043-SLLR-SLLR-2004-V-2-ARIYASINGHE-AND-OTHERS-v.-ATTORNEY-GENERAL-Wickremasinghe-Abduction-Case.pdf
CA Trustees of the Sir Mohamed Macao Markar Trust v Fernando 357
and another (Abeyratne, J.)
ARIYASINGHE AND OTHERSVATTORNEY GENERAL(Wickremasinghe Abduction Case)
COURT OF APPEALFERNANDO, J. ANDAMARATUNGA, J .
CA 147-159/1999MAY, 15,17, 20, 200223, 28, 29, 2002JUNE, 4, 12, 25, 2002JULY, 10, 24, 31, 2002AUGUST, 28, 2002SEPTEMBER, 5,11,17, 2002OCTOBER, 2, 2002
Penal Code – Sections 67, 102,355,356, and 375 – Conspiracy to commitabduction and to commit extortion – Retention of stolen property -Evidence Ordinance, section 114- Prescription – Circumstances in whichsection 114 presumption may be drawn – Ingredients necessary toestablish section 355 and 356. Offences – Applicability of section 67 of thePenal Code – Interpretation Ordinance, section 9.
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The accused-appellants with two others were indicted on charges ofconspiracy to commit abduction and to commit extortion. The 1st, 2nd and 3rdaccused-applellants were charged for the abduction of one 'W 'and his driver'N ' – under section 355 of the Penal Code, 4th to 15th accused were chargedfor aiding & abetting the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, accused to abduct W. All accusedwere charged for aiding and abetting a person unknown to the prosecution toput Mrs 'W' in fear in order to induce her to deliver a sum of Rs. 200 lakhs toa person unknown to the prosecution, under section 375 of the Penal Coderead with section 102. All accused were charged under section 394 for theretention of stolen property.
After trial, two accused were acquitted and discharged. All accused wereacquitted of the charge of retaining stolen property. All were convicted of theoffence of conspiracy to abduct and to commit extortion. 1 st-3rd accused wereconvicted for abduction of W and N. 4th-13th accused were convicted forabetting the said offence and all were convicted for abetting the offence ofextortion. The convicted accused were sentenced to imprisonment for periodsranging from 30-60 years and were also fined.
On appeal, it was contended that the trial judge has erroneously chosen todraw the more serious presumption when in fact and in law the availableevidence permitted, if it was the drawing of the serious presumption that theaccused were only guilty receivers and that the prosecution has not proved theingredients necessary to establish an offence under section 355.
It was further contended that as all offences have been committed in thecourse of the same transaction, court should have ordered that the sentencesof imprisonment imposed should run concurrently.
Held:
In deciding to presume the existence of any fact, the court can take in toaccount the common course of natural events, human conduct and publicand private business in their relations to the facts of the particular case.On the proved facts of the case, it was open to the trial judge to draw inhis discretion any presumption of fact having due regard to the particularfacts of this case.
Per Amaratunga, J.,
'A presumption is an inference which the judges are directed or permittedto draw from certain state of fact in certain cases and these presumptionsare given certain amount of weight in the scale of proof. Somepresumptions are conclusive and established. Some presumtions arepresumptions of fact which can be rebutted by facts inconsistent withpresumed fact.
In order to draw a presumption there must be proof of certain basic factsbefore court."
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Bare facts necessary for a court to consider the principle contained insection 1t4 were before court
When strong prima facie evidence is tendered against a person, in theabsence of a reasonable explanation prima facie evidence wouldbecome presumptive.
In order to prove an offence under section 355 it is necessary, to provethat the accused had the intention at the time of abduction that theperson abducted should be murdered or would be so disposed of as tobe put in danger of being murdered. It is the burden of the prosecution toprove that the accused had that particular intention at the time they,abducted the victim, that intention must be unequivocal intention, it can’tbe conditional.
The offence made out by the evidence was an offence under section 356and not under section 355.
The offences with which the accused-appellants were charged were notoffences which fall into the category of offences contemplated in the 2ndlimb of section 67. The 3rd limb of section 67 applies to cases wherethere are several acts when individually taken one themselves offencesbecome a different offence when all acts are combined. If the accused isfound guilty of a greater offence he cannot also be given a separatesentence for a minor offence covered by a greater offence. In the instantcase there are two such offences-section 67 has no application to thecharges framed.
For the separate offences separate punishment could be given. The trialjudge had the discretion to make the sentences of imprisonmentconsecutive.
APPEAL from the judgement of the High Court of Colombo
Cases referred to:
Seetin v A.G – (1965) 68 NLR 316
O v Liyanage and others – 67 NLR at pp 203, 204,
K v William Perara – (1944) 45 NLR 433
Saundraraj v State of Madya Pradesh – (1954) 55 Cr. L.J 257
King v Lewishamy – (1941) 46 NLR 91
Cassim v Udaya Mannar – (1943) 44 NLR 519
Don Somapala v Republic of Sri Lanka (1975) 78 NLR 183
A.G v Seneviratne – (1982) 1 Sri LR 302.
Saundaranayagam v Dayapala- (1973) 77 NLR 213 at 216.
Nego Kar v State – 57 Cr LJ 1313 (Cal).
Tondi v State of Uttara Pradesh – (1975) Cr LJ Vol. I, 950
12 . Samundar v Emperor – (1923) 27 Cr U 64 (Lahore)
Bahadur Ali vThe Emperor – (1922) Cr LJ 622 (Lahore)
Jayanetti v Mitrasena – (1968) 71 LR 385
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Ranjith Abeysuriya, P.C., with Ms. D. Mirihana and Ms. Lanka de Silvafor 1st, 7th and 10th accused-appellants.
Ranjith Abeysuriya, P.C., with Vijitha Manampery for 4th and 6thaccused-appellants.
Dr. Ranjith Fernando with Ms. Sandamalee Munasinghe, Ms. SandamaliManatunga, Ms Kavindra Nanayakkara, for 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 12th,accused-appellants.
Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne, P.C. .with Ms P. Wickramaratne for 9th and11th accused-appellants
Dulinda Weerasuriya with Janaka Amarasinghe for 13th accused-appellant.
C.R.de Silva, P.C., Solicitor-General with Buwaneka Aluvihare, Senior StateCounsel and Ms Haripriya Jayasundera, State Counsel for the AttorneyGeneral.
Cur. adv. vult.
March 22, 2004
GAMIN1 AMARATUNGA, J.
This is an appeal against the convictions of and the sentencesimposed on the present accused-appellants by the learned HighCourt Judge of Clolmbo sitting without a jury. The present accused- appellants, with two others, were indicted in the High Court oncharges of conspiracy to commit abduction and conspiracy tocommit extortion. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused-appellants werecharged for the abduction of G.C. Wickremasinghe and his driverNandasena, offences punishable under section 355 of the PenalCode. Fourth to fifteenth accused were charged for aiding andabetting the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused to abduct G.C.Wickremasinghe. All accused were charged for aiding and abettinga person unknown to the prosecution to put loma Wickremasinghe,the wife of G.C. Wickremasinghe, in fear in order to induce her todeliver a sum of Rs.200 lakhs to a person unknown to theprosecution – an offence punishable under section 375 of the PenalCode read with section 102. All accused were also charged undersection 394 of the Penal Code for the retention of stolen property.
At the end of the prosecution case on an application made bythe prosecuting counsel, the 14th and 15th accused were acquittedand discharged as there was no evidence againts them. Allaccused were convicted of the offences of conspiracy to abduct
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and to commit extortion. First to third accused were convicted forthe abduction of G.C. Wickremasinghe and Nandasena and the 4thto 13th accused were convicted for abetting the said offence. Allaccused were convicted for abetting the offence of extortion. Allaccused were acquitted of the charge of retaining stolen property.The convicted accused were sentenced to imprisonments forperiods ranging from 80-60 years and were fined Rs.3,00,000. Thisappeal is against the convictions and the sentences.
The person abducted, G.C. Wickremasinghe, 65 years old(hereinafter refered to as G.S.W) was former Chairman of one ofthe well established leading business establishments of Sri Lanka,Aitken Spence Ltd, which had wide and varied business activitiessuch as estate and hotel management, shipping, marineinsuarance etc. At the time of the abduction G.C.W has retiredfrom his post of Chairman of the company but was serving as aDirector.
G.C.W. was in the habit of playing golf every morning at theRoyal Colombo Golf Club which had its golf course at Model Farm •Road, Borella. During weekdays he left his residence at WardPlace, Colombo 7, around 6.00-6.15 a.m. to play golf. Duringweekends he used to leave his home around 7.30-8.00 a.m. for theGolf Club. Every time when he went to play golf he used to take thesame route – from his Ward Place residence upto the Ward Place-Kinsey Road Junction, from there along the Kynsey Road, passingMcCarthy Road and Rosmead Place upto the Horton Place-KynseyRoad junction where there are colour lights regulating vehiculartraffic. From there he turned left, proceeded along Horton Placepassing the Senanayake junction situated betweem Borella and theGeneral Cemetery and proceeded towards the Model Farm Road.
On the day he was abducted he instructed his driver Nandasenato prepare the vehicle to go to Golf Club. He left home around 6.00-6.10 a.m. in the Land Cruiser driven by Nandasena. G.C.W wasdressed in a T- shirt and slacks. He was not wearing shoes – hisgolf shoes were in the vehicle. He was seated in the front left sideseat of the vehicle. The vehicle proceeded along the usual routeand as it turned left at the Kynsey Road-Horton Place colour lights,he saw a white van halted about ten yards ahead of him, facing theSenanayake junction. As his vehicle passed that van, a man
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wearing police uniform signalled to stop his vehicle. When he firstsaw this man he was about twenty yards ahead of his vehicle. Heclearly saw this policeman, who when signalling the vehicle to stopacted in an authoritative and in a trained professional manner. Thatpoliceman was not a constable but an officer. G.C.W knew thedefference. Thinking that the police were checking vehicles G.C.Wasked his driver to stop the vehicle. The driver accordingly stoppedthe vehicle and switched off the engine. At that time, the sun wasbegining to rice and there was clear daylight at that place. After thevehicle was stopped, another person, wearing police uniformapproached the driver's side of the vehicle. G.C.W's office wassituated in a high security area in the city and the police had issueda special pass for pass his vehicle to enter that restricted area. Thispass was in the vehicle at that time. He therefore asked his driverto show that special pass to the police.
At that time the policeman who approached the driver's side ofthe vehicle opened its right front door and pulled the driver out ofthe vehicle. Then another person wearing civil clothes opened theleft front door of the vehicle and got into the left front seat pushingG.C.W to the front middle seat. Then he felt that someone openedthe right rear door of the vehicle and pushed the driver into thevehicle. Then the person who was wearing police uniforms got intothe driver's seat. He was the same person who first approached thedriver's side of the vehicle and pulled Nandasena out. After thatperson occupied the driver's seat, G.C.W was in the middle of thefront seat, sandwhiched between those two persons – the man whogot into the front left seat and the other man occupying the driver’sseat. According to G.C.W’s evidence even at that stage he thoughtthat those persons were police officers. He therefore told them thatthey had made a mistake and that he was the former Chairman anda present Director of Aitken Spence. He struggled a little protestingagainst the way they were handling him. When he continued tostruggle, the man who was seated on his left side placed a pistol tohis head and pushed the head down towards the gear lever. Sincehe still believed that those persons were police officers who uponmistaken identity treated him in that way, he told them in Englishthat they had made a mistake. Then the man who was on his leftsaid that they were from the C.I.D. At that stage the man who wasin the driver's seat started the vehicle and simultaneously the man
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who was on G.C.W's left blindfolded G.C.W with a handkerchief.The vehicle then started to proceed in the same direction in whichit was travelling when the police stopped it. G.C.W has said that hecontinued to struggle saying that they had made a mistake. Thevehicle continued its journey, but as he was blindfolded, G.C.W didnot know the route along which it proceeded.
After travelling for about ten minutes the vehicle was stopped.The man who was on his left opened the left front door of thevehicle and pulled G.C.W out and having opened the left rear doorbetween the front and rear seats of the vehicle, pushed him intofloorboard of the vehicle between the front and rear seats. G.C.Wwas pushed in face downwards, so his face touched the feet ofsomeone and he at once realized that those were the feet of hisdriver Nandasena. G.C.W has stated that then a pistol was placedon the back of his chest and he was told not to shout, not to moveand if he did he would be killed. At that stage he realized that thosepersons were not police officers. The vehicle then continued itsjourney for about another half an hour. G.C.W has said that at thatstage he realized that he was in the hands of some abductors – hestarted to think why they have abducted him. He wanted to escapefrom them in the very first opportunity he would get – so he kept hiscool and concentration.
After a journey which continude for about an hour, the vehiclewas stopped. G.C.W has said that someone opened the door of thevehicle and pulled him out. When his bare feet touched the grasson the ground he felt that two persons held his body near hisarmpits lifting him. He thought that thety were trying to take him toa ground and shoot him. He thought that the moment had come forhim to cry for help. He at once pulled down upto his neck the clothwhich coverd his eyes and shouted 'maranawa'I 'maranawa'!(killing! killing!) At that stage it appeared to him that his abductorsnever expected such resistance from him. G.C.W has stated that at •that time he saw the persons who were holding him from eitherside of his body. The person on his left was the same person whotravelled in the front left side seat of the vehicle – the man who puta pistol to his head and pushed his head down earlier. Then he sawanother man with a silver coloured pistol. In front of that personthere was another short person with another silver coloured pistolin hand. He also saw the place where he was – it was surrounded
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by a wall – beyond the wall there was a tiled roof of a building -within the walled premises there were two huge heaps of timber,like timber known as kempas, neatly stacked. There were two otherbuildings in the premises – one was a two storied building andother was like a factory.
According to G.C.W's evidence when he struggled and shouted,his captors pushed him down and hit him. Their blows alighted allover his body; his slacks got torn and he sustained injuries on hismouth and leg. He had a talisman with a gold chain, he felt thatsomeone snatched it causing an injury on his neck. Havingassaulted and overpowered him his captors blindfolded him againand they tied another cloth around his neck which covered hisnose. They tied it very tight making it impossible for him to breathe.He shouted out saying that he could not breathe and then theyrelaxed the grip and made it loose but tied his hands together.They them told him "we need something from you. If you do whatwe want you to do you can go home this evening!" Having said thatthey took him towards two storied building and took him through asmall door and made him sit on a chair.
In his evidence G.C.W has stated that at that stage he realizedthat it was futile to attempt to escape. Since he was not comfortablehe asked his captors to untie his hands and to give him some water.Then some one said 'Selvaraja, bring water'! There was a radioplaying tamil music in high volume. When water was brought herequested his captors to untie his hands and assured them that hewould not try to escape. They then untied his hands.
His captors told him that they needed Rs. 200 lakhs and that ifthat sum was given he could go home that evening itself. They toldhim that they were people from an organization and that they werecarrying out the orders of their bosses and that they needed thismoney to get some guns released. They also told him that the nextday was a Poya Day and that if money was given he could go homeon that day itself but that they could not keep him till the followingday. He was also told that if he did not give money, he would betaken to Batticaloa and if that happened there was no chance ofcoming back.
According to G.C.W's evidence by this time he had realized thatalthough his captors pretended to be Tamils, they in fact were not
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Tamils. They could speak sinhala very well. He knew that they werenot terrorists. He thought that even if he gave the money they weregoing to kill him. He therefore decided not to give them any moneybut just told them that he had twenty lakhs and that he could givethem ten lakhs. On that day there was a cricket match to be playedbetween Sri Lanka and India, so he told his captors that he couldnot continue to listen to that tamil music but he liked to listen to thecricket match commentary. They readily obliged and tuned theradio to the match commentary.
It is to be gathered from G.C.W's evidence that whilst all thosethings described by him were happening, his captors have alsoobtained from him the telephone numbers of his wife, sons and thedaughters. Around 12.30 noon, his captors gave him a phone andasked him to speak to his wife. When he took the phone, his wifeanswered from other end.
It is pertinent and opportune to turn our attention, as revealed inthe evidence led at the trial, to what was happening at theresidence of G.C.W at Ward Place, Colombo. The wife of G.C.W,loma Wickremasinghe has described in her evidence whathappened after her husband left home on that day. It appears fromthe evidence that Mrs. Wickremasinghe was a lady, well educatedand well conversant in three languages, Sinhalese, English andPali. She was also the author of a book on the Company Law andhad been a Company Secretary. At the time relevant to thisincident she was leading the life of a house wife, devoting the majorpart of her time to the translation of Buddhist Texts written in Pali toSinhala and English, to be published and distributed free of charge.Hereinafter she will be referred to as Mrs.W.
According to Mrs. W's evidence her husband G.C.W was in thehabit of leaving home around 6.00-6.30 am every day to play golf.The routine was for the driver to drop her husband at the golf cluband return home with bread for breakfast. The usual routine was forthe driver to return within 10-15 minutes. On the date of thisincident i.e. 30th March 1999, her husband G.C.W left homearound 6.15 am. in vehicle No. 61-9020 driven by driverNandasena for the golf club. The vehicle did not return till about
am., so she gave a call to the golf club and was told that herhusband did not come to the golf club and that the gentleman who
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was scheduled to play with her husband was waiting thereexpecting him Then, as the other driver was not available at thattime, she took the other vehicle and drove it herself along KynseyRoad and Horton Place to the golf club where she was told that herhusband did not come there that morning. Then she drove backalong a different route, that is the road running along the GeneralCemetary's boundary upto the Kanattha roundabout and thenalong the Kynsey Road back to her residence. Mrs. W hasexplained that the purpose of taking a different route on her returnjourney from the golf club was to see whether there was any roadaccident involving her husband’s vehicle. There was nothing of thatsort along the routes she covered.
According to Mrs. W’s evidece, after reaching home she phonedher son and the daughter and told them that the father was missing.Then they telephoned the Cinnamon Gardens police station andinquired whether there was an accident reported to that policestation. When they were told that no accident was reported, theywent to the Borella police station and made inquiries and got asimilar reply. Then they went to the accident ward of the GeneralHospital, but even there, there was nothing to suspect that therehad been an accident involving G.C.W. After returning home theycontacted friends and relatives and inrformed them about thedisappearance of G.C.W. Thereafter they went to the CinnamonGarden police station and made a complaint about thedisappearance of G.C.W. After they returned home InspectorGunawardana from the Cinnamon Garden police station came totheir residence. Around 12.30 noon she received a telephone call.The person who spoke from the other end spoke in Sinhala. He toldher that her husband, the vehicle and driver were with them andthat if the sum of money demanded by them was given herhusband would be sent home but if the money was not given hewas to be taken to Batticaloa and that it would be the end. Havingsaid so the man requested her to listen to her husband. Then herhusband spoke from the other end. He told her that he had beenkidnapped and that they were demanding a sum of money whichhe could not afford. He told her “I am a 66 years old. I have livedmy life. I am not scared to die; don’t give the money. I cant affordit.” According to Mrs. W’s evidence, she then told her husband,“GC, don’t worry, I will find the money and save you. Keep your cool
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and meditate (Ana Pana Sathi) and drink lot of water”. It was Mrs.W's evidence that before her husband spoke further the phone wastaken from him and another person then spoke to her.
It was pertinent at this stage to refer to G.C.W’s evidencerelating to the telephone conversation he had with his wife when hewas in the hands of his captors. According to G.C.W’s evidencewhen he spoke to his wife he told her “I am 66 years old. I havelived my life. Don’t give money to them”. Then his captors got angryand said “don’t talk about your age. If the boss learns about this, itwould be your end". G.C.W has stated that when he told his wifenot to give the money demanded from them she told him that shewould find the money and save him. In his evidence G.C.W has notspecifically stated how his telephone coversation with his wifecame to an end.
Mrs. W in her evidence has described what happened after herhusband spoke to her. According to her evidence the unknowncaller at the other end took the phone from her husband and spoketo her. That man said that they wanted the money. Mrs.W told himthat she would give them any amount demanded and requested
him not to harm her husband. That man then said
She did not at once realize the exact amount meant by him. So sheasked whether it was two lakhs and said that if it was two lakhs shecould give that amount at anytime. Then that man said that it wasnot two lakhs but two hundred lakhs. When she said that they wereunable to give such an amount that man said “you can give it. Tellus in one and a half hours time, if it is not given mahattaya will befinished. He will be taken to Batticaloa.” Then she said “I will give itsomehow – where shall I bring the money?” Then that man said“Have the money ready. We will let you know later.”
Nandasena who was abducted along with G.C.W was alsodetained in the same building where G.C.W was. Nandasena wasalso blindfolded. In his evidence he has stated that he heard thepersons who were there demanding Rs.200 lakhs from G.C.W andthe latter saying that he did not have such a big amount. Later heoverheard G.C.W speaking to his wife over the phone. Heoverheard G.C.W telling his wife that they demand Rs.200 lakhs.
From the evidence of G.C.W, Mrs. W and Nandasena it wasestablished beyond reasonable doubt that the telephone call
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demanding a ransom of Rs.200 lakhs for the release of G.C.Woriginated from the place where G.C.W was being detained and theperson who demanded the ransom was a person who wasdetaining G.C.W.
According to the evidence of Mrs.W, about one hour after shereceived the phone call demanding Rs.200 lakhs, her brother,Lalith Kotalawala, the Chairman of the Seylan Bank, came to herresidence. He promised to lend her Rs.200 lakhs. According to Mrs.W's evidence, at the time she received the call demanding theransom there was an Inspector of police from the CinnamonGardens police at her residence. He listened on the extension tothe whole conversation between her and the person whodemanded the ransom. The man who demanded the ransomwarned Mrs. W not to inform the police and told her that if she did,everything would be over. However as shown above, from the verybeginning the police were fully aware about the demand for theransom. Mrs. W has stated that the police instructed her to get theransom money in new notes and to note down the numbers ofthose notes.
The Seylan Bank has provided Rs.200 lakhs to Mrs. W in brandnew uncirculated Rs.1000/- notes, which had G/66 as seriesnumber. Through the evidence of witnesses from the Seylan Bankand the Central Bank the prosecution has placed before Court a fulllist containing the numbers of all notes used to pay the ransom.When the abductors contacted the residence of G.C.W, they wereinformed that the ransom money was ready. ThererafterNandasena was released with the vehicle. After he reurned homeMrs. W was instructed by the abductors over the phone to go in thevehicle with Nandasena and deliver the ransom according to theinstructions that would be given to her once she left home.Accordingly Mrs. W has left home in the vehicle driven byNandasena and on the way instructions had been given to hermobile phone about the route to be taken by them. Eventually theywere directed to a place at Angoda where Nandasena, actingaccording to the directions given, handed over the two brief casescontaining the ransom money to two persons who accepted thetwo bags without turning their faces towards him. The ransom wasdelivered around 10.00 in the night. Some minutes afterNandasena delivered the ransom, the abductors have telephoned
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Mrs. W and infromed her that they had received the money and thather husband would be released.
According to the evidence of G.C.W around midnight that day,his captors informed him that they had received the money. Theyasked him to count the money but he refused to do it. Later he wastold that the money was OK. He was thereafter taken in a van to bereleased. Two persons travelled in that van. It was driven by thesame person who drove his vehicle when he was abducted. Theother person who travelled in the van in the seat behind the frontseats was the same person who got into the left front seat of hisvehicle at the time he was abducted. Eventually they dropped himon the High Level Road near Kottawa from where he returned to hisresidence in a hired three-wheeler. Thus ended the events relevantto the abduction, detention and extortion. The investigationcommenced therefrom.
As I have already mentioned when Mrs. W received the call fromabductors demanding the ransom, a police officer was listening tothe conversation from the extention of the main telephone atG.C.W's residence. Therefore though there was no officialcomplaint, the police knew from the begining that G.C.W was beingheld to ransom. It was Mrs. W’s evidence that the police instructedher to get the ransom money in new notes and to note down thenumbers of those notes. The evidence reveals that on thedirections given by Lalith Kotalawala, the Seylan Bank providedRs.200 lakhs to Mrs. W in brand new uncirculated notes in bundlescontaining 100 notes in each bundle. All notes provided by theBank had series No. G /66 and each bundle contained 100 noteswith consecutive serial numbers.The Chief Cash Controller AnandaCoomaraswamy had a note, from which series and serial numbersof all notes used to pay the ransom could be ascertained. That notewas marked and produced at the trial as P8.
After G.C.W’s release and in the course of their investigationsthe police obtained a copy of p8. At the request of the police theDirector of Information has issued a press communique to the printand electronic media containing the serial numbers of G/66 Rs.1000/- notes used to pay the ransom. The public was warned notto accept or to deal with those notes. The said press communiquecontained a request that if any one came across such notes he
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should notify the police. This notice was in the newspapers on4/4/1999.
On 5/4/1999, Somaratne, the Manager of the People’s Bankbranch at Meegalewa saw that notice in the ‘Divaina’ newspaper of5/4/1999. He took a special note of the contents of that notice andat the end of the day he examined the money that was in the Bank'ssafe and found 209, Rs.1000/- notes bearing those G/66 serialnumbers mentioned in the press notice. He has given the numbersof those 209 notes in his evidence given at the trial. (Pages 106,107-111, 114-120 volume 3 of the proceedings.) Thereafter heinformed the Meegalewa police about finding those notes in hisBank. The police informed him that a police team would come tomeet him. In the night of 5/4/99, around 12.45 midnight (early hoursof 6/4/99) a police team led by C.I.- Kumarasinghe visited him Theywanted him to examine the deposit slips and ascertain the personswho had deposited large sums of money.
The bundles of money kept in the safe had a slip of paperattached to each bundle showing the date on which the notes in thebundle have been deposited in the Bank. The slip of paper in thebundle where 209 G/66 notes were found had the date 1/4/1999.When the deposit slips for 1/4/1999 were checked it was found thata sum of Rs. 200,000/- had been deposited to the current accountof the Maha Kathnoruwa Govi Sanvidanaya on 1/4/1999. Thepresident, secretary and the treasurer had authority to operate thataccount. The president of that Sanvidanaya was one D.M.HerathBanda. The deposit had been made in the name of D.M.HerathBanda. The police obtained Herath Banda’s address from theManager. There were other deposits in sums like 15,000/-, 10,000/.The Bank Manager gave the addresess of all those depositors tothe police. On the next day i.e. 6/4/1999 when the police checkedthe cash that was in the Bank's safe another G/66 note relevant tothe investigation was found. All 210 G/66 notes were bundled andsealed and subsequently handed over to the police by the Bank onthe orders of court.
According to the evidence of Chief Inspector Kumarasinghe ofthe C.I.D. he was one of the officers of the team that was detailedto investigate into the abduction of G.C.W. On 5/4/1999 around8.30 p.m. he left Colombo with Chief Inspector Priyantha Jayakody,
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I.P.-Abeysekera, I.P-Wedasinghe, S.I.- Sulaiman and S.I.-Thabrewand some other officers in a vehicle for Meegalewa. Around
a.m. the same night they reached Meegalewa and met theBank Manager Somaratna. He obtained from the Bank Managerthe details of person who have deposited large sums of money on1/4/1999. The biggest deposit was a sum of Rs.200,000/-deposited by D.M.Herath Banda of the Mahakathnoruwa GoviSanvidanaya. There was another deposit of Rs. 167,000/- byG.D.Premaratna of Galnewa. Since it was not possible to tracefrom the deposit slips the identity of the person or persons whodeposited the G/66 notes he decided to meet those persons andquestion them.
After conducting further investigations at the Bank, he left theBank with the police party around 10.00 am on 6/4/1999 for HerathBanda's house. He reached the house of Herath Banda around 12noon. There was a white coloured van stopped in front of HerathBanda's house which was closed at that time. There was a personin the vicinity and the police inquired from him about Herath Bandaand were told that Herath Banda was at his brother Pinhamy’shouse which was about 75 yards away. Then C.I.-Kumarasinghewith C.I.-Jayakody and I.P.-Abeysekera went to Pinhamy's houseand found Herath Banda, the 6th accused, there along with threeothers. Of those 3 persons, Kumarasinghe knew one person -Nuwan the 2nd accused. The 2nd accused was an ex-airman laterworking at Sunanda Trade Centre, Peliyagoda. I.P.- Abeysekeraknew another person, Victor Ranthilaka, the 4th accused. C.I.-Jayakody knew the other person Kapila the 5th accused.
C.l. – Kumarasinghe has stated that he questioned HerathBanda about the deposit of Rs. 200,000/- in the Bank but he wasunable to satisfactorily answer the questions – he started tostammer and his demeanour was very unsatisfactory. He decidedto take Herath Banda into custody for further investigations andquestioning and did so having explained the charge to him. He keptthe 2nd, 4th and 5th accused separately and questioned them buthe was not satisfied about the manner in which they answered hisquestions. He therefore took all of them into custody for furtherinvestigations having explained to them that they were being takeninto custody in connection with the abduction of G. C.Wickremasinghe and obtaining a ransom of Rs.200 lakhs. He then
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searched Herath Banda’s house and found a copy of the‘Lankadeepa’ newspaper of 31/3/1999. He searched the van whichwas in front of Herath Banda’s house and found inside it a batonand a copy of the 'Lankadeepa' newspaper of 5/4/1999. The 4thaccused Victor had the keys of the van.
Thereafter he, with the police party returned to the C.D.BColombo with 2A, 4A, 5A and 6A who were in police custody. Theyreached Colombo at 11.45pm on 6/4/1999. At the C.D.B.Kumarasinghe questioned 2A Ruwan Kumara Ranasinghe andrecorded his statement at 12.45 mid-night. Having recorded thatstatement he left the C.D.B. at 1.30am on 7/4/1999 with 2A andreached premises No.116/A/2, Wickremasinghepura Battaramullaat 2.00am. This place was not known to the C.l. earlier. That was ahouse which had an iron gate at the entrance to the premises. Heopened the gate and entered the premises with 2A. The latterpointed out to him a place on the ground close to a plant known inSinhalese as “rampe”. He dug the place pointed out by 2A andabout one foot under the surface he found a plastic bag in whichthere was another green coloured plastic bag. Inside the green bagthere were 15 bundles of Rs.1000/- notes containing rupees 15lakhs -all G/66 notes used to. pay the ransom money. C.I.-Kumarasinghe produced in Court marked P-16 an extract of 2A’sstatement given to him which also led to the discovery. This extracthas been produced under section 27 of the Evidence Ordinance.Then he returned to the C.D.B with 2A and the cash recovered byhim.
I.P.-Kumarasinghe says that he recorded the statement of 4AVictor at 7.45am on 7.4.1999. 4A signed that statement. Afterrecording that statement he went with 4A to house No.151, KudaButhgamuwa, Angoda. In that house there was SenarathHettiarachchi alias Jayalath, the 9th accused. He questioned 9Aabout the abduction of G.C.W and then having informed 9A thereason, he arrested him and recorded a brief statement from himthen and there.
According to I.P.-Kumarasinghe after making his statement 9Apointed out to him an almirah in his house which was not locked.9A opened the almirah'and pointed out the left side bottom shelf ofthe almirah where there was a black polythene bag inside whichthere werel 5 bundles of Rs.1000/- G/66 series notes. Each bundle
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had 100, Rs.1000/- notes and the total amount was Rs.15 lakhs.Inthe same bag there was a Motorola cellular phone, the serialnumber of which had been scratched off. All G/66 series Rs.1000/-notes found in the bag were notes used to pay the ransom.
It appears that whilst giving evidence C.I.Kumarasinghe hadmade a mistake by mixing up the numbers of notes found from 2Awith the numbers of notes found from 9A. He has corrected thismistake later, vide pages 17-27- Proceedings of 4/10/1999 Volume9 of the proceedings.
From the house of 9A, Kumarasinghe went to No.174/11,Kelanimulla, Angoda. It was the 4A, who was in his custody, whodirected him to that place.In that house there was a person calledLalith.The 4th accused took C.I.-Kumarasinghe to the kitchen of thehouse and from there 4A pointed out a place in the ceiling of themain house. Since there was no ceiling to the kitchen, from thekitchen one could insert a hand into the space between the roofand ceiling of the main house. When the place in the ceiling pointedout by 4A was examined C.I.-Kumarasinghe found a parcel insidewhich there was a polythene bag. In this bag there was a nickleBrowning pistol which was in working condition and which hadserial No. 58635(P5)with two magazines which could be used forthat pistol, a Rambo knife, blade three inches long, one set ofhandcuffs with keys, a black coloured pistol holster, ten rounds of38mm live ammunition, four rounds of 9.5 mm live ammunition, one6.9 mm live ammunition, one 4.5 mm live ammunition twenty fourrounds of 9 mm l|ve ammunition, one belt used by army officers, akahki uniform – both lower and upper parts. All those items weremarked and produced at the trial. The portion of 4th accused'sstatement which was relevant to the recovery of items from theceiling was also marked and produced as P32A .
. From Lalith’s home C.I.-Kumarasinghe returned to the C.D.B.with the 4th accused around 12.15 noon. At 13.00 hours herecorded 6A Herath Banda’s statement at the C.D.B. Afterrecording that statement at 14.00 hours he with a police partyconsisting of C.I.-Jayakody, I.P.-Abeysekera, S.I.-Sulaiman andS.I.-Thabrew and other officers left for Meegalewa in a vehicle with4A and 6A to check on the statements made by 4A and 6A. Theyreached 6A’s house at Meegalewa around 6.00pm on 7.4.1999.The 6th accused then led. C.I.Kumarasinghe to a room of hishouse. There were about 16 bags of paddy stacked in that room.
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The 6th accused pointed out the bag which was on top. C.I.-Kumarasinghe took that bag down, untied it and examined it andfound a black bag inside it. There were Rs. 1000/- notes – G/66series used to pay the ransom – to the value of Rs. 11,80,000/- andRs. 69,000/- in Rs.1000/- notes which were not G/66 series.Thereafter the police party left 6A’s house at 10.30 in the night andproceeded to 4A’s house in Saliyapura-Anuradhapura. Theyreached that house at Saliyapura around 3.00am the next day(same night). It was a small thatched house. It had only one door.As shown by 4A they entered the house and 4A pointed two boxeswhich were in the house. One was a wooden box and the other wasmetal box. The wooden box was on top of the metal box. When C.l.-Kumarasinghe opened the metal box he found a black colouredpolythene bag. The bag contained Rs.1000 notes to the value ofthirty lakhs and fifty thousand. All those notes were G/66 seriesnotes used to pay the ransom. At the time they visited 4A’s house -his wife and four children were there. They left 4A’s house around3.30am and proceeded to Kaduwela and following the directionsgiven by 4A reached a factory at Hewagama called Silver Forest.That place was shown by 4A. It was a factory and an office whichhad been closed. The office building had two stories. Inside theoffice there was a toilet. The premises was covered with high walls.There was an iron gate at the entrance to the premises. The rearside of the premises was bounded by Kelani River. In thecompound within the walls there were heaps of Kempas timberstacked. There was no one in the premises. C.I.-Kumarasinghethen detailed some officers of his party to guard the place andreturned to the C.D.B.
I.P.-Abeysekara who was in the police team which visitedMeegalewa Bank and 6A’s house has given evidence corroboratingC.I.Kumarasinghe’s evidence as to what happened at those placesand about the arrests of 2A, 4A, 5A, and 6A. After returning to theC.D.B., Abeysekara has recorded the statement of 5A. Afterrecording the statement around 1.30am, he has proceeded with apolice team and 5A to the house of 3A Anil at No.8, MangalaMawatha, Ganemulla, Kadawatha. The 3rd accused was not athome. He therefore left some police officers there to wait for Anil. Itappears that this vigil was unsuccessful until I.P.Jagath Rohana’spolice ‘scent’ brought the 3rd accused into the case. This will bereferred to in detail later. From there I.P.-Abeysekara proceeded to
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the house of 5A at C/6/6/1, Mawella Road, Pethiyagoda, Kelaniya.They reached that house around 3.15am. There was no one in thehouse and 5A opened the door with the key he had with him. Afterthey entered the house 5A pointed out a refrigerator to Abeysekera.When he opened the refrigerator 5A pointed out the plastic bottlerack affixed to the door of the refrigerator. Abeysekera obtained ascrewdriver and removed the screws which held the plastic bottlerack. When it. was taken away there were Rs.14 lakhs in G/66series Rs 1.000/- notes in bundles of 100 notes with consecutiveserial numbers stacked behind the plastic cover attached to therefrigerator door. All those were notes used to pay the ransom.Each bundle had a paper band around it. The police party left the5th accused’s house at 5.00am and went to the house ofChaminda, the 10th accused.That house was at No. 375/81,Ranasinghegama, Mulleriyawa. That house was pointed out by 5A.The 10th accused was at home. Abeysekera questioned him andrecorded his statement. After that statement was recorded 10Apointed out a place, that was the corner of the cement floor insidethe house, just next to the 2nd door one finds after enteringthrought the first door. The place shown by 10A was the cementfloor polished with black coloured polish. When Abeysekeraexamined that place he felt that the cement floor at that place wasnot as smooth as the rest of the floor. It appeared that that spot hadbeen newly cemented. He obtained a crowbar and broke thecement floor. About 3-4 inches beneath the surface he found apolythene bag which had 13 bundles of G/ 66 series Rs. 1000/-notes each bundle containing 100 notes. Those were notes used topay the ransom. From 10A’s house the police party went to thehouse of 11th accused H.A.Sumangala which was at No.70/38,Sarasavi Lane, Castle Street, Colombo 8. That house was pointedout to the police party by the 10th accused who was in custody atthat time. The 11th accused was at home. Abeysekara questioned11A and recorded his statement. After making that statement 11Atook Abeysekara upto the bathroom which was located towards therear of the house and pointed out a place under a cupboard whichwas near the bathroom. Abeysekera took the cupboard away anddug the floor which was under it with a crowbar. He found a whitecoloured bag in which he found 763 G/66 series notes of Rs. 1000/-denomination and a thousand rupees note not belonging to G/66series. Those 763 notes were notes used to pay the ransom.
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From 11A’s house Abeysekara went to 12A PriyankaraPerera’s house which was at No.12, Playground Road,Obeysekarapura, Rajagiriya. The time was about 6.05 am. Hearrested him. After the statement was made, 12A pointed out to hima place of the floor near the door leading to the kitchen. When hedug that place he found a pink coloured polythene bag and insidethe bag there were four bundles of G/66 series Rs.1000/- notes -three bundles each containing 100 notes and the fourth bundle with94 notes, all ransom money.
According to I.P.-Wedasinghe, on 7/4/1999 around 2.20 a.m.he went to the house of Pradeep Janaka, the 7th accused. Hequestioned 7A, arrested him and recorded his statement. Aftermaking the statement, 7 A took Wedasinghe to a room and pointed
out an almirah to him. The 7th accused himself took a key whichwas on top of the same almirah and opened it. There were clothesin the bottom shelf and there was money under those clothes.There were eight bundles of G/66 series notes each bundle having100 notes. There were also 35 notes of G/66 series and the total ofG/66 notes was Rs. 8,35,000/- In addition there were Rs.9000/- innotes not belonging to G/66 series.
From the house of 7A, Wedasinghe and his police party with7A proceeded to the house of 8A, Nelson Mahinda. That house wasat Eriyawetiya, Kelaniya. The 8th accused was at home.Wedasinghe questioned him, arrested him and recorded hisstatement. After making the statement, 8A showed a place near thedoor leading from the hall to the kitchen. With an Iron rodWedasinghe broke the cement floor and dug the ground. He founda cellophane bag about 6 inches under the surface. In that bag hefound 7 bundles of G/66 series Rs.1000/- notes, each bundlehaving 100 notes with consecutive numbers. Then 7A tookWedasinghe to the kitchen and showed the lower portion of adiscarded table fan. Wedasinghe unscrewed the bottom metal plateof the fan and found seven bundles of G/66 notes each containing100 notes with consecutive serial numbers. Thereafter he returnedto the C.D.B. the accused and the productions he has recovered.
On the same day i.e. 7/4/1999 around 6.35am Wedasingheleft the C.D.B for Ratnapura to arrest one Ariyasinghe, a Reserve
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Sub Inspector of Police attached to the Ratnapura police. Havingmade discreet inquiries about him in Ratnapura, Wedasinghe withhis police party went to Ariyasinghe’s house at Olugantota,Balangoda and arrested him at his house. Ariyasinghe is the 1staccused. After arresting the 1st accused they went to a nearbyhotel from which 1A obtained his travelling bag. It contained thesterling sub machine gun issued by the police to 1 A, his police cap,a Sam Browne belt, a police uniform, a pocket note book and theidentity card issued by the police. Thereafter with 1A he returned tothe C.D.B. in Colombo.
As stated earlier when I.P. -Abeysekara visited in search of 3AAnil to N0.8, Mangala Mawatha Ganemulla, Kadawatha, around1.30 am on 7/4/1999, 3A was not at home. During this period theO.I.C. Crimes in the Peliyagoda police station was Inspector JagathRohana. From newspapers he had learnt about G.C.W ransomcase. He also knew that in connection with the said case the policewere looking for a person named ‘Navy Anil’ or Anil Kaluarachchi.On 13/4/1999 he got an information about Anil. To check thisinformation he left the police station with a police party at 23.00hours on 13/4/1999 and went to No. 184/3, Makola South,Sapugaskanda. That house belonged to one Siripala Perera, arelative of Anil. Siripala Perera was not at home, but his wife, sonand other members of his family were there. He questioned theinmates and searched the house. He felt that the wanted manmight come to this house and therefore he remained inside thehouse having concealed his vehicle at a nearby place. Around4.30am a van came. It was Siripala Perera who came in that van.The Inspector questioned Siripala Perera and ascertained certainfacts from him but he felt that Siripala was trying to concealsomething. Therefore he arrested him and with him went to theKiribathgoda bus stand and the three-wheeler park and looked forAnil without success. Then he went with Siripala Perera to theColombo Private Bus Stand and from there to the Central BusStand. At the Central Bus Stand Siripala Perera showed him Anilwho was at the bus terminal where Embilipitya buses stop. Hequestioned the person shown to him as Anil and examined hisidentity card and ascertained the identity correctly. There was awoman and a priest with 3A Anil. The woman was introduced as
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Anil’s wife and the priest was a resident in Kolonna. He questionedthem suspecting that they have concealed ot aided Anil to concealthe money. He took all three of them to the Peliyagoda policestation and at the police station recorded Anil’s statement. Havingrecorded the statement at 11.00am (on 14/4/1999) he left thestation with a police party and Anil and went to Anil’s house at No.76, lhala Karagahamuna, Kadawatha. 3A Anil pointed out thishouse to him. Anil took him to the well in the garden and pointedout a basin which had flower plants. The Inspector removed thebasin and examined the ground under it. He then saw a rigifoambox coverd with earth. The box was buried in a pit made to its size.He took the box out, opened it and examined. Inside it he found aparcel covered with wax paper. Inside the parcel he found anotherpolythene bag which had the words ’Nipuna Samba’ printed on it.Inside that bag the Inspector found 13 bundles of G/66 seriesRupees 1000/- notes. Each bundle had 100 notes with consecutivenumbers He noted down all numbers then and there. Thereafter hebrought 3A and the money to the police station and handed overthe money to the reserve'having entered the same in the PR. Laterthe C.D.B. was informed about the arrest of 3A and the recorveryof the money and I.P. Wedasinghe later came to the Peliyagodapolice, station and took charge of 3A and the money. At the time hemade the detection. I.P. Jagath Rohana had no connectionwhatsoever to the police team which conducted investigations intothe ransom case.
According to the evidence of S.l. Rodrigo on 7/4/1999 around14.40 hours he with a police party and 9A Jayalath left the C.D.B.and went to Avissawella Road, Angoda in search. Rohana Perera(13A). The house was shown by 9A. Rohana Perera was not athome. Then they proceeded towards Kaduwela and at one point 9Ashowed a vehicle to Rodrigo and he stopped it. In that vehicle therewas one Chandralal Perera, a brother of Rohana Perera. Hequestioned Chandralal. It appeared to him that Chandralal wasexcited. Then he went to Chandralal’s house with him. That was at560/2, Hospital Road, Angoda. Chandralal took him to a bedroom‘ in the upstair of his house and showed him a parcel which was ontop of an almirah in the room. When he examined the parcel whichwas in a shopping bag he found 12 bundles of Rs.1000/- notes-all
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G/66 series. There were eleven bundles each having 100 notes -with consecutive serial numbers. In the 12th bundle there were 95G/66, Rs.1000/- notes and the total sum in the bag wasRs,11,95,000/- Rodrigo counted the notes and noted down thenumbers of those notes found in those bundles. He took Chandralalinto custody and returned to the C.D.B with the cash andChandralal. On the same day at 22.45hrs he questionedAriyasinghe (1A) and recorded his statement. Having recordedthat statement he left the C.D.B around 23.40 with a police partyand 1A for Balangoda. Around 5.15am on 8/4/1999 he reached 1 A’shouse at Olugantota, Balangoda. 1A showed him the directions toreach this house. The 1st accused showed him a plot of land,cultivated with tea, situated on a hill above 1A’s house. The firstaccused pointed out a place in that tea garden. Rodrigo dug thatplace with an iron rod and found a plastic bucket put into apolythene bag. In the bucket there was another polythene bag andin that bag there was a revolver and Rs. 1000/- currency notes.The revolver had a serial number – 10 D 2426. There were fiverounds of ammunition in it. He brought the bucket into the van inwhich he travelled and examined the money. There were 14bundles, each containing 100 one thousand rupees notes. Theother bundles, had 95 one thousand rupees notes. All those noteswere G/66 series notes. Each bundle was covered with a plasticcover fastened with a white ribbon.
On 17/4/.1999 I.P.Wedasinghe with a police team has taken 5Aand 8A at 11.25 from the C.D.B. He has first proceeded toN0.449/B, Tample Road, Eriyawetiya Road, Kelaniya. That was theplace where he arrested 8A on 7/4/1999. Wedasinghe and thepolice party searched the top of a cement cupboard that was in thekitchen of this house. There were pieces of metal parts on it. Whenthey removed those things, they found Rs.1000/- notes of G/66series there. Altogether there were 89 G/66 series notes. Therewere 11 notes of Rs. 1000/- denomination not in G/66 series andpome other cash.
From there the police party proceeded to 5A’s house atPethiyagoda. At his house 5A pointed out a metal flower pot standwhich was in the Hall of his house. It had a metal sheet on topaffixed to a metal stand which was an iron pipe. When the metal top
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was unscrewed, the police found 16 notes of G/66 series inside theiron pipe and one note of Rs.1000/- not belonging to G/66 series.
Thus the prosecution evidence was that on statements madeby 1st to 12th accused an on being pointed out by those acused theplaces where the money was, the police officers have recoveredlarge sums of G/66 notes, the numbers of which tally with thenumbers of Rs.1000/- notes of G/66 series provided to Mrs. W. bythe Seylan Bank to pay the ransom demanded for the release ofG.C.W. G/66 notes were not recovered from 13A but it was hisbrother Chandralal Perera who handed over to S.I.-Rodrigo abundle which contained Rs.11,95,000/- in 1000 rupees notes – allG/66 series. Chandralal was not indicted but was called as awitness for the prosecution. According to him, his elder brotherWallington Perera had a factory at Hewagama, Kaduwela. It was afactory which was established to manufacture water taps but thefactory did not go into production. Wallington Perera has allowedthe 13th accused to used the factory premises to conduct a timberbusiness. Thus the place was in the control of 13A. The 13thaccused used this premises to store his timber. It was the evidenceof G.C.W and C.I.-Kumarasinghe that there was Kempus timberstored in this factory premises. On 21/7/1999 during the trial thelearned President’s Counsel appearing for 13A made anapplication to Court for permission to dispose of the timber storedin this factory premises. The learned President’s Counsel hasspecifically stated to Court that he made that appllication on behalfof 13A and Chandralal Perera. This application made in openCourt, in the presence of 13A, very clearly indicates 13A’sconnection to this premises If 13A has stored his valuable timberwithin this factory premises he should have had effective controlover the premises.
It was Chandralal Perera’s evidence that on 5/4/1999, hisbrothers, 13A gave him a parcel asking him to keep that moneyuntil he came and collected it. It was this same parcel that wasgiven by Chandralal to S.I.-Rodrigo on 7/4/1999. That wasChandralal’s evidence. It establishes 13A’s connection with theparcel handed over to S.I.-Rodrigo by Chandralal. S.I.- Rodrigo’sevidence reveals that the parcel contained Rs. 11,95,000/- in G/66series Rs.1000/- notes. Thus the prosecution has led evidence to
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show that 1st to 13th accused had links to large amounts of G/66money.
The prosecution has led evidence to establish the identity ofsome of the offenders. G.C.W. has in Court identified the 1staccused as the person who in police uniform signalled his vehicleto stop at the place where the abduction took place. He hasidentified 2A as the person who pulled his driver Nandasena out ofthe vehicle and thereafter got into the driver’s seat and drove thevehicle. It was same 2nd accused who drove the van when theywere taking G.C.W. to be released. G.C.W. has identified 3A as theperson who opened the left front door of his vehicle and got into thefront left seat having pushed him to the middle of the front seat. 3Awas the person who was seated in the same seat when G.C.W wasbeing driven in the van to be released. It was 3A who placed a pistolto his head and pushed the head down at time of abduction.
According to G.C.W at the destination to which he was takenafter the abduction he (G.C.W) pulled down the cloth whichcovered his eyes and at that time he saw two persons in front ofhim with pistol in hand. Those two persons were the 4th and the 5thaccused. G.C.W has identified all those five accused at the trial aswell as at the identification parade.
Nandasena’s evidence was that he saw two persons inuniform signalling the vehicle to stop. At the trial and at theidentification parade he has identified 1A as one of the policeofficers who signalled him to stop the vehicle.
The police have subsequently taken G.C.W to the factory atHewagama, Kaduwela – that is the premises belonging toWallignton Perera where 13th accused has stored his timber.G.C.W has recognized that place as the place to which he wastaken and detained.
Fifteen persons were indicted in relation to this kidnapping andextortion incident. Accused No.15 was never arrested and trialagainst him was held without him. At the end of the prosecutioncase the learned Additional Solicitor General has made anapplication to acquit and discharge the 14th and 15th accused asthere was no evidence against them. The learned trial Judge hasthereupon aquitted both of them.
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At the trial G.C.W was subjected to a lengthy and a searchingcross-examination relating to the incident. He was especiallyquestioned with regard to the correctness of his identification of theaccused. The position put forward to G.C.W by the defence wasthat G.C.W was unable to identify the persons who abducted him.The police were questioned about photographing the accusedwhen they were in police custody. Some accused person in theirdock statements have stated that they were photographed at theC.D.B. It appears that those questions have been asked with a viewto suggest that the accused persons’ photographs were availableto G.C.W before he came for the identification parade.
The prosecution case rested on two main pillars – theevidence relating to the identity of the accused and the policeevidence relating to the recovery of G/66 notes from the accused.G.C.W was questioned in detail about the opportunities he had toobserve the five accused he had identified. At the argument beforeus the learned President’s Counsel for the 1st accusedendeavoured to stress the limited opportunity G.C.W had to seeand observe the first accused. At the trial G.C.W was questioned atlength regarding the time at which he was stopped by the abductorsand he was questioned about the difference of the time given in hisstatement to the police and his evidence in Court suggesting thathe has changed the times to show that there was sufficient light atthe time to see the accused clearly.
The police officers’ evidence regarding the recovery of G/66money was seriously challenged and they were subjected to asearching cross-examination. The prosecution has led in evidenceunder section 27 of the Evidence Ordinance, portions of the 1st to12th accused statements to the police, which led to the discovery offacts – namely that the accused persons had knowledge that G/66money was there at the places mentioned in those statements. Inaddition to those statements, the police officers have testified thatthe 1st to 12th accused pointed out the place from which G/66money was recovered.
The accused persons’ position was that they never madethose statements attributed to them but the police having usedforce obtained their signatures to blank papers. The accuseds’position was that they had no connection whatsoever to the G/66
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money produced in Court and that they knew nothing about thoseamounts of money. It appears from the suggestion made that theposition of the defence was that the police having recovered thismoney from somewhere, introduced various amounts against eachaccused in order to fabricate a case against them. The learnedPresident’s Counsel for the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th accusedsubmitted that the task of the defence is not to prove that the policeevidence relating to the recovery of money was fabricated. Hesubmitted that the task of the defence is to raise matters to showthat the police evidence is unreliable. We agree with thissubmission. The learned trial Judge has considered the suggestionthat the police have introduced the money in order to fabricate acase against the accused. He has given his reasons for notaccepting that suggestion. His reasons in short are as follows.
except the 2nd and the 4th accused the other accused, wereunknown to the police officers who conducted investigations intothis offence. There was no reason for those police officers tofabricate a serious case against the accused. According to the4th accused, I.P.-Abeysekera had displeasure with him due tosome incident which had happened when the 4th accused wasworking as a bus driver. The learned Judge has held that onecannot accept that Abeysekera would fabricate a serious caseagainst the 4th accused for such a petty matter.
There were other person who were arrested in the course of thisinvestigation but no charges were framed against them. Thismilitates against the view that the police have fabricated thecase.
The amount of cash produced by the police as money recoveredfrom the accused exceeded Rs. 180 lakhs. It is not possibleeven to imagine that such a large sum of money was availableto the police to fabricate a case against the accused.
It is in evidence that on 7/4/1999 the police recovered Rs.14lakhs from the 5th accused and Rs.14 lakhs from the 8thaccused. Sevan days thereafter the police have recovered afurther sum of Rs. 16,000/- from the 5th accused and Rs.89,000from the 8th accused. If the police evidence relating to therecoveries was a fabrication and money had been introduced,there was no necessity for the police to do it in two instalments.
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In addition to the recovery of G/66 notes, in certain instances thepolice officers have recovered other currency notes notbelonging to G/66 series. If the series. If the case was afabrication there was no necessity to include non – G/66 notesamong the recoveries.
The 1sl to 5th accused from whom the police recovered G/66notes had been identified by G.C.W as person who participatedto abduct him.
In our opinion the reliability of the police evidence and theevidence relating to the identity of the accused cannot beconsidered in isolated compartments. Evidence must beconsidered as a whole. The evidence in this case was that theSeylan Bank provided Rs.200 lakhs in G/66 series notes and theserial numbers of those notes have been noted by AnandaCoomaraswamy in document P8. This money was handed over toMrs. W in two brief cases. It was the evidence of Mrs. W that shetook those two brief cases when she set out from home to pay theransom. Nandasena’s evidence was that he handed over the twobrief cases, given to him by Mrs.W, to the persons who where thereto collect the ransom. Mrs.W’s evidence was that a few minutesafter Nandasena handed over the ransom money she got a callfrom the abductors stating that they had received the money.According to G.C.W’s evidence, around midnight that day hiscaptors informed him that they have got the money. They askedhim to count the money. Later he was told that the money was OK.He was released thereafter. This evidence beyond reasonabledoubt establish that those G/66 notes used to pay the ransommoney reached the hands of the abductors by midnight on30/3/1999.
On 1/4/1999, two hudred and nine of those G/66 notes usedto pay the ransom, have been deposited in the MeegalewaPeople’s Bank. On that day a person named Herath Banda hasdeposited Rs.200,000/- to the account of the MahakathnoruwaGovi Sanvidanaya. The police obtained that Herath Banda’saddress from the Bank. When the police visited the given addressthey met a Herath Banda. He is the 6th accused. The 6th accusedin his dock statement has admitted that he was the president of theMahakathnoruwa Govi Sanvidanaya in 1997 and 1998. Herath
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Banda was in the company of 2A, 4A, and 5A. All three of themhave been identitfied by G.C.W as person who took part in hisabduction and detention. Subsequently the police found G/66notes, used to pay the ransom, from Herath Banda’s house. Thepolice recovered a very large number of G/66 notes from 2A, 4aand 5A as well. It was the 4th accused who led C.I.- Kumarasingheto the Factory at Hewagama, Kaduwela where G.C.W was keptuntil the ransom was paid. Are all those incidents merecoincidences?
According to the evidence available in. the case, the 13thaccused had effective control and possession of the factorypremises at Kaduwela. It was the evidence of his own brotherChandralal Perera that on 5/4/1999 the 13th accused gave him aparcel containing money and asked him to keep the same till hetook it later. It was this parcel that was given to S. I. Rodrigo byChandralal who has stated that after he handed over the money hesaw S. I. Rodrigo counting the money. According to S.l.Rodrigo’sevidence the parcel handed over to him by Chandralal containedG/66 notes, used to pay the ransom, there was a sum ofRs.11,95,000/- in that parcel, all G/66 notes. This evidence cutsacross the theory that the money had been introduced by thepolice.
The evidence of I.P.- Jagath Rohana of the Peliyagoda Policealso cuts across the theory of introduction of the money by thepolice. He had no connection whatsoever to the police team whichconducted investigations. He, on his own and in the discharge ofhis police duties checked an information received by him andarrested the 3rd accused and recoverd from 3A G/66 notes to thevalue of Rs.13 lakhs.
According to the evidence of S.I.- Rodrigo he recovered a sumof Rs.14 lakhs in G/66 notes from a place pointed out by the 1staccused. G.C.W and Nandasena both identified the 1st accused asa person who was in police uniform and who signalled G.C.W’svehicle to stop. He was in fact a policeman to whom police uniformswere available and by virtue of his office he could afford, to be seeneven on Colombo in police uniform. Thus he had also theopportunity to play the role he was alleged to have played in thisincident.
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Thus police evidence relating to the recovery of G/66 moneyfrom 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th accused finds support from G.C.W'sidentification of those accused. The identification in turn findssupport from the recoveries. I.P.- Jagath Rohana’s evidencerelating to the recovery of G/66 money from the 3rd accused findssupport from G.C.W’s identification of the 3rd accused.Chandralal’s evidence relating to the money given by the 13thaccused and the evidence relating to the 13th accused’spossession and control of the Factory premises at Kaduwela istelling evidence againts the 13th accused. The association ofHerath Banda with persons identified as key figures in theabduction supports the police evidence relating to the recovery ofG/66 money from him. In this state of evidence, a Court can safelyrely on the reliability of the police evidence and identificationevidence relating not only in respect of those accused referred toabove but also against the other accused as well. The learned trialJudge was therefore quite justified in coming to the conclusion thatthe police evidence and evidence of identification was reliable andcould be safely acted upon.
The facts discovered by the portions of statements of theaccused persons and their acts of pointing out the places whereG/66 notes were found were that the accused had knowledge thatG/66 notes were in the places described and pointed out by them.How did they know that G/66 notes were in those places? In orderto find out the answer to this question the learned trial Judge hasconsidered the ways in which the accused could have gained suchKnowledge. According to the analysis, there were three ways inwhich the accused persons could have acquired their knowledgeabout the places where G/66 notes were found. The following arethe three ways.
The accused himself concealed those G/66 notes found in theplace where they were found.
The accused saw another person concealing the notes in thatplace.
A person who had seen another person concealing those notesin that place has told the accused about it.
The positions in No.2 and 3 are innocuous explanations. Fromthe evidence led in this case it was clear that by 5/4/1999 the police
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have warned the public by a press release which was given widepublicity by print and electronic media that those Rs.1000/- notesbelonging to G/66 series and bearing the serial numbers given inthe press release were the notes used to pay the ransom money toget G.C.W released. The public was warned not to deal with thatmoney. Therefore at the time the police recovered those G/66 notesfrom the places mentioned by the accused, it was public knowledgecurrent in the country that those notes were connected to a seriousoffence, and the fruits of a crime. However no explanation camefrom, 1st to 12th accused to bring their cases within the positionsset out in No.2 and 3 above. In Law they are not bound to explainbut in certain circumstances, failure to explain damning facts maybecome in law, presumptive evidence against them. See Seetin v.AGO).
At the time the police recovered G/66 series notes from 1st to12th accused it was public knowledge in the country that Rs.1000/-notes, the numbers of which were given in the press release issuedby the police and received wide publicity in the print and electronicmedia, were the currency notes used to pay the ransom to getG.C.W released. The police nave warned the public not to deal withthose Rs.1000/- notes. A request had been made to the public toinform the police if they came across those notes. In thosecircumstances, one would ordinarily and naturally expect anexplanation from any person who is shown to have had aknowledge about a place where those notes were concealed. Ifsuch knowedge had been acquired in a manner falling withinsituations 2 of 3 above one would expect and explanation fallingwithin one of those situations. In this case the accused has givenany such explanation. In this case the accused were facing seriouscharges and in the circumstance if they had any innocuousexplanation, about the manner in which they acquired theirknowledge or came to possess those notes one would expect themto give those explanations to exculpate themselves. That was whatChandralal Perera did at the stage of the investigation and it savedhim from being charged along with the other accused.
What was discovered from the statements of the accused andtheir conduct in pointing out the places where G/66 series noteswere concealed was their knowledge that G/66 notes were in those
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places. What were recovered consequent to those statementswere not just one note or two, but bundles of G/66 series notes.Those notes were in bundles of 100, with consecutive serialnumbers – that is in the same way those bundles were supplied bythe Seylan Bank to Mrs. W. The evidentiary value of the finding ofthe bundles of G/66 were notes was much more than the effectproduced by the recovery of just one or two notes from anindividual. The effect produced by the recovery of bundles of G/66series notes from 1st to 12th accused was damning. As the learnedtrial Judge has stated, G/66 money was found in places where theaccused had control and outsiders had no access. Money wasfound buried inside houses, concealed in refrigerators, flowerstands, and table fans, enclosed in bags of paddy stored insidehouses, on kitchen cupboards, in almirahs in bedrooms and inenclosed gardens. The only exceptions was the place pointed outby the 1st accused. It was in a land adjoining his house. Thelearned Judge having considered all those matters has ruled outpositions No.2 and 3- that is the innocuous explanations about themanner in which accused knowledge was derived. He has held thatthe accused persons knew the places where G/66 money wasconcealed because they themselves had put those notes in thoseplaces. Having considered the places where the money was foundconcealed, the learned trial Judge has held that all accused hadpossession of G/66 notes. The facts of possession and theintention to possess were both established, we agree with theconclusion of the trial Judge.
The next question is whether this evidence is sufficient toestablish the charges framed against the accused. Against allacqused there were two charges of conspiracy, conspiracy to allcommit abduction and extortion. The essence of the offence ofconspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. What isnecessary to prove in a charge of conspiracy is that allconspirators, with knowledge of the purpose and the design of theconspiracy, agreed to commit or to abet the offence which was theobject of the conspiracy or to act together with a common purposein committing or abetting an offence. Very often it is difficult to provea conspiracy by direct evidence. The existence of an agreement tocommit a particular offence is a matter to be inferred from the
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proved circumstances. The inference to be drawn from thecircumstances must be such as to exclude any other reasonableinference inconsistent with the existence of a conspiracy, in otherwords the existence of a conspiracy and a particular accused’sinvolvement in it should be the only irresistible inference to bedrawn from the facts. (See the Judgement of Court. The Queen vLiyanage and others.
According to the evidence in this case G.C.W was abductedfor the sole purpose of obtaining a ransom for his release. At thepoint of abduction G.C.W has identified the 1st to 3rd accused asparticipants of his abduction. Within about an hour of his abductionhe was taken to a closed down factory building situated within anenclosed compound to be detained there till the ransom was paid.It later transpired that this building was in the custody and controlof the 13th accused. At the time G.C.W was taken to this factorypremises he has identified the 4th and 5th accused as persons whowere there as participants of the incident. Within one week after thepayment of the ransom, the police have recovered from all fiveaccused (1st to 5th) large sums of money used to pay the ransom.The irresistible inference to be drawn from those facts is that theywere persons who have agreed to abduct G.C.W in order to obtaina ransom for his release. When a person is abducted to obtain aransom it is necessary to keep him in a safe place until the ransomis paid. From the description of that place given by G.C.W, theplace where he was detained was an isolated place where therewas no one in the vicinity to respond to his cries of distrees. Thusit was an ideal place to detain an abducted person. The 13thaccused had possession and control of this premises. His valuabletimber was stored there. The abductors would not have taken anddetained G.C.W there unless they had 13th accused’s permissionto use the premises. It was Chandralal’s evidence that his brother,the 13th accused gave him a parcel of money on 5/4/1999 for safekeeping. According to S.I.- Rodrigo’s evidence that parcelcontained G/66 money used to pay the ransom.There was Rs.11,95,000/- in it. This evidence gives rise, in the absence of areasonable explanation from the 13th accused to the irresistibleinference that he too was a person who agreeed to the plan toabduct and detain G.C.W to obtain a ransom.
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The main item of evidence against the 6th to 12th accused isthe recovery for G/66 money from them. Of course there is anotherfact relevant to the case of the 6th accused. When the police visitedhis residence he was in company of 2nd, 4th, and 5th, accused,three key figures connected to the abduction and the detention ofG.C.W. In the case of the 9th accused, a cellular phone wasrecovered from him and prosecution case was that it was thecellular phone used to give calls to G.C.W’s residence. Therer wasno proof of the ownership of this phone but the possession of thisitem of communication which had been used for communicatingwith G.C.W’s family when coupled with the possession ofRs. 15,000,000 by the 9th accused is sufficient to draw a stronginference that the 9th accused was also a party to the conspiracyto abduct G.C.W to extract money from his family.
Thus it is our view that against 1st to 5th;and 13th accused,there is sufficient evidence to draw the irresistible inference thatthere was an agreement among them to abduct G.C.W and toobtain a ransom for his release. This is a direct reasonableinference deducible from the available evidence without the aid ofany presumption. Thus the convictions of 1st to 5th accused andthe 13th accused are convictions based on legitimate, irresistibleinferences drawn from the proved facts. We therefore uphold theconvictions of those accused for the charges of conspiracy. The1st, 2nd, and 3rd accused have been convicted for abductingG.C.W and Nandasena. We affirm their convictions on thosecounts. The 4th 5th and 13th accused have been convicted forabetting the 1st to 3rd accused to abduct G.C.W. We affirm theirconvictions. The iearned trial Judge has convicted the 1st to 5thand the 13th accused for abetting a person unknown to theprosecution to commit the offence of extortion by demanding theransom from Mrs.W.
The learned Solicitor General submitted that the identity of theperson who gave the telephone call to Mrs. W was not known. Inthose circumstances the prosecution was unable to frame a chargeagainst any accused for extortion. However it was clear from theevidence that the call demanding the ransom originated from theplace where G.C.W was being detained, but there was no evidencethat all accused were present at the time the ransom wasdemanded. It was therefore not possible to frame charges against
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the accused under section 32 of the Penal Code. It was in thosecircumstances that the prosecution charged all accused forabetting a person unknown to the prosecution to commit extortion.On the inferences to be drawn from the available evidence we holdthat the learned trial Judge has rightly convicted the 1st to 5th andthe 13th accused for abetting an unknown person to commit theoffence of extortion.
With regard to the 6th to 12th accused, the only evidenceagainst them was the police evidence relating to the recovery ofG/66 money from them consequent to statements made by themand on being pointed out by them. The learned trial Judge hasaccepted the police evidence ralating to the recovery of G/66 notesas reliable evidence. On this evidence he has held that thoseaccused had knowledge that G/66 notes were there in the placesmentioned by them and pointed out by them. Thereafter havingconsidered the ways in which the accused could have acquiredsuch knowledge, the learned Judge had come to the conclusionthat the accused had such knowledge because they themselveshad put those notes in the places mentioned and pointed out bythem. On this basis he has held that the accused persons were inpossession of those G/66 money recovered from them.
Possession of such large quantities of G/66 money within tendays after the ransom was paid remained unexplained at the endof the trial. In the absence of any explanation from the 6th, to 12,haccused about their possession of such large quantities of G/66notes within such a short time, the learned trial Judge has drawnfrom the proved facts, a presumption of fact under section 114 ofthe Evidence Ordinance, that 6th to 12th accused were also personswho were involved in the criminal transaction from the stage of theconspiracy up to the collection of the ransom. On this basis thelearned trial Judge has concluded that even the 6th to 12th accusedwere guilty of the charges of conspiracy to abduct-and to commitextortion and the other offences commited in the same transaction.
The legal validity (or the correctness) of the learned trialJudge’s decision to draw a presumption under section 114 of theEvidence Ordinance, was one of the important questions of lawargued before us in this appeal. Counsel of both sides who havevery wide knowledge and experience in the field of criminal law and
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evidence made their submissions to us on that question of law. Alllearned counsel for the accused appellants argued (assuming thatthe police evidence relating to the recoveries was reliable) that thelearned trial Judge has erroneously chosen to draw the moreserious presumption, when in fact and in law the available evidencepermitted, if at all, the drawing of the less serious presumption thatthe accused were only guilty receivers.
On the other hand the learned Solicitor General submitted thatthe general principle laid down in section 114 of the EvidenceOrdinance, which is very broad in its scope, permitted the learnedtrial Judge to presume from the proved facts that those who werein unexplained possession of large amounts of G/66 notes, withinsuch a short time, came to possess those notes because theythemselves were parties to the conspiracy and the subsequent actsby which the ransom was extracted from Mrs. W.
The Evidence Ordinance, in the Chapter relating to the burdenof proof, contains certain provisions relating to presumptions. Apresumptions is an inference which the Judges are directed orpermited to draw from certain states of facts in certain cases andthese presumptions are given certain amounts of weight in thescale of proof. Some presumptions are conclusive andirrebuttable.Some presumptions are presumptions of fact whichcan rebutted by facts inconsistent with the presumed fact. In orderto draw a presumption there must be proof of certain basic factsbefore Court. For instance, when it is proved that a boy is undertwelve years of age, the law directs the Judge to draw theirrebuttable presumption that such boy is incapable of committingrape.
Section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance which permits theCourt to presume the existence of a certain facts reads as follows.
“The Court may presume the existance of any fact which itthinks likely to have happened, regard being had to thecommon course of natural events, human conduct andpublic and private business in their relation to the facts ofthe particular case.”
Eight of the most important presumptions of fact that may be
drawn under the general principle laid down in the section are
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given as illustrations of the application of the principle laid
down in the section. Illustration(a) to the section is as follows.
"The Court may presume, that a man who is in possessionof stolen goods soon after the theft os either the thief or hasreceived the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless hecan account for his possession.”
In order to draw the presumption indicated in this illustrationthere must be proof of certain basic facts before Court. Firstly theremust be proof before Court as to the ownership of the property inquestion. Secondly there must be proof of the theft of that propertyand thirdly there must be evidence of the recent possession of thatproperty by the accused. Those proved facts then enables theCourt to draw, depending on the facts of the case,- and in theabsence of a reasonable explanation from the accused with regardto his possession, a presumption of fact with regard to the fact tobe proved namely that the accused was either the thief or a guiltyreceiver of stolen goods.
The circumstances in which the presumption under section114 may be drawn are not limited to cases of theft and retention ofstolen property. The decided cases indicate that a presumption offact, under section 114, may be drawn connecting accused personsto other offences as well. Thus in the case of The King v William
Perera <3> it has been held that very recent possession of propertyremoved when a robbery was committed coupled with evidencethat on the night of the robbery the accused was seen in the vicinityof the scene of the robbery with several other men raised, in theabsence of an explanation, an overwhelming presumption that theaccused participated in the robbery.
In the Indian case of Saundraraj v The State of MadyaPradesh!4) it has been held that in cases where murder androbbery were shown to be part of the same transaction, recent andunexplained possession of stolen articles, in the absence ofcircumstances tending to show that the accused was only areceiver, would not only be presumptive evidence on the charge ofrobbery but also on the charge of murder.
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When section 114 of Evidence Ordinance is closely examined,a very significant feature, which is hightly relevant to the exerciseof the discretion available to Court, Becomes apparent. In decidingto presume the existence of any facts, the Court can take intoaccount the common course of natural events, human conduct andpublic and private business in there relation to the facts of theparticular case. Those highlighted words indicate the guidingfactor. Those words clearly indicate that the reasonableness andthe correctness of the Court’s decision to presume the existence ofany fact would depend on the particular facts of that case. Thequestion of drawing a presumption of fact is a matter to beconsidered on a case by case basis . The use of the words 'in theirrelation to the facts of the case’ prevents the courts from layingdown any general guidelines regarding the situations in which aCourt may be justified on drawing a presumption under section 114of the Evidence Ordinance. When a trial Judge has presumed afact under section 114 of Evidence Ordinance, it is the unenviabletask of an appellate Court to examine the validity of the trial Judge’sconclusion in the light of particular facts of the case.
The decisions of the cases of The King v William Perera(supra), and Saundraraj v The States of Madya Pradesh (supra),indicate that in those two cases the Appellate Courts had, in thelight of the facts of those cases, endorsed the trial Judges’decisions to presume facts under section 114 of EvidenceOrdinance.
At the argument before us cases were cited by the learnedCounsel for the accused-appellants where the Appellate Courts didnot endorse the trial Judge’s decision to draw presumptions undersection 114 or the correctness of the directions given to the Juryregarding the permissibility of drawing presumptions of facts undersection 114 of the Evidence Ordinance.
In the case of The King v Lewishamy (5) the only evidenceagainst the accused was the unexplained possesion by them ofcertain property removed from the premises attacked by themembers of an unlawful assembly. The trial Judge’s direction wasthat from this unexplained possession, it was open to the jury toconclude that the accused were members of the unlawful assembly
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which attacked the premises where such property was kept. Thiswas held to be a misdirection and that the accused were not liableto be convicted for being members of an unlawful assembly.
In the case of Cassim v Udaya Mannaffl 519, the accusedwas charged with house breaking by night, theft and in thealternative retention of stolen property. It was the evidence in thecase, that on 14th January, 1943, some of the goods stolen from ahouse in Mannar which was burgled eight days earlier were foundwith the accused in Anuradhapura. The evidence was that theaccused was a hawker. The learned Magistrate has come to theconclusion that possession by the accused on 14.01.1943 atAnuradapura of property obtained by a burglary committed inMannar eight days before enabled him to draw the inference thatthe accused had knowledge that it was stolen property.Wijewardana, J. (as he then was) considering the fact that theaccused was a hawker and that there was no evidence whatever toshow that the accused was seen near the burgled house or even inMannar at or about the time of the burglary held that it was not safein the circumstances of the case to base a conviction forhousebreakng and theft on the isolated fact of the retention ofstolen property eight days later.
Those two decisions, when compared with those twodecisions I have considered earlier where the trial Judges’decisions to draw presumptions under section 114 were upheldshow the importence attached by the appellate Courts to the factsof each case in deciding the correctness of the trial Court's decisionto draw an inference under section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance.
In 1975, the Supreme Court or Sri Lanka in the case of DonSomapala v The Republic of Sri Lanka (7) has made a sweepingstatement which appears to restrict the application of the widegeneral principle contained in section 114 of the EvidenceOrdinance. That was a case where the accused – appellant wascharged alone on an indictment for the murder of three persons andthe robbery of cash and jewellery valued at Rs.500/- Theprosecution case presented at the non-summary inquiry in theMagistrates Court was that the accused – appellant with others hadcommitted the murders. In the High Court the accused-appellant
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was indicted on basis that he alone has committed the offence ofmurder. There was before Court medical evidence that at least twoperson had participated in the attack on the deceased, and thatseveral finger prints which the Registrar of Finger Prints was notable to identify, reasonably suggesting that more persons than onehad hands on the killing of the deceased persons.
The learned trial Judge summed up to the Jury that possesionby the accused of a wrist watch and a gold chain belonging to thedeceased, presence of the accused’s palm prints at the scene ofthe offence, possession of a sword by him and his conduct on thedate of his arrest were matters which they could take ontoconsiderarion against the accused. The summing up thencontinued as follows. “In a case where murder and robbery hasbeen shown, as in this case, to form part of the same transaction,recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property will bepresumptive evidence against a person on a charge of robbery andwould similarly be evidence against him on a charge of murder.”
Commenting on this the Supreme Court has stated as follows,“The Court may presume that a man who is in possession of stolengoods, soon after the theft, is either a thief, or has received goodsknowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for itspossession. This is a presumption which a Court mav or may notdraw depending on the circumstances of the case. There is no‘similar’ presumption that a murder committed in the sametransaction was committed by the person who had suchpossession. There is no presumptive proof of this”, (emphasisadded)
An examination of the facts in Somapala’s case, as set out inthe judgment of Supreme Court, shows that there was no evidencethat the sword recovered from the accused had been used to inflictthe fatal injuries on the deceased. The medical evidence showedthat probably at least two persons have participated in the killings.The presence of many other finger prints at the scene which werenot decipherable indicated that those prints could have come fromother persons who participated in the attack. The Supreme Court’sfinding that the jury was not justified in finding that the accused wasthe murderer is defensible on those special facts. The SupremeCourt has affirmed the accused’s conviction for robbery, whichshows that the Court has based its conclusion on the presumption
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drawn under section 114.
Commenting on the decision in Somapala’s caseCoomaraswamy has stated that “This case seems to restrict thediscretionary power in the Court under section 114 and to overlookthe fact that section 114 (a) is only an illustration of the presumptionthat may be drawn under section 114.” (Law of Evidence Vol II Book
1 p.3 15) In the case of Attorney-General v Seneviratne (®) theaccused was charged with the murder of two persons and therobbery of bags of pepper which were in the deceaseds’ house.There was evidence that on the night of the murder, the accused ata point which was three quarters of a mile away from thedeceaseds’ house loaded bags of pepper belonging to thedeceased into a car at 11.30 p.m. There was a trial of pepper seedsfrom the deceaseds’ house up to the point where the bags wereloaded into the car. Two blood stained foot prints, positivelyidentified as the accused’s foot prints, were found inside the roomwhere the dead bodies of the deceased persons were found. A pairof shoes recovered from the accused had stains of human blood. Abunch of keys belonging to the deceaseds’ household wasrecovered on a statement made by the accused. There was alsoevidence suggesting that one weapon could have caused theinjuries found on the two dead bodies. The accused’s position atthe trial was that he was not guilty and knew nothing about thewhole incident. The summing up did not contain any reference to apresumption of fact to be drawn under section 114 of the EvidenceOrdinance.
Weeraratna, A.C.J. delivering the majority judgement of theSupreme Court in appeal filed by the Attorney-General sgainst thedecision of the Court of Appeal acquitting the accused on the twocounts of murder held that the available circumstantial evidencewhich was of strong and compelling nature implicated the accusedon all three counts of the indictment. Convictions for murderentered by the High Court against the accused were restored bythe Supreme Court. In his Judgement Weeraratna, A.C.J. referredto the facts in Somapala’s case and expressed the view that theruling in that case should be confined to the special facts of thatcase. His Lordship added that a trier of facts is entitled to concludethat “where murder and robbery form part of the same transaction
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the person who committed the robbery committed the murder also.The validity of such a conclusion depends on the facts of thetransaction.” AG. v Seneviratne (supra)
Thus it is quite clear from the cases I have referred to above,that the validity of any inference as to the existence of any facts,drawn from the proved facts, depends on the facts of the particularcase. The broad general principle, couched in broad languagegiving a wide discretion to a trier of fact to be used, having regardto the common course of natural events, human conduct and publicand private business in their relation to the facts of a particularcase, cannot be curtailed of restricted by reference to an illustrationprovided to illustrate the application of the general principle laiddown in section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance.
In Cassim v Udaya Mannar (supra) Wijeyawardene, J. (as hethen was) cited with approval the following passage from Taylor onEvidence which shows that the application of the general principlecontained in section 114 and the presumption to be drawnthereunder is not confined to any particular category of offences.
"The presumption is not confined to cases of theft but appliesto all crimes even the most penal. Thus on indictment for arsonproof that property which was in the house at the time it was burnt,was soon afterwords found in the possession of the prisoner hasbeen held to raise a probable presumption that he was present andconcerned in offence. A like inference has been raised in the caseof murder accompained by robbery, in the case of burglary and inthe case of possession of a quantity of counterfeit money.” (12thEd.- para 142 emphasis added)
Section 114 of Evidence Ordinance is a reproduction ofsection 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, drafted by James FitzjamesStephen, Q.C. In moving the draft Act before the LegislativeCouncil on 5th March 1872, he had stated that he had put intowriting what he had to say on the subject dealt with in the Act andthat he proposed to publish what he had written by way of acommentary upon or introduction to, the Act itself. His notes havebeen subsequently published under the title “An Introduction to theIndian Evidence Act. The Principles of Judical Evidence.” In thiswork referring to secton114 he has stated as follows. “It declares,
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in section 114, that the Court mav in all cases whatever draw fromthe facts before it whatever inferences it thinks just.” (2ndimpression 1904, page 181, emphasis added)
The words 'may in all cases whatever draw’ in the abovequotation indicate that Stephen intended to make section 114applicable, when it is to be invoked in criminal cases, to all offenceswithout limiting it to any category of offences. With the words usedin section 114 Stephen has effectively given expression to hisintention.
Thus the categories of offences in respect of which apresumption under section 114 may be drawn are not restricted orclosed. The Courts are left with an unfettered discretion in all casesto presume, if so advised, the existence of any fact ‘ which it thinkslikely to have happened, regard being had to the common courseof natural events, human conduct and public and private businessin their relation to the facts of the particular case’.
We therefore hold that on the proved facts of this case, it wasopen to the learned trial Judge to draw, in his discretion, anypresumption of fact, having due regard to the particular facts of thiscase.
In the instant case proof of the basic facts necessary for aCourt to consider the application of the principle contained insection 114 were before Court. There was proof that G.C.W wasabducted; a ransom was demanded for his release; the ransomwas paid; G.C.W was thereafter released and within a period ofless than ten days from the payment of ransom large quantities ofcurrency notes used to pay the ransom were recovered from thepossession of the 6th -12th accused – appellants in circumstancesshowing that they had effective control of the money recoveredfrom them. The learned Solicitor-General submitted that if the 6th to12th accused were innocent receivers of those currency notes itwas within their power to offer an innocent explanation regardingtheir possession. That was what Chandralal Perera had done.
The learned Solicitor-General pointed out the ‘facts of theparticular case’ which justified the drawing of the higher
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presumption that the 6th to 12th accused too were perpetrators ofthe main offences set out in the indictment. The following were thefacts set out by him.
The manner in which G.C.W was abducted and detainedvery clearly showed that the entire operation had been wellplanned and carefully thought of.
The facts surrounding the abduction, detention and thecollection of ransom clearly showed the involvement ofseveral persons in the entire operarion which inevitablyleads to the conclusion that they had acted with priorarrangement and agreement. In other words that there wasan agreement between all accused to act together forcommon purpose in committing or abetting an offence.
Soon after the ransom was paid wide publicity was given tothe series number and the serial numbers of the currencynotes used to pay the ransom and the public were warnednot to keep or deal with that money and the possession ofsuch money would expose the possessor to a criminalprosecution.
The manner in which the money was concealed eg. buriedinside houses, stacked inside the inner parts of arefrigerator, in the bottom part of a table fan, inside a flowerpot stand kept inside a house, in a bag of paddy etc.showed the consciousness of the possessors that themoney that was in their possession was the ransom moneyand the desire of the possessors to conceal the money toavoid easy detection at the same time keeping their closecontrol over the money.
The learned Solicitor-General submitted that when G.C.W.was abducted and detained those persons who participated inthose acts faced a grave risk. In the event of detection they wereliable to be exposed to serious penal consequences. Collecting the. ransom money from Mrs. W was in itself a rjsky operation as thepossibility of police intervention was there. The abductors havefaced all those risks and acted with lot of sacrifice to collect thehuge amount of ransom money for their personal gain.
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The total amount of G/66 notes recovered from 6th to 12thaccused exceeds Rs. 75 lakhs. This is more than one third of thetotal ransom money. The learned Solicitor-General asked ‘can anyreasonable man ever imagine or think that the abductors havelavishly gifted one third of their ‘hard earned' money to a selectedfew who had no hand whatsover in the abduction and thesubsequent collection of the ransom*? This point was well taken.When the facts of this case are viewed in the light of ordinaryhuman conduct, experience and common sense, the onlyreasonable inference deducible is that the 6th to 12th accusedcame to possess those G/66 money recovered from them on theirown account as their individual share received for their participationin the conspiracy to commit abduction and extortion and the otheroffences committed in the same transaction. As Rajarathnam.J,has observed in the case of Saundranayagam v Dayapala.‘The law does not place the Court in a dark room so to speakforbidding it to use its common sence and enjoining it to be alwaysa doubting Thomas.”
If there was an innocent explanation for their possession ofsuch large amounts of G/66 notes, one would expect the accusedto give that explanation in order to exculpate themselves. Of coursethey are not bound to prove their innocence. But when such strongincriminating evidence is tendered againat a person facing suchserious charges, and if that person has an innocent explanation,the ordinary human conduct is to tender that explanation in order toexculpate himself. When strong prima facie evidence is tenderedagainst a person, in the absence of a reasonable explanationprima facie evidence would become presumptive. – AG. v Seetin(Supra). In the absence of any such explanation, on the facts of thiscase, the learned trial Judge was justified in drawing thepresumption that even the 6th to 12th accused were guiltyparticipants of the offences with which they were charged. On thefacts of this case, it is possible to say that it was the only irresistibleinference to be drawn from the proved facts. We therefore hold thatit was open to the learned trial Judge, in the exercise of the widediscretion available to him in terms of the general principlecontained in section 114 of Evidence Ordinance, to draw thepresumption that even the 6th to 12th accused were not mere guiltyreceivers but were the perpetrators of offences of conspiracy and
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the offences of abetment of abduction and extortion. We thereforeuphold the learned Judge's conclusion that the 6th to 12th accused- appellant were guilty of the offences of conspiracy and abetmentof abduction and extortion.
At the hearing of the appeal, the learned Senior counsel forthe 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 12th accused did not contest theconvictions of those accused but made legal submission topersuade us to hold that their legal liability is less than the liabilityimposed on them by the learned trial Judge. The decision of thoseaccused not to contest the validity of their convictions indicate theircomplicity in the criminal transaction for which they were charged.However despite their decision not to contest the convictions, wehave considered the evidence against them to satisfy ourselvesabout the correctness of their convictions and we have alreadygiven our conclusions for upholding their convictions.
We also took special care not to utilize the position taken bythe 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 12th accused against the other accusedsrepresented by the other counsel. We have considered theevidence available against the other accused to satisfy ourselvesabout the correctness of their convictions and we have alreadygiven our conclusions even with regard to their convictions.
The other important legal argument raised by all counsel waswith regard to the applicability of section 355 of the Penal Code tothe facts of this case. All counsel contended that the prosecutionhas not proved the ingredients necessary to establish an offenceunder section 355 of the Penal Code. They contended that, if at all,the facts proved by the prosecution established an offence undersection 356 of the Penal Code and therefore the learned Judge’sdecision to convict all accused for an offence under section 355 ofthe Penal Code was wrong in law. Section 355 of the Penal Codereads as follows.
“ Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that suchperson may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be putin danger or being murdered, shall be punished with rigorousimprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years andshall also be liable to fine.”
QAAriyasinghe and others v The Attorney-General403
(Gamini Amaratunga)
In order to prove an offence under this section, it is necessaryto prove that the accused had the intention at the time of abductionthat the person abducted should be murdered or would be sodisposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered. It is theburden of the prosecution to prove that the accused had thatparticular intention at the time they abducted the victim. Thatintention must be an unequivocal intention. It cannot be conditional.
Section 355 of the Penal Code is identical to section 364 of theIndian Penal Code. In the Indian case of Nedo Kar v The State <1°)it has been held that in order to bring home a charge under section
the Judge or Jury must be satified that at the time when theaccused took away the deceased, they had the intention to causehis death. In Tondi v The State of Uttara Pradesh(11) there was noevidence that at the time of the abduction the accused had theintention to murder the deceased or to dispose of him as to be putin danger of being murdered. It was held that a conviction undersection 364 was not warranted.
In SamundarM The Emperor <12> it was held that section 364has no application when the intention to murder was not inexistence at the time of abduction. The section is not applicablewhere the object of the abductor was to hold the abducted personto ransom. In such a case the abductor is liable to be convictedunder section 365. In Bahadur Ali v The Emperor (13> the accusedwho wrongfully enticed a young woman on the pretext of talking herto a police station, wrongfully confined her whilst he negotiated withher relatives for the payment of a sum of money which waspractically her ransom. It was held that his act fell under section
365.
Section 365 of the Indian Penal Code is identical to section356 of our Penal Code. It reads as follows.
“Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to causethat person to be secretly and wrongfully confined shall bepunished with imprisonment of either description for a termwhich may extend to seven years and shall also be liable tofine.”
All learned counsel for the accused-appellants invited ourattention to section 356 and submitted that assuming that theprosecution evidence is accepted, the offence made out by the
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evicence was an offence under section 356 of the Penal Code andnot the offence under section 355 set out in the Indictment.
It is very clear from the evidence available in this case, that theobject of the abductors was to hold G.C.W. to ransom. Subsequentevents confirm this. The abductors have not stated that they weregoing to kill G.C.W of the ransom was not paid. What they havesaid was that if the ransom was not paid they were going to takehim to Batticaloa and that it would be the end. It is therefore clearthat on the available evidence one cannot conclude that at the timeG.C.W was abducted, the abductors had the intention to kill G.C.W.Accordingly it is our considered view that the prosecution has failedto make out a case falling under section 355 of the Penal Code. Wetherefore hold that the convictions of the 1st to 3rd accused forcommitting an offence under section 355 of the Penal Code and theconvictions of the 4th to 13th accused for abetting the 1st to 3rdaccused to commit an offence under section 355 of the Penal Codeare not tenable in law.
We are satisfied that on the available evidence, the 1st to 3rdaccused-appellants could have been rightly convicted forcommitting an offence under section 356 of the Penal Code. Wetherefore set aside the conviction of the 1st to 3rd accused for anoffence under section 355 and substitute therefore a convictionunder section 356 of the Penal Code. In consequence, theconvictions of the 4th to 13th accused-appellants for abetting thecommission of an offence under section 355 of the Penal Code arehereby set aside and a conviction of the 4th to 13th accused forabetting an offence under section 356 is substituted therefore.
We now turn to the question of the sentence. The learned trialJudge has given, for each offence, the maximum sentence ofimprisonment prescribed by law. On the facts of this case, theaccused-appellants deserve it. In the recent past a new wave incrime has emerged in Sri Lanka: Criminals have started'to kidnapor abduct persons with a view to get huge amounts of money asransoip. The Indian Parliament has brought an amendment to theIndian Penal Code to deal with a similar situation that has emergedin India in the recent past. Section 364 A of the Indian Penal Code,
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(Gamini Amaratunga)
inserted by Act No. 42 of 1993 and subsequently enlarged by ActNo. 24 of 1995 reads as follows.
“Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person indetention after such kidnapping or detention and threatens tocause death or hurt to such person or by his conduct gives riseto a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put todeath or hurt or causes hurt or death to such person in orderto compel the Government, any foreign state or international,inter-governmental organization or any other person to do orabstain from doing any act or to pay a- ransom, shall bepunishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall alsobe liable to fine.”
The important thing to be noted is the sentence prescribed bythis new section. It is our view that the time has come for ourLegislature to consider whether a similar amendment to our Penalcode is necessary and desirable to arrest this new wave of crimeemerging in Sri Lanka.
The learned trial Judge has directed that all sentences ofimprisonment imposed on the accused-appellants shall runconsecutively. All learned counsel for the accused-appellantsaddressed us on this aspect. They contended that all offences havebeen committed in the course of the same transaction andtherefore the learned trial Judge should have ordered that thesentences of imprisonment imposed by him shall run concurrently.The learned counsel invited us to give a direction (if we uphold theconvictions and the sentences) that the sentences of imprisonmentshall run concurrently.
Section 67 of the Penal Code limiting the punishments foroffences reads as follows.
“Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, anyof which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not bepunished with the punishment for more than one of suchoffences unless it be so expressly provided.
Where anything is an offence falling within two or moreseparate definitions of any law in force for the time being bywhich the offences are defined or punished; or
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Where several acts of which one or more than one, would byitself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute whencombined a different offence; The offender shall not bepunished with a more severe punishment than the Court whichtries him could award for any such offence.”
This provision contains a rule of substantive law based on theprinciple that no man can be punished twice for the same offence.The section regulates the measure of punishment. Illustration (a) tosection 67 shows that the first paragraph of the section isapplicable to situations where there is repetition in the sametransaction of several criminal acts of exactly the same charactersuch as a number of blows on one person or the theft of severalarticles in one house breaking. In this case there were twoconspiracies, and abetment of abduction and extortion. Thoseoffences do not fall within this limb of the section. The 1st to 3rdaccused have abducted G.C.W. and Nandasena at the same timeand in the same transaction. Illustration (b) to the section showsthat when the same offence is committed at the same time againsttwo distinct persons, the principle set out in the 1st limb of section67 has no application. Thus the first limb of section 67 is notapplicable to the offences with which the accused-appellants werecharged.
The second limb of section 67 provides that where anything isan offence falling within two or more separate definitions of law inforce for the time being the offender shall not be punished with amore severe punishment than that which the Court which tries himwill award in any one of such offences. A similar provision iscontained in section 9 of the interpretation Ordinance.
The case of Jayanetti v MitrasenaW provides a goodexample of the application of this section. In that case the appellantin his Return submitted under the Income Tax Ordinance omitted toshow in his Return an income of Rs. 12,126/-. This omission waspunishable under section 92(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance. Hewas charged under this provision. Under section 90(2) making afalse return was also a punishable offence. On the basis of thesame omission the appellant was also charged under section90(2). The Magistrate who convicted him for both offences imposed
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(Gamini Amaratunga)
407
the maximum fine for both offences. In appeal Weeramantry, J.held that the same ‘act’ (omission) gave rise to both offences andthe appellant should be punished in respect of only one offencecarrying the heavier penalty.
In the present case the offences with which the accusedappellants were charged were not offences which fall into thecategory of offences contemplated in the 2nd limb of sction 67. The3rd limb of section 67 applies to cases where there are several actswhen individually taken are themselves offences become adifferent offence when all acts are combined. The principle involvedin the 3rd limb is that if the accused is found guilty of a greateroffence he cannot also be given a separate sentence for a minoroffence covered by the greater offence. In the instant case thereare no such offences.
Accordingly it is our view that section 67 has no application tothe charges framed in this case. For the separate offencescommitted by the accused-appellants separate punishment couldbe given and the learned trial Judge had the discretion to make thesentences of imprisonment consecutive.
The learned trial Judge in coming to his conclusions hasproperly evaluated the evidence having considered thecontradictions marked and the omissions highlighted at the trial.We are of the view that, except as indicated above, there is nonecessity to interfere with the convictions and the sentences of theaccused-appellants. We therefore, subject to the variations madeby us, affirm the convictions and the sentences of the accused -appellants and dismiss their appeals. For the sake of clarity weappend hereto a schedule indicating the substituted sentences ofthe accused-appellant.
We finally wish to place on record our appreciation of thevaluable assistance rendered to us by all learned Counsel whoappeared in this appeal before us.
FERNANDO, J. -1 agree.
Appeal dismissed subject to variations.
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SCHEDULE OF SENTENCES
CA 147- 159 /1999H.C. Colombo 01/1999
I. P.G. Ariyasinghe
Count 1Count 2Count 3Count 4Count 17
10 years Rl7 years Rl -7 years Rl -7 years Rl -7 years Rl –
Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Ruwan Kumara Ranasinghe
Count 1Count 2Count 3Count 4Count 18
10 years Rl7 years Rl -7 years Rl -7 years Rl -7 years Rl –
Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SIRs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Anil Kaluarachchi
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 37 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 47 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 197 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Victor Ratnatilaka
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 57 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 207 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Kapila Kumaratunga
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 67 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 217 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
CA
Ariyasinghe and others v. The Attorney-General 409
(Gamini Amaratunga)
D. M. Herath Banda
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 77yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 227yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Pradeep Janaka
Count 110 years Rl • Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 87yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault. 6 monthsSI
Count 237yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Nelson Mahinda
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 97yearsRl•Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 247yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Sentences to run consecutively.
H. A. Senarath alias Jayalath
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 107yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Count 257yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine indefault 6 monthsSI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Chaminda Sisira Kumara
Count 110 years Rl – Rs.50000/- fine in default6 monthsSI
Count 27 years Rl-Rs.50000/- fine in default6 monthsSI
Count 117 years Rl-Rs.50000/-fine in default6 monthsSI
Count 267 years Rl-Rs.50000/- fine in default6 monthsSI
Sentences to run consecutively.
H. A. Sumangala
Count 110 years Rl – Rs.50000/- fine in default6 months SI
Count 27yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine in default6 months SI
Count 127yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine in default6 months SI
Count 277yearsRl-Rs.50000/- fine in default6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
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Asanka Priyankara Perera
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 137 years Rl -Rs. 50000/-fine in default 6 months SI
Count 287 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Ajith Rohana Perera
Count 110 years Rl – Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 27 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 147 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Count 297 years Rl -Rs. 50000/- fine in default 6 months SI
Sentences to run consecutively.
Sentences of all accused to take effect from the dateof conviction by the High Court that it 6/12/1999.
Note by Editor:
The Supreme Court on 5.9.2005 in S.C. Spl.LA 121,122,123, 127/4refused special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.