PURE BEVERAGES COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION v. COMMISSIONER

026-SLLR-SLLR-2001-V-2-PURE-BEVERAGES-COMPANY-EXECUTIVE-OFFICERS-ASSOCIATION-v.-COMMISSIONER-.pdf


PURE BEVERAGES COMPANY EXECUTIVEOFFICERS ASSOCIATIONv.
COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR
COURT OF APPEALHECTOR YAPA J (P/CA)
C.A. 823/97
OCTOBER 11st, 12th, 1999JANUARY 3 1st, 2000MARCH 16™, 2000MAY 23rd, 2000AUGUST 28™, 2000,
Termination of Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) 7k,,, No.45 of 1971 as amended by Act No. 4 of 1976 – S.2(l), S.16 – Rules ofnatural Justice – ultra vires – Partial quashing of decision – FinalityClause – Decision a Nullity – cannot stand.(■
The Pure Beverages Company sought to terminate Its employees attachedto the Kaduwela Factory. The Petitioner had come to know that, a DeputyCommissioner of Labour, was inquiring Into this matter and, as somemembers of the Petitioners Association were named as persons whoseemployment was to be terminated, the Deputy Commissioner had intimatedto the Members of the Petitioners Association requesting them to participate,if so desired. The Petitioner informed the Deputy Commissioner, that itsmembers cannot participate without obtaining legal opinion. However, theCommissioner of Labour had approved the termination of all personsincluding the members of the Petitioners Association, although the DeputyCommissioner did not recomend the termination of the members of thePetitioner Association.
It was contended that the said decision is ultra vires and has been done inviolation of the principles of natural justice, and that it was unreasonable,arbitrary capricious.
Held :
S.17 of the Act has laid down that any inquiry conducted by theCommissioner or by any officer to whom such powers functions aredelegated should conform to the principles of natural justice.
Principles of natural justice not only demands that the affected partyshould be heard but that they should be given a reasonable opportunity
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to present their case. Further the facility of presenting the case of anaffected parly to be effective and meaningful such an inquiry shouldbe proceeded by sufficient notice.
Certiorari could go to quash an unlawful part of an administrativedecision having effect in public law while leaving the remainder valid- the decision made regarding the members of the PetitionersAssociation could be quashed allowing the decision in respect of theother employees belonging to the other two trade unions intact.
Even thoughthe decision made by the Commissioner of Labour underS.2(2) (f) £5 final and conclusive, a decision without any regard to theavailable material and in violation of natural justice is a decisionbad in law. Such a decision in law a nullify and cannot stand.
Cases referred to :
*
University of Ceylon vs. Fernando – 61 NLR 505.
Regina vs. Secretary of State for Transport Exparte Greater LondonCouncil – 1985 3 WLR 574.
Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Boardvs. Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd., 1972 1 WLR 190.
Amis Minic Ltd., vs. Foreign Compensation Commission – 19692C 147.
Abeywickrema vs. Pathlrane – 1986 1 SLR 120.
E Vlmalachanthiran with A.E Niles for Petitioner.
Adrian Perera S.S.C. for 1st Respondent.
Chula De Silva, EC., with M. Maharoof and M. Gunasekera for 2ndRespondent.
January 29, 2000HECTOR YAPA, J.
This is an application for a writ of Certiorari to quash thedecision of the Commissioner of Labour the 1st Respondent(hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner) dated 24.09.1997
AppOation for a Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition.
Cur. adv. vult.
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made under the Termination of Employment of Workmen(Special Provisions) Act No. 45 of 1971, (as amended by LawNo. 4 of 1976) Section 2(1) approving the termination of theemployment of some of the workmen (executives) who aremembers of the Pure Beverages Company Executive OfficersAssociation (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner Association)and for a writ of Mandamus (in the caption wrongly referred toas a writ of prohibition) compelling the Commissioner to do allacts as are necessary to ensure thxt the workmen i.e. PGangodage, B.K.S.L.W. Gunawardana, K. Gunest’^ra and M.S.Sunil are continued in the employment of the Pure BeveragesCompany Limited who Js the 2nd Respondent to this application(hereinafter referred to as the Respondent Company). ^
The facts relating to this application briefly are as follows.The petitioner Association is a Trade Union registered uijderthe Trade Unions Ordinance. The Petitioner Association has asits members persons who are officers of the executive gradeemployed by the Respondent Company which is incorporatedunder the Company Law of Sri Lanka and has its registeredoffice and principal place of business at the address referred toin the petition. The Respondent Company produces Coca Cola,Eanta and Sprite drinks on a franchise from the Coca ColaExport Corporation of U.S.A. It also produces Lion Brand drinks.The said company has two factories, one at Biyagama employingabout 700 workmen and another at Kaduwela employing about370 workmen. The Respondent Company in November 1996announced that the Kaduwela factory is to be closed. Manyreasons were given by the Respondent Company for the need toclose down the Kaduwela factory on the basis that it wassustaining financial losses. However the Petitioner Associationwhich had members of the executive grade and two other tradeunions which had members of the non executive grades in theemployment of the Respondent Company protested stronglyagainst the threatened closure of the Kaduwela factory.
The Petitioner Association therefore requested theintervention of the Minister of Labour to effect a settlement.
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Further the said association made a request for arbitration underthe Industrial Disputes Act in the event of the RespondentCompany not agreeing to a settlement. However PetitionerAssociation did not receive any reply. Thereafter the PetitionerAssociation came to know from the other two trade unions thatan inquiry was taking place before Mr. W. J.L.U. Wijeyaweera,Deputy Commissioner of Labour, in the Termination ofEmployment Unit of the Labour Department, regarding anapplication by the Respondent Company to terminate theemploymenjfcflST the employees at the Kaduwela factory. ThePetitioner Association also learnt that some members of the saidassociation were named as persons whose employment was tobe sq terminated. According to the Petitioner Association theinf<Jmation regard to the said inquiry before the DeputyCommissioner of Labour reached the said associationunofficially through the other two unions, as there was nointimation by the Commissioner or his subordinates. It was thenthat the affected members of the Petitioner Association receivedletters dated 07.01.1997 from the Respondent Companymentioning about the said inquiry fixed for 08.01.1997 andthat they could participate if so desired at the inquiry. The copyof the said letter sent to P Gangodage has been marked P8.Thereafter the then treasurer of the Petitioner Association Mr.W.H.E. Rodrigo and some of the affected members of the saidassociation namely Y.P. Jayaratne, E Gangodage and M.S. Sunilwent before the said Deputy Commissioner of Labour andexplained to him that they could not participate at the inquiryat that stage because the lawyers of the Petitioner Associationhad to be consulted. Hence the Petitioner Association sent theletter dated 23.01.1997 to Mr. W.J.L.U. Wejeyaweera DeputyCommissioner of Labour which has been marked P9. Thecontents of the said letter reads as follows
“We refer to the inquiry now proceeding regarding the
application for permission to terminate the employment of
about 350 employees.
Five of the employees in respect of whom such permission
is being sought are members of our Association, However,
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neither our Association nor the said employees wereinformed of this inquiry. The names of the said fiveemployees are as follows
R GangodageY.R JayaratneB.K.S.L.W. GunewardenaK. GunesekeraM.S. Sunil
It was only after the inquiry had been conducted for severaldays that the said members were informed. Our Associationhas not been officially informed up to date.j
Our representatives then appeared before you and informedyou that our lawyers would have to be consulted .
Having obtained the advice of our lawyers, we wish to stateas follows:-
Our Association has, by its letter of 4th November 1996,requested the Honourable Minister of Labour to refer thematter for Arbitration. (A copy of the letter is annexed, foryour information). In the circumstances, our Associationhas to await the decision of Honourable Minister, as towhether the matter would be referred for Arbitration.
The Company has acted mala fide, in not informing thesaid members and our Association of the Company’sapplication and this inquiry. In these circumstances, ourAssociation cannot be expected to participate in the presentinquiry.
The present inquiry has proceeded for several dates. Thecompany’s witness has given evidence in chief, and is undercross-examination by the representative of another TradeUnion. All this has happened in the absence of ourAssociation, and our said five members. It is therefore not
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possible for our Association and the said five members tojoin the proceedings at this stage.
The said five members are executives. Executives are in amuch worse plight, as compared to other employees, whenit comes to seeking new employment. Thus, executives mustbe treated separately, when it comes to examining questionspertaining to termination of employment.
For thesaa^asons, our Association reapectfully submits thatthe question of the said five members should not be takenup in this inquiry.
We await your kind reply.”
Since there was no reply to the said letter a reminder wasser?t on 30.04.1997 (Vide P10) but there was no reply. ThePetitioner Association thereafter had assumed that the requestmade in the letters sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Labourwas acceded or that it was receiving attention. Hence thePetitioner Association had not participated in the said inquirybut the said inquiry had continued with the participation of theother two unions.
On 30.09.1997 the Petitioner Association, had come toknow from the other two unions that the Commissioner hadapproved the termination of the employment of all personsnamed including the said members of the Petitioner Association.Further there had been no intimation to the PetitionerAssociation or to its affected members form the Commissioneror his subordinates. Hence the Petitioner Association sent theletter dated 30.09.1997 to the Commissioner and this letterhas been marked PI 1. The said letter among other things statedas follows. “We are -shocked to learn that you have decided toapprove the termination of employment of our members too.We find that the names of five of our members are included inyour decision. They are E Gangodage, B.K.S.L.W. Gunewardena,
K. Gunasekera, M.S. Sunil and Mrs. S.R.S.W. Mahanamahewa.We have not received a copy of your decision. Please let us have
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a copy of the decision. We respectfully call upon you to takeimmediate steps to rectify the decision, and to arrange to haveour matter referred to arbitration. Also, be good enough toinstruct the company to refrain from terminating the employmentof our members, pending your action on this.”
Meanwhile the Respondent Company terminated theemployment of four of the said members of the PetitionerAssociation. However the employment of Mrs. S.R.S.W.Mahanamahewa was not terminated and iiMs made tounderstand that the Respondent Company intends to retainher services. The said IIP Jayaratne (referred in P9) has severalmonths ago accepted the voluntary Retirement Scheme gT theRespondent Company and resided from his employments Theother four members of the Petitioner Association whose serviceswere terminated are R Gangodage, B.K.S.L.W. Gunaward^na,K. Gunasekara and M.S. Sunil. Their letters of termination ofemployment have been marked P12 (a) to P12 (d). ThePetitioner Association has marked the decision of theCommissioner dated 24.09.1997 as P13 and the report of thesaid W. J.L.U. Wijeyaweera Deputy Commissioner of Labour asPI4. According to P14 it would appear that said DeputyCommissioner has not recommended the approval of thetermination of the employment of the said 5 members of thePetitioner Association. Therefore the Petitioner Association hassent the letter dated 06.10.1997 to the Commissioner whichhas been marked PI5. The said letter quoted the relevantpassages from the report of the Deputy Commissioner whichrecommended against the termination of the services of theaffected members of the Petitioner Association and the need fora fresh inquiiy. FUrther the said letter of the Petitioner Associationdemanded the Commissioner to take immediate steps to issuean amended decision in respect of the five names referredtherein deleted. It also demanded the Commissioner to directthe Respondent Company to treat the said four persons as beingin continued employment. However there has been no responseto the said letter from the Commissioner. Thereafter the officebearers of the Petitioner Association with two of the affected
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members met the Commissioner on 08.10.1997 and reiteratedthe request made in the letter marked PI5. However theCommissioner did not acceded to their request. Hence thePetitioner Association has instructed its Attorney at Law to sendthe letter dated 16.10.1997 to the Commissioner which hasbeen marked PI6, demanding that the request made in theletter dated 06.10.1997 (P15) be acceded. There has been noresponse to the said letter either.
<s?
In theseg^fcumstances the Petitioners Association statedthat the said decision of the Commissioner dated 24.09.1997approving the termination of the employment of the five membersof thg said association is ultra vires and has been done inviol^Yion of the principles of nature justice. Further the saidassociation complained that the said decision of theCommissioner is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and inbreach of the legitimate expectations of the said association andthe five members that there would be an arbitration or a separateinquiry by the Commissioner. Hence the Petitioner Associationas referred to above, has prayed for a Writ of Certiorari to quashthat portion of the decision of the Commissioner dated24.09.1997 (PI3) which approved the termination of theemployment of P Ganagodage, B.K.S.L.W. Gunawardana, K.Gunasekera and M.S. Sunil and a Writ of Mandamus to compelthe Commissioner to do all acts as are necessaiy to ensure thatthe said four members of the Petitioner Association (referred toabove) to be continued in the employment of the RespondentCompany.
At the hearing of this application it was submitted bylearned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Commissioner haddirected the Deputy Commissioner W.J.L.U. Wijeyaweera toconduct an inquiry into the application of the RespondentCompany seeking permission in terms of the Section 2( 1) of theTermination of Employment of Workmen (special provisions)Act. The said Deputy Commissioner conducted an inquiry andmade his report marked PI4 recommending that permissionbe granted to terminate the employment of number of employees.
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However the said report specifically recommended thatpermission should not be granted to the Respondent Companyto terminate the employment of the five (now four) members ofthe Petitioner Association namely E Gandodage, B.K.S.L.W.Gunewardana, K. Gunesekara and M.S. Sunil. The DeputyCommissioner has given his reasons for making thisrecommendation to exclude the said members of the PetitionerAssociation. It was the contention of the Counsel for thePetitioner that the Deputy Commissioi2?r was conscious of andhas acted in accordance with the requirement oT^e principlesof natural justice as set out in Section 17 of the Termination ofEmployment of Workrqpn Act. Hence it is important to keep inmind the vital provisions contained in Section 17 of the^saidact. This section provides as follows:-
“The proceedings at any inquiry held by the Commissionerfor the purposes of this act may be conducted by theCommissioner in any manner, not inconsistent with theprinciples of natural justice, which to the Commissioner mayseem best adapted to elicit proof or information concerningmatters that arise at such inquiry.”
In my view Section 17 of the said Act has laid down in veryclear terms that any inquiry conducted by the Commissioneror by any officer to whom such powers of functions are delegated(vide Sections 11(2) & 12(1) (e) of the said Act) should confirmto the principles of natural justice. In this case there is no doubtthat there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice.It would appear from the available material that the said inquiryhad been conducted without giving due and sufficient notice tothe Petitioner Association and its affected members. As seenfrom the report of the Deputy Commissioner the inquiry hadcommenced on 19.12.1996 and continued on 26.12.1996,
08.01.1997 and thereafter continued for severaldates until the inquiry was concluded on 16.07.1997 (vide P14).
It was on 07.01.1997 that the affected members were officiallyinformed by the Respondent Company requesting them toparticipate on 08.01.1997 if they so desired (vide PB). Therefore
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it would appear that the Respondent Company had attemptedto keep the Petitioner Association and the affected membersout of the said inquiry, perhaps for reasons best known to theRespondent Company. However the Petitioner Association andthe affected members complained that they were kept out sincethey were more knowledgeable than the employees of the othertwo Unions on the question of justification or otherwise of theclosure of the Kaduwela factory. It is well to remember thatprinciples of natural jt^tice not only demands that the affectedparty or pagt&ls should be heard but that they should be givena reasonable opportunity to present their case. Further thefacility of presenting the case of an affected party to be effectiveandjneaningful such an inquiry should be preceded by sufficientnoCfce. (Vide The University of Ceylon vs. Fernando1u) TheRespondent Company and the Commissioner have grievouslyfailed to give sufficient notice to the Petitioner Association andto the affected members. No one has the right or justification totreat these inquiries lightly for the reason that ultimately adecision at such an inquiry would involve the termination ofthe employment of several workmen. In other words at the endof such an inquiry there is the prospect of denying a man of hisbread and butter. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner of Labourwas correct when he came to the following conclusion.
“On receipt of the application the company was requestedto inform all the workers and relevant unions, about theinquiry and the commencing date. The company has failedto inform the Pure Beverages Company Executive OfficersAssociation. They have come to know of this inquiry onlyafter the Examination in chief of the company witness wasover. And they demanded that they should be heardseparately. Therefore I do not recommend the approval ofthe termination of the services of the 5 workers, who aremembers of the Pure Beverages Company ExecutiveAssociation namely:
P Ganegoda
Y.RR. Jayaratne
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B.K.S.L.W. Gunawardena
K. Gunasekara
M.S. Sunil
If the company so desire they can make a fresh applicationto the Commissioner of Labour.”
In view of the above finding of the Deputy Commissioner, Iam unable to accept the submission made by learnedPresident’s Counsel on behalf of the Respondent tympany thatthe Petitioner Association and the affected members wereprovided with ample opportunity to participate at the inquiryconducted by the Deputy Commissioner. The best person jyhocould speak on the matter, the Deputy Commissioner has stLiedin very clear terms that he thinks otherwise as seen from theabove paragraph of his report PI 4. Hence he has very specificallynot recommended the termination of the service of the five (fourin this application) executives who are members of the PetitionerAssociation and has suggested a fresh inquiry by stating asfollows. “If the Company so desire they can make a freshapplication to the Commissioner of Labour.”
It is appropriate to consider here the justification of therequest made by the Petitioner Association on behalf of theaffected members that they be given a separate inquiry. ThePetitioner Association has gone so far as to demand arbitrationproceedings. However having regard to the fact that the affectedpersons are executives and the number involved being so small,i.e. four or five, it is fair and reasonable that they should begiven at least a separate inquiry for the reason that the executivesshould not be treated on the same footing as the labours or theclerks. In my view there should have been a separate inquiryfor many reasons; Firstly as complained by the PetitionerAssociation in their letter dated 23.01.1997 to the DeputyCommissioner (vide P9) “executives are in a much worse plight,as compared to other employees, when it comes to seeking newemployment.” Secondly one should never forget the fact thatcompensation can never be a proper substitute for employment.
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In the present day context it is only a necessary evil. Thereforeevery effort must be made to keep the workmen firmly in theirjobs unless the termination of their employment is a gravenecessity. Therefore if there was a separate inquiry for theexecutives, it may be that since four or five executives wereinvolved, a reasonable effort could have been made at theinstance of the Commissioner to retain their employment at leastin the Biyagama Factory, as was done in the case of Mrs. S.R.S.W.Mahanamaljf,wa. If^lhis fact of keeping Mrs. S.R.S.W.Mahanamafewa in employment of the Respondent Companyis Correct, then it would amount to an act of discrimination bythe Respondent Company with regard to the other affectedex^fdtives. Further a separate inquiry would have also enhancedthe prospect of calculating a higher scale of compensationpayable to the affected members of the Petitioner AssociationwOo are executives. Surely it is not reasonable to treat a labourerand an executive on the same scale when calculatingcompensation payable in order to terminate the services of anexecutive. Therefore I am unable to accept the submission oflearned President’s Counsel of the Respondent Company thatthe Commissioner has correctly determined that no distinctionshould be drawn between the executives and the workers andfurther that the Commissioner has decided that compensationshould be calculated for everybody on the same basis aftertaking into consideration the period of service and the salarydrawn.
It was also submitted by the learned Counsel for thePetitioner that there was a serious contradiction between therecommendations of the Deputy Commissioner (PI4) and thedecision of the Commissioner dated 24.09.1997 (P3). It wouldappear that after the recommendations of the DeputyCommissioner, the Commissioner has set out his findings in aninternal document dated 18.09.1997 which has been producedmarked X8, annexed to the further affidavit filed by R Gangodageone of the affected members of the Petitioner Association. Thefindings of the Commissioner referred to in X8, deal only withthe reasons for the closure of the Kaduwela bottling plant
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(factory) of the Respondent Company. The penultimateparagraph mentions that the Respondent Company has actedmala fide with regard to one aspect of the closure and then inthe last paragraph the Commissioner states as follows.
“Having regard to the aforesaid reasoning and the closureof the Kaduwela Bottling plaint, I approve therecommendations made by the Deputy Commissioner ofLabour (Industrial Relations). The* parties be informedaccordingly."
Therefore as submitted by Counsel for the Petitioner thereis not even an indication that the Commissioner intended to gocontrary to the recommendations of the Deputy Commissionerregarding the five (now four) members of the PetitionerAssociation. However the Commissioner thereafter made hisdecision dated 24.09.1997 (P13) granting permission to theRespondent Company not only to terminate the services of theemployees specified by the Deputy Commissioner but also thefive (now four) members of the Petitioner Association e.i. RGangodage, B.K.S.L.W.L. Gunawardana, K. Gunasekera andM.S. Sunil. The said decision of the Commissioner is arbitraryand quite contrary to the recommendations of the DeputyCommissioner. Further the Commissioner has not given anyreason for so acting contrary to the recommendations of theDeputy Commissioner which he has approved on 18.09.1997.Therefore this part of the decision of the Commissioner cannotbe allowed to stand, since it is a per incuriam order or decision.Besides there is nothing in the said decision of the Commissioner(PI3) to show that the Commissioner was even aware that hewas acting contrary to the recommendations of the DeputyCommissioner. Even if one were to argue that the Commissionerhas the power to do so, since Section 2 (1) of the Termination ofEmployment of Workmen Act empowers only the Commissionerto grant approval to terminate the scheduled employment ofany workmen, his decision dated 24.09.1997 relating to theaffected members of the Petitioner Association has to benecessarily struck down for there has been a failure of natural
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justice in contravention of Section 17 of the Termination ofEmployment of Workmen Act. Ftirther the argument of thePresident’s Counsel for the Respondent Company that someexecutives have accepted the compensation given by theRespondent Company does not change the character of theinquiry, where such an inquiry has been conducted in violationof natural justice. Besides, in today’s context workmen are forcedto accept compensation packages out of necessity and notbecause the compensaKon package was reasonable.
If that be the case, the next matter to be considered here iswhether such partial quashing of the Commissioner’s decisionby Certiorari is possible in law. In other words whether it isleglfi and proper to quash part of the decision of theCommissioner dated 24.09.1997 which is bad in law. On thismatter learned Counsel for the Petitioner cited the case of ReginaVs. Secretary of State for Transport Ex parte Greater LondonCouncil12’ which held that, in an appropriate case, Certioraricould go to quash an unlawful part of an administrative decisionhaving effect in public law while leaving the remainder valid.Further Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law Seventh EditionPage 329 states as follows. “An administrative Act may bepartially good and partially bad. It often happens that a tribunalor authority makes a proper order but adds some direction orcondition which is beyond its powers. If the bad can be cleanlysevered from the good, the Court will quash the bad part onlyand leave the good standing.” Vide also Agricultural,Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board Vs.Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd.13’ Therefore in relation to thedecision of the Commissioner dated 24.09.1997 it is clearlypossible to sever the good from the bad. Hence the decision ofthe Commissioner which had been wrongly made, so as to applyto the four affected members of the Petitioner Association couldbe quashed allowing the decision made by the Commissionerin respect of the other employees belonging to the other twotrade unions intact.
There is one other matter to be considered in this judgment.This arises form the submission of learned President’s Counsel
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for the Respondent Company that the decision of theCommissioner is final and conclusive having regard to Section2(2) (f) of the Termination of Employment of Workmen Act.Learned Counsel contended that the legislature has left thediscretion of the Commissioner outside the jurisdiction of theCourts. Section 2(2) (f) of the said act provides as follows.
“Any decision made by the Commissioner under theproceeding provisions of this subsection shall be finaland conclusive, and shall not be called in^uestionwhether by way of writ or otherwise.”
»
Above submission of Counsel is based on the ouster or thepreclusive clause provided in Section 2(2) (f) referred to ab^ve.However it must be stated here that a decision made by theCommissioner without any regard to the available material andin violation of natural justice is a decision bad in law. Hencesuch a decision is in law a nullity and cannot stand. Thereforeit is open to a court to declare such a wrong decision as void. Inthe case of Anisminlc Ltd. Vs. Foreign CompensationCommission141 majority of judges held that the wrong decisionof the commission on what they regarded as a “jurisdictionalfact” vitiated the decision since the tribunal had exceeded itsjurisdiction by this wrong decision. The ouster clause, therefore,was not applicable as there was no true determination by thetribunal as required by the statute.” In the same case at page170 Lord Rid stated as follows. “If you seek to show that adetermination is a nullity, you are not questioning the purporteddetermination – you are maintaining that it does not exist as adetermination. It is one thing to question a determination whichdoes exist: it is quite another thing to say that there is nothingto be questioned.” Also vide the case of Abeywickrama vs.Pathirana and others01 Therefore this argument of learnedPresident’s Counsel has to fail.
For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that, that portion of thedecision of the Commissioner dated 24.09.1997 approving thetermination of the employment of E Gangodage, B.K.S.L.W.
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Gunawardana, K. Gunasekera and M.S. Sunil is bad in law.Accordingly, I make order granting the Writ of Certiorari asprayed for by the Petitioner quashing the said part or portion ofthe decision as contained in P13. Further I grant a Writ ofMandamus against the Commissioner and direct him to do allacts as are necessaiy to ensure that the said four members ofthe Petitioner Association are continued in the employment ofthe Respondent Company. Application is allowed with costs.
<*.v
Application iff&bwed.