Judge said that the remedy provided by that sectionis open not only tostrangers, but also to a party to the formeraction.To use his own words—
“ There is no distinction for this purpose between a party to asuit and a stranger, even a party to the suit is not estoppedby the decree if the Court was not a competent Court.It has been expressly held in the Indian Courts that aparty to a suit is as much entitled to the benefit ofsection 44 of the Evidence Ordinance as a stranger(Rajib Panda v. Lakhan Sendh4). It is open to any partyto the action to impeach the validity of, the judgmentas it is to the plaintiff himself.”
1 (3920) 22 N. L. R. 364.» (1827) 3 Russell 415.
% (1918) 20 X. L. R. 372.« (1899) 27 Cal. 11.
1024.
.Tavewab-1>EHE A.J.
Andris v.Siriya
( 74 )
1924.
Jayewa H*dene A.J.
Andris v.Siriya
De Sampayo J. said—
“ Having considered the matter in the point of view of law,I cannot think that the decree of a Court without com-petent jurisdiction, whatever its effects might be asbetween the parties to it, could bind a stranger, such asthe plaintiff in this action is.”
The right of a party to the relief provided by section 44 wasnot in question in that case, but the opinion of the learned ChiefJustice is entitled to the greatest weight. De Sampayo J. was, how-ever, not himself prepared to accept unreservedly the statementthat the parties to a suit would be in the same position as strangerswith regard to section 44, but, in my opinion, if I may say so res-pectfully, section 44 must clearly apply to the parties to theprevious action. Otherwise, the section would be meaningless.But there may be circumstances which would prevent a party tothe action from taking advantage of the provisions of section 44.If the ground on which the previous judgment is sought to beimpeached was a ground which had to be decided on evidence,and the party subsequently seeking to impeach it has failed toadduce the necessary evidence, it may be that he would not befree to question the binding effect of the previous judgment.
To come to the facts of these two cases, in the first place, the plain-tiff had expressly stated the value of the share which he claimedto be Rs. 200. This value was never disputed. If it had beenquestioned, it would have been open to the plaintiff to prove byevidence that his valuation was correct, but the defendants tacitlyadmitted the correctness of the valuation placed on the land bythe plaintiff, and prevented the plaintiff from establishing to thesatisfaction of the Court the fact that it had jurisdiction to decidethe matter which had been brought before it.
In these circumstances, I think, it is possible to hold that a partymay be barred from questioning the competency of the Courtwithout doing violence to the principles which have been laiddown in the cases above referred to. I might in this connectionrefer to the case of Jose Antonio Baretto v. Francisco AntonioRodrigues,1 where it was held in a case in which the question ofjurisdiction depended upon the value of the property, that whereneither party raised any question as to the want of jurisdictionany by their silence and conduct accepted the value to be of theamount required to give jurisdiction to the Court*, they had dis-pensed with proof on the question by their tacit admissions, andthat the rule contained in section 58 of the Evidence Ordinancecame into operation and prevented the statement of the valuebeing thereafter questioned.
1 (1910) 35 Bom. 24.
( 75 )
The Court there said that, as a rule, the parties cannot by consentgive jurisdiction where none exists. But this rule applies onlywhere the law confers no jurisdiction, such, for instance, as theactions referred to in the proviso to section 77 of the CourtsOrdinance which a Court of Bequests is prohibited from takingcognizance of.
It does not prevent parties from waiving inquiry by the Courtas to facts necessary for the determination of the question as tojurisdiction where that question depends on facts to be proved.
It is a fundamental rule governing the question of jurisdictionthat the valuation of the subject-matter as given in the plaintprimd facie determines the jurisdiction of the Court, and the valuethus placed having given the Court jurisdiction, the jurisdictionitself continues whatever the result of the suit, unless a differentprinciple comes into operation to prevent such a result or to makethe proceedings from the first abortive. (See the case of LakshmanBhatkar v. Babaji Bhatkar.1) Applying these principles to thecase before me, I think that the Court of Requests of Gampolahad jurisdiction to try the previous case. Its right to do so wasdetermined by the value placed on the share claimed by the plaintiffin his plaint. The jurisdiction of the Court depended on the valueof the share or interest claimed by the plaintiff in his plaint. Thedefendants at no stage disputed the correctness of the valuationgiven by the plaintiff. It must, I think, be taken that they weresatisfied that the proper value was given and they did not thinkthat any inquiry would show that the property was beyond thejurisdiction of the Court of Requests as regards its monetaryvalue.
I would, therefore, hold that as regards the first defendant thedecision in the previous case is res judicata, and that it is not opento him to impeach it on the ground that it was passed by a Courtwithout jurisdiction.
As regards the rights of the second defendant no question ofres judicata arises, because, in my opinion, the decree in theprevious case cannot be construed as in any way affecting hisrights. The appellant has succeeded partly and has failed partly.In the circumstances I would make no order as to costs.
Let the case be returned to the Court of Requests to be proceededwith in due course.
Set aside ; case remitted.
1924.
Jayewar-PENE A.J.
Andris v,
Siriya
1 (1883) 8 Bom. 31-33.