020-SLLR-SLLR-1994-V2-DHARMASENA-AND-OTHERS-V.-PERERA-COMMISSIONER-REGISTRAR-CO-OPERATIVE-DEV.pdf
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DHARMASENA AND OTHERS
v.
PERERA, COMMISSIONER & REGISTRAR. CO-OPERATIVEDEVELOPMENT (WESTERN PROVINCE) AND OTHERS
COURT OF APPEAL.
SENANAYAKE. J.
C.A. APPLICATION NO. 897/91.
AUGUST 21. SEPTEMBER 21 AND OCTOBER 14,1991.
Certiorari and Prohibition – Election of Board of Directors of a Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Law No. 5 of 1972as amended by Act No. 32 of 1983 – Regulation 2 of the Emergency Regulations(Maintenance of Essential Supplies and Services) Regulation No. 1 of 1989 -Appointment of Competent Authority in place of the Board – Good faith – Want ofreasonable grounds.
The petitioners were the duly elected members of the Board of Directors of theAtlanagalla Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society (7th respondent) – a Societyregistered under the Co-operative Societies Law No. 5 as amended by Act.No. 83 of 1983. The petitioners were elected on 22.9.90 to the Board of Directors.One T. S. Bandara the leader of the U.N.P. group which was defeated at thiselection, filed case No. D.C. 3554/Spl.and obtained an enjoining order restrainingthe petitioners from functioning. The petitioners filed papers for the dissolution ofthe enjoining order and the District Judge vacated the enjoining order on 9.10.90.Bandara filed Leave to Appeal and Revision Applications in the Court of Appealand of consent the District Judge's order was set aside and a fresh inquirydirected to be concluded on or before 25.2.91. The District Judge held the freshinquiry and on 25.2.91 made order refusing the application for an enjoining order.In the meantime the 3rd respondent (Hon. Weerasinghe Mallimarachchi, Ministerof Food and Co-operatives) purporting to act in terms of Regulation 2 of theEmergency (Maintenance of Essential Supplies and Services) Regulation No. 1 of1989 on 18,2.91 made order appointing the 4th respondent (Lionel Gunatilleka,A.G.A. Gampaha), 5th respondent (A. A. de Silva. Inspector of Co-operativeSocieties) and the 6th respondent (Laxman Hewapana, Assistant Director ofPlanning) as Competent Authority of the 7th respondent Society. The appointmentdated 18.2.91 was published in the Gazette Extraordinary No. 650/6 of 19.2.91but a copy of the order of 18.2.1991 was filed with his objections by Bandara
Dharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CACooperative Development (Western Province) And Others (Senanayake, J.) 215
even before the Gazette was available to the public. Later the 3rd respondent hadinformed Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranayake former M.P. for Attanagalla electorate thatthe Competent Authority will function only tilt 1B.3.1991 and the petitioners couldassume duties from 19.3.91. On being so informed, the Petitioners assumedduties on 19.3.91, At an emergency meeting of the Board held on 20.3.91 thepetitioners however were informed that the 4th, 5th and 6th respondents hadbeen re-appointed on 22.3.91 as the Competent Authority by notificationpublished in Gazette No. 655/9 dated 26.3.91.
Held:
The 3rd respondent did not have any material with him to exercise his opinion inissuing the order appointing 4, 5 and 6 respondents as Competent Authority toact for the 7th respondent Society. His discretion was exercised unreasonablywith the idea of helping T. S. Bandara the defeated candidate. He had not actedin good faith or reasonably. On the District Judge refusing to grant an EnjoiningOrder, the Petitioners as the elected members should have been permitted tofunction in their capacity as Directors of the 7th respondent society. There was nomaterial on which in his opinion there was, is or is likely to be a disruption in themaintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community of thearea. The 3rd respondent has without any material appointed the 4th, 5th and 6threspondents as Competent Authority and continued to issue the impugned orderswith a view to keep the Petitioners out of office. This exercise of his opinion wasnot in good faith and without any reasonable grounds.
Application for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
G. Dayasiri for petitioners.
S. V. J. Silva for 1st, 8th and 9th respondents.
K.C. Kamaiasabayson D.S.G. for 2 to 5 respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
March 24, 1993,
SENANAYAKE, J.
The Petitioners have filed this application for Writs of Certiorari andProhibition to quash the order made by the 3rd Respondent dated
order produced as P24 appointing the 4th, 5th & 6thRespondents as the Competent Authority of the 7th RespondentSociety and also prayed for the grant of a Writ of Prohibitionrestraining the 3rd Respondent from exercising powers in terms ofthe Emergency (Maintenance of Essential Supplies & Services)Regulation No. 1 of 1989 appointing Competent Authority in respectof the 7th Respondent. The facts relevant to this application arebriefly as follows: The Petitioners are the elected members of the
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Board of Directors of the 7th Respondent which is a RegisteredSociety under the Co-operative Societies Law No. 5 of 1972 asamended by Act No. 32 of 1983. It is not contested that the 7thRespondent Society was the main society with 85 branchescomprising of 28,603 members in the Attanagalla area and a sectionof the Mirigama area. The Board of Directors were elected on22.9.1990 which was held in the presence of the 8th and 5thRespondents and several other officers of the Co-operativeDevelopment Department of the Western Province and also in thepresence of a Deputy Inspector of Police and a number of seniorofficers of the Police including the O.I.C. of the Nittambuwa Police.The Petitioners were elected and defeated the candidates of theopponent group led by T. S. Bandara and the results of the saidelection were produced as P.12.
The Petitioners state that the newly elected Board of Directors tookoaths and held their 1st meeting on 23.9.90 and elected the 1stPetitioner as the Chairman and the 2nd Petitioner as the Vice-Chairman and appointed Standing Committees for Finance,Education, Consumer Welfare, Loans, Transport and several otherdecisions in relation to various other matters of the 7th Respondentand the minutes of the 1st Board of Directors was produced as P.13.
It was common ground that on 30.9.90 an ex parte enjoining orderwas obtained by T. S. Bandara from the Additional District Judge ofGampaha in case No. 3554/Spl restraining the functions of thePetitioners as members of the Board of Directors of the 7th RespondentSociety. The Petitioners on 8.10.90 filed papers in the District Court ofGampaha with notice to T. S. Bandara to vacate the enjoining orderissued against the Petitioners and the Learned District Judge vacatedthe Enjoining Order on 9.10.90. The said T. S. Bandara preferred aLeave of Appeal Application bearing No. 143/90 and a RevisionApplication bearing C/A. 1018/90 to the Court of Appeal. The Court ofAppeal made order on 14.2.91 of consent (a) that the order of thelearned District Judge dated 9.10.90 dismissing the enjoining orderwas set aside (b) District Judge of Gampaha to hold a fresh inquiry intothe question of the enjoining order within 10 days from February 14th1991 and to conclude same by 25.2.91 (c) the Plaintiff T. S. Bandarawas permitted to file his objections on or before 18.2.91.
The Petitioners alleged that the 3rd Respondent purporting to beacting in terms of Regulation 2 of the Emergency (Maintenance of
Dharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CACo-operative Development (Western Province) and Others (Senanayake, J.) 217
Essential Supplies and Services) Regulation No. 1 of 1989 actingmala fide, apprehending that the District Judge would make an orderagainst the defeated United National Party Candidate and in favourof the Petitioners in 3554/Spl issued an order dated 18.2.91 atColombo appointing 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as the CompetentAuthority of the 7th Respondent Society. And the Plaintiff T. S.Bandara has produced the Gazette Extraordinary No. 650/6 dated19.2.1991 where the 3rd respondent had appointed the 4th, 5th and6th Respondents as Competent Authority for the 7th RespondentSociety. And T. S. Bandara in the last paragraph of his affidavit hadaffirmed that three officers of the State have been appointed to theBoard to carry on the work of the 7th respondent Society.
The crucial factor appears to be that Bandara was able to file acopy of the appointment on 18.2.1991 even prior to the Gazette ofthe 19th was available to the Public. They further alleged that the 3rdRespondent had informed the Member of Parliament of GampahaDistrict and the former member for the Attanagalla electorateMrs. Srimavo Bandaranayake that the Appointed CompetentAuthority will cease on 18.3.91 according to the terms of appointmentand that the Petitioners could assume duties from 19.3.1991.Accordingly the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents ceased to hold officeas Competent Authority and the 3rd Respondent did not extend theperiod when their appointment lapsed on 18.3.91. On being informedby the General Manager and the Member of Parliament thePetitioners assumed duties from 19.3.91. The petitioners hadattended the emergency meeting of the Board of Directors andannexed a copy of the minutes marked as P.26a. They alleged thatthe 1st Respondent had informed the General Manager by Telephonethat the 3rd Respondent has changed his decision and that he wouldbe appointing a Competent Authority to manage the affairs of the 7thRespondent Society and the 3rd respondent by GazetteExtraordinary bearing No. 655/9 dated 26.3.91 purporting to act interms of the said Emergency Regulations re-appointed the 4th, 5thand 6th Respondents; the Gazette was produced as P.27. ThePetitioners alleged that the 3rd Respondent illegally and in mala fidecontinued to appoint 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as CompetentAuthority by orders dated 22.4.91, 22.5.91, 22.6.91, 22.7.91 and
published in the Gazette Extraordinary purporting to act interms of the Emergency Regulations and P.27A to P.27E. They allegedthat the order made on 24.3.91 and subsequent orders appointing the4th, 5th & 6th Respondents as Directors of the 7th Respondent is ultravires, illegal and or null and void for the following reasons:
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The 3rd Respondent could not in law have formed an opinionthat there is likely to be a disruption of essential services andsupplies as there was no such disruption, and in the absence of anenjoining order, restraining the Petitioners from exercising the powersand functions of the Board of Directors of the 7th Respondent asthere was no disruption of maintenance of supplies and servicesessential to the community. They alleged that the orders were mademala fide and had no power to issue as there was no disruptionwhich was a condition precedent to issue such orders.
The 3rd Respondent in his affidavit dated 17.3.92 paragraph 3admitted paragraphs 1 to 18, 21 to 26, 28 to 40, 42 to 44, 49 to 53and 55 of the petition and subsequently an affidavit was filed by the3rd Respondent on 8.5.92 to delete paragraph 3 and new paragraph3 was substituted where there was no admission of any paragraphsof the petition but specifically denied the averments that arecontained in paragraphs 30,39, 42, 54, 57, 58 and 60 of thePetitioners affidavit. In paragraph 5 of the 3rd Respondent’s affidavithe affirms to the fact that the members of the Board of Directors ofthe 7th Respondent were elected on 22.9.90. An unsuccessfulcandidate filed an action No. 3554/Spl in the District Court ofGampaha contesting the election and obtained an Enjoining Orderrestraining the Board of Directors and subsequently the order wasvacated on 9.10.90. Thereupon the Plaintiff filed a Revisionapplication with an application for leave to the Court of Appeal andthe Court of Appeal set aside the order vacating the Enjoining Orderand directed that a fresh Inquiry to be held and concluded before
25.2.91.
In paragraph 6 he affirmed that during the above mentionedperiod the public of the area served by the 7th Respondent and itsbranches were deprived of the supply of essential supplies anddistribution of food and fuel had come to a standstill as the Boardwas not functioning and as there was no person or personsauthorised to sign cheques. This was brought to his notice by the 9thRespondent, Minister of Co-operative Societies and Development,Western Province with supporting documents from the Commissionerof Co-operative Development, Western Province and produced truecopies of the documents 3R1, 3R2 and 3R3 and by 3R4. In order toprevent a total breakdown in the supply of food and fuel, he madeorder under Emergency (Maintenance of Essential Supplies andServices) Regulations appointing the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondentsas Competent Authority of the 7th Respondent and they continue to
Oharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CA Co-operative Development (Western Province) and Others (Senanayake, J.) 219
function with a view to preventing any future breakdown in the supplyof Essential Services and Commodities. The 3rd Respondent affirmedthat it was necessary to have the Competent Authority to continue tofunction until the case in the District Court of Gampaha wasconcluded as it is possible for Bandara to obtain an Enjoining Orderagainst the elected Board of Directors at any time before theconclusion of the case. The 3rd respondent further averred that heacted on the advice of the Attorney-General in appointing theCompetent Authority to function until the conclusion of the DistrictCourt case.
The Board of Directors had appropriated Rs. 49,185/- from thefunds of the 7th Respondent and he denies that he acted mala fide orin excess or abuse of the powers vested in or to obstruct theAdministration of Justice.
The 1st Respondent admits holding of the General Meeting of theSociety in terms of By-law as amended and the Board of Directorsbeing elected in terms of By-law 44(1) and he admitted paragraph 5,6 and 16, and that he was aware of P.7 Regarding the otheraverments in the petition he was unaware as they do not pertain tohim. He denies paragraph 50 and states that he did not giveinstructions of any nature to the General Manager of the 7thRespondent Society.
The 8th Respondent admits para 10 and 14 and admits that hewas present at the general meeting of the 7th Respondent Societyheld on 22.9.90. And the other averments in the petition do notpertain to him.
The 9th Respondent admits para 11 of the Petition and otheraverments do not pertain to him.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the 3rdrespondent has the power to issue orders similar to P.21 under theEmergency Regulations but his submission was that the reasonsgiven in his affidavit were unreasonable, ultra vires and the 3rdRespondent has not exercised his opinion correctly. He submittedthat P.21 dated 18.2.91 lapsed and the Petitioners had convened anEmergency Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 7th RespondentSociety and held a meeting on 20.3.91 and the copy of the minutes
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was produced and marked as P.26 and a typed copy as P.26B. Andon 23.3.91 the 3rd Respondent brought the emergency provisionswithout any fresh material. And the counsel submitted that there wasno disruption of the supply of essential material to the community andthat he has formed the opinion without any material and his discretionwas exercised mala fide, unreasonably and there were no conditionsprecedent existing for him to exercise his authority and issue theorders. He submitted the documents 3R1 of 5.10.90, 3R2 of 8.10.90and 3R3 of 8.10.90. These were material which were effective duringthe period when the District Court case was pending as the Plaintiffhad obtained Enjoining Order against the Petitioners but this orderwas set aside by the learned District Judge on 9.10.90. The opinionwas not exercised properly and the learned Counsel furthersubmitted on 22.3.91 his opinion was based on old material and thiswas an act of bad faith. And he had no material or basis to exercisehis discretion and this was done with the sole idea of keeping thePetitioner out of elected office. He further submitted as the DistrictCourt of Gampaha had not granted an Enjoining Order at the secondInquiry there was no possibility in law for the Plaintiff to obtain asubsequent Enjoining Order at a later stage. The 3rd Respondent inhis affidavit has stated that he was advised by the Attorney-Generalthat there was a possibility of T. S. Bandara obtaining an EnjoiningOrder before the conclusion of the District Court case. He submittedthat this was not legally tenable.
The learned Counsel submitted that T. S. Bandara with hisobjections filed on the 18 February 91 filed a copy of the order dated
and it was Gazetted only on 19.2.91 and the public would beentitled to get it only on the 19th. His submission was that this couldbe given to the said Bandara by the 3rd Respondent or his officials.Therefore he submitted the nexus between the 3rd respondent andBandara was visible from the commencement. The learned Counselsubmitted that this position has not been denied by the 3rdRespondent except to state that he was not aware of the saidaverment. He further submitted that the 3rd Respondent acted on3R1, 3R2, and 3R3 on complaints made in October on which theMinister the 3rd Respondent failed to act. He submitted that the 3rdRespondent on 18th of March 1991 allowed the appointment of theCompetent Authority to lapse and thereafter he invoked theEmergency Regulations on 22,3.91. He further submitted the conduct
Dharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CA Co-operative Development (Western Province) and Others (Senanayake, J.) 221
of the 3rd Respondent shows his desire to keep the Petitioner out ofoffice and there was nexus with the defeated Candidate Bandara andhis opinion was coloured and not an objective opinion but based onextraneous considerations amounting to mala tides.
When one examines the first affidavit of the 3rd Respondent; inparagraph 3 he had admitted paragraphs 1-18, 21 to 26, 28, 29, 31,32 to 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 53 and 56. On 8.5.92 he filed anotheraffidavit, deleted and substituted by a fresh averment according towhich there was no admission of any averment nor were thereexpress denials except to state that he was unaware, which in myview was a complete change of position. This in my view appears tobe a grave shortcoming of his legal advisers who I believe to be theHon. Attorney-General.
The issue in my view was that one T. S. Bandara obtained anEnjoining Order from the District Court on the 28th September. 1990which order was served on the Petitioners on 30.9.90 and this orderwas vacated on 8:10.91. The Enjoining Order effectively curtailed therights of the Petitioners in performing their duties as Directors of the7th Respondent Society. The order of the Court of Appeal dated
had the effect of restoring the said Enjoining Order. But thedocuments filed by the 3rd Respondent were pertaining to a perioddated between 5.10.90 and 8.10.90. The Respondent acted onmaterial which related to the period in which the Enjoining Order wasin force. From 4.2.90 to 14.2.91 the Petitioners were free to performtheir duties without any hindrance till the Court of Appeal on 14.2.91in effect had restored the said Enjoining Order and directed theDistrict Judge of Gampaha to hold a fresh Inquiry on the question ofthe Enjoining Order and conclude the Inquiry before 25.2.91. The 3rdRespondent acted on material which did not pertain to the period. Icould understand it if the 3rd Respondent acted under theEmergency Regulations prior to the vacation of the Enjoining Order bythe District Court on 8.10.90 because he was acting on material onwhich in his opinion there was, is or is likely to be a disruption in themaintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of thecommunity in the area, But on 3R1, 3R2 and 3R3 there was no materialfor him to issue an order under the Emergency Regulations appointingthe 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as Competent Authority to performthe functions of the 7th Respondent Society. When he issued the order
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on 18.2.91 he did so without any fresh material and without any basis.The 3rd Respondent did not take action on 3R1, 3R2 and 3R3 whenthe Petitioners were effectively Enjoined by Court. The Court of Appealdirected the District judge to hear the inquiry regarding the EnjoiningOrder and conclude it before 25.2.91. The Plaintiff T. S. Bandara filedobjections and he was able to get a copy of the Order dated 18.2.92which was signed and issued on 18.2.91 but was published in theGazette Extraordinary only on 19.2.91. This shows the close nexusbetween the 3rd Respondent and his Officials with Bandara. The orderwas issued not on any fresh materials and when the 3rd Respondent'sofficials were fully aware that the matter had to be concluded before
T. S. Bandara in his affidavit and his petition filed on 18.2.91took up the position that an Enjoining Order from the District Courtshould not affect the Petitioners as 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents wereappointed as Competent Authority. The Learned District Judge afterinquiry refused the issue of an Enjoining Order. There was no Appeal oran Application to Revise the order of 25.2.91. The direction of the Courtof Appeal was that the order should be delivered on or before 25.2.91.The averment in para 10 was irrelevant to the issue of the Order underthe Emergency Regulations. Smith on “Judicial Review ofAdministrative Affairs' 4th Edition at page 339 states “If the exercise ofa discretionary power has been influenced by considerations thatcannot lawfully be taken into account, or by disregard of relevantconsiderations, a court will normally hold that the power has not beenvalidly exercised." The appropriation of the funds or legal expensescannot under any circumstances have any bearing on the Orderissued in terms of the Emergency Regulations (Maintenance ofSupplies and Services). This is an irrelevant ground which would haveno bearing to effect his opinion that this appropriation was likely todisrupt supplies and services essential to the life of the community
Smith at page 335 states: “The concept of bad faith eludes precisedefinition, but in relation to the exercise of statutory powers it may besaid to comprise dishonesty (or fraud) and malice. A power isexercised fraudulently if its repository intends to achieve an objectother than that for which he believed the power to have beenconferred. For example a local committee would exercise in bad faithits powers to exclude interested members of the public if it deliberatelychose to hold the meeting in a small room. The intention may be to
Dharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CA Co-operative Development (Western Province) and Others (Senanayake, J.) 223
promote another public interest or private interests. A power isexercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personalanimosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise..Ifthe court concludes that the discretionary power has been used for anunauthorised purpose it is generally immaterial whether its repositorywas acting in good or bad faith. But there will undoubtedly remainareas of administration where the subject-matter of the power and theevident width of the discretion reposed in the decision maker render itsexercise almost wholly beyond the reach of Judicial Review, In thesecircumstances, courts have still asserted jurisdiction to determinewhether the authority has endeavoured to act in good faith inaccordance with the prescribed purpose. In most instances thereservation for the case of bad faith is hardly more than a formality. Butwhen it can be established, the courts will be prepared to set aside ajudgment or order procured or made fraudulently despite the existenceof a generally worded formula purporting to exclude Judicial review."
Wade in “Administrative Law" 6th Edition at page 396 citing LordMacNaghten states: "It is well settled law that a public body investedwith Statutory powers such as those conferred upon the corporationmust take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must act withinthe limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith andit must act reasonably. The last proposition is involved in the secondif not in the first.”
Lord Wrenbury stated ‘A person in whom is vested a discretionmust exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretiondoes not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he isminded to do so: he must in the exercise of his discretion do not whathe likes but what he ought. In other words he must by the use of hisreason ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He mustact reasonably."
“With the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish thecourt is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyondthe powers of the authority. As Lord Hailsham, L.C. said tworeasonable persons can perfectly reasonably come to oppositeconclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to beregarded as reasonable."
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In my view the 3rd Respondent did not have any material with him toexercise his opinion in issuing the order appointing 4th, 5th and 6thRespondents as Competent Authority to act for the 7th RespondentSociety. His discretion was exercised unreasonably with the idea ofhelping T. S. Bandara the defeated candidate and who was also thePlaintiff in the District Court Case in Gampaha. He had not acted ingood faith or acted reasonably. On the District Judge refusing to grantan Enjoining Order, the Petitioners as the elected members should havebeen permitted to function in their capacity as Directors of the 7thRespondent Society. There was no possibility of T. S. Bandara obtainingan Enjoining Order from the court. If he was dissatisfied he should havemoved in Revision and filed papers in the Court of Appeal and this wasnot done by T. S. Bandara. The learned Counsel for the 3rd Respondentin his written submissions has stated that there was a possibilityof Bandara obtaining from the District Court an injunction. But the7th respondent in his affidavit has stated that he was advised by theHon. Attorney-General that Bandara could obtain an Enjoining Orderbefore the case was concluded in the District Court. With all duerespect to the Hon. Attorney-General I am of the view that the positiontaken by him is not legally tenable. This in my view is not legallypermissible under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Once anEnjoining Order is refused the Plaintiff cannot seek another EnjoiningOrder on the same material facts disclosed in his Petition. "ITie Attorney-General has many powers and duties. In the exercise of those powershe is not subject to the direction of any Public Officer or to the controland supervision of courts. It may well be and it is true in the instant casethat the Hon. Attorney-General ought not to put into operation the wholemachinery at his disposal in order to support what is not legally tenable.
I am of the view the 3rd Respondent without any material hasappointed 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as Competent Authority andcontinued to issue the said orders with a view to keep the Petitionersout of office. This exercise of his opinion was not in good faith andwithout any reasonable grounds.
In view of the above reasons I allow the prayer in the amendedpetition and issue and grant a Writ of Certiorari quashing the ordersmade by the 3rd Respondent of 18.2.91 and 22.3.91 appointing the4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as the Competent Authority of the 7th
Dharmasena and Others v. Perera, Commissioner & Registrar,
CA Co-operative Development (Western Province) and Others (Senanayake, J.) 22S
Respondent and the subsequent orders made under the Emergency(Maintenance of Essential Supplies & Services) Regulation No. 1 of1989 in respect of the 7th Respondent, and also issue and grant aWrit of Prohibition restraining the 3rd Respondent from exercisingpowers in terms of the Emergency (Maintenance of EssentialSupplies & Services) Regulation No. 1 of 1989 appointing CompetentAuthority in respect of the 7th Respondent Society.
The delay in delivering this order was due to my recent illness.
I allow the petitioner's application with costs fixed at Rs. 3,500/-.Writs issued.