024-SLLR-SLLR-1981-1-LAND-REFORM-COMMISSION-v.-GRAND-CENTRAL-LIMITED.pdf
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LAND REFORM COMMISSION
v.GRAND CENTRAL LIMITED
SUPREME COURTSAMARAKOON, C. J.
ISMAIL, J., WEERARATNE, J., SHARVANANDA. J.,AND WANASUNDERA, J.
S. C. APPEALS NO. 36/81 and 37/81
A. (LA) NO. 20/81 .
C. COLOMBO 14125/LJULY 27. 28, 29, 30 ANDAUGUST 3,1981.
Constitutional Law — Fundamental right to practise Profession — Right of Attorney-General and State Counsel to appear in private capacity — Article 14(1) (g) of Constitu-tion — Section 41 of Judicature Act No. 2 of 1978—
The right to be heard in a Court is a right conferred on the party to the proceeding. Itis not a right conferred on the attorney-at-Law, It is open to an attorney-at-law to appearfor the party litigant and to exercise His client's right to be heard on his behalf. The'entitlement* follows and is dependent on the 'right' of the party. They are two differentconcepts. Although the Attorney-General and the Legal Officers of his Department havebeen granted permission to engage in private practice such arrangements between emplo-yer and employee cannot affect the issue if in fact there are legal constraints on theAttorney-Generafengaging in private practice.
The Attorney-General is the Chief Legal Officer and adviser to the State and therebyto the sovereign and is in that sense an officer of the public. The Attorney-General ofthis country is the Leader of the Bar and the highest Legal Officer of the State. As Attor-ney-General he has a duty to the Court, to the State and to the subject to be whollydetached, wholly independent and to act impartially with the sole object of establishingthe truth. That image will certainly be tarnished if he takes part in private litigationarising out of private disputes. No Attorney-General can serve both the State and privatelitigant.
Cases referred to:
In the matter of a Proctor of the Supreme Court (1927) 30 NLR 65, 70
O' Toole v. Scott [1965] 2 All ER 240, 243
Collin v. Hicks (1831 ] 2 B & Ad. 1290
Simus v. Moore [1970] 3 All ER 1,3
Le mesurier v. Layard (1898) 3 N LR 227, 230
Appeal from judgment of the Court of Appeal.
C. Thiagalingam Q.C. with K M. M. B. Kulatunga Acting Solicitor General and S. RatnapalaState Counsel for defendant-petitionar-petitioners.
H. W. Jayewardene Q.C. with H. L. da Silva, Romesh da Silva, and Lakshmari Pererafor Plaintiff-respondent.
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A. C. de Zoysa with George Candappa and Siva Rajaratnam (on notice) for Bar Associa-tion of Sri Lanka.
September 16,1981.
Cur. adv. vult
SAMARAKOON, C. J.
Mr. Siva Pasupati the Attorney-General of Sri Lanka, appearedin this case at its hearing in the Court of Appeal and marked hisappearance as private Counsel for the Land Reform Commission(hereinafter referred to as the Defendant) and not in his officialcapacity as Attorney-General of the country. Two State Counselappeared with him and their appearance too was marked in thesame manner by Mr. Pasupati. Mr. Pasupati was denied a rightof audience by the Court of Appeal as that Court was of theopinion that he could only appear in his official capacity and notin his private capacity. He has not chosen to complain to thisCourt, or assert any right claimed by him either by way of applica-tion or affidavit, although this Court enrolled him and he nowholds the exalted positions of Attorney-General of Sri Lankaand Leader of the Sri Lanka Bar. Therein lies a tragedy. Instead,his client, the Defendant, has sought to appeal to this Court, osten-sibly on the plea that it has been denied the services of Counselof its choice, and now appearing by Senior Queen's Counsel hassubmitted as his only argument that Mr. Pasupati has been deniedhis fundamental right of practising his profession, that he had aright to appear as plain Attorney-at-Law and be granted the rightof audience by the Court of Appeal and that the Court of Appeal"in denying him the right of audience infringed the fundamentalright of Mr. Pasupati as a lawyer conferred on him by Article14(1,)(g) of the 1978 Constitution and it also committed a breachof Section 41 of the Judicature Act No. 2 of 1978. It is the hand ofEsau but the voice of Jacob. But perhaps I should begin at thebeginning
On 21. 1. 1981 Grand Central Ltd. (hereinafter referred to asthe plaintiff) instituted proceedings in the District Court ofColombo against the defendant praying for an order directing thedefendant to hand over to the Plaintiff the lands described in theschedule to the plaint and for an interim injunction restraining theDefendant and its servants and agents from interfering with thePlaintiff's right of management of the said lands. The learnedAdditional District Judge issued an interlocutory order coupledwith an enjoining order of restraint on the Defendant: On 6-2-81the Defendant applied inter alia for a discharge of the enjoiningorder which application was refused by the District Court by its
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order of 20-1-81. The Defendant then appealed against that refusal. to the Court of Appeal. It filed two applications — one for leave toappeal to the Court of Appeal (No. 20/81) and another to revisethe order of refusal (No. 21/81). When these applications weretaken up for hearing Mr. H. W. Jayewardene, Q.C. marked hisappearance with his Juniors for the Plaintiff and Mr. Siva Pasupathimarked his appearance with his Juniors for the Defendant. To apointed question by Mr. Jayewardene, Mr. Siva Pasupati statedthat he and his Juniors (who were all State Attorneys) were appea-ring in their private capacities as Attomeys-at-Law and not in theirofficial capacities of Attorney-General and State Attorney respec-tively: Thereupon Counsel for Plaintiff took objection to theAttorney-General appearing in his private capacity stating thathe could only appear in his official capacity as Attorney-General.
It is not clear whether the objection included the State Attorneys .but that does not matter now because the order of the Court ofAppeal refers only to the Attorney-General. It held that the Attor-ney-General cannot appear for a litigant in his private capacity andcan only enter an appearance, if at all, in his official capacity asAttorney-General. He could therefore not be heard on behalf ofthe Defendant in his private capacity as Attorney-at-Law. TheDefendant sought permission from the Court of Appeal to appealto this Court which application was refused. This Court has grantedthe Defendant special leave to appeal to this Court in both cases.The appeals in S.C. No. 36/81 and No. 37/81 were taken togetherfor hearing and this order of mine covers both appeals.
At the outset I desire to deal with a minor bone of contention.Mention has been made to the Court of Appeal by Mr. Pasupatisuggesting that Mr. Pasupati and his Juniors were not appearingat their own volition but "were doing so on the direction of thePresident of the Republic. There is no express record of it inthe Court of Appeal record. However I find the following statementin the written submissions of the Defendant filed in the Court ofAppeal :-
"The Court has been infoimed from the Bar that the Attor-ney-General is appearing in his private capacity in accordancewith a direction of the Head of State and Executive, His Excellen-cy the President".
The Plaintiff has referred to this in his written submissionspresented to this Court and states that the Attorney-Generalreferred to this direction in the course of his submissions before theCourt of Appeal. (Para 4 of written submissions). He adds that thisstatement of the Attorney-General was objected to and the Attor-
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neyGeneral "was told by Court not to refer to it but at a later stagepersisted in doing so though objected to" (para 6). The objectionis of no consequence in this appeal. All that matters is thatMr. Pasupati did mention a direction stated to have been givento him by the Head of State to appear for the Defendant. Rana-singhe, J. has referred to this statement in his judgment and theimpression created in his mind appears to be that it was mentionedto support the propriety of his appearing in the way he did. Perera,J. also refers to this statement although he expressed the view thatMr. Pasupati "did not seem to rely heavily on such direction".Neither of them appear to have been prejudiced in any way by thisstatement. The Plaintiff alleges that that statement of the Attorney-General was "calculated to cause prejudice" to the.objection raisedby the Plaintiff and that the Attorney-General made the statementfrom the Bar which he was not entitled to do. During the hearingbefore us Mr. Kulatunga, Junior Counsel for the Defendant whoholds the post of Deputy Solicitor-General in the Attorney-Gene-ral's Department, stated that the Attorney-General marked hisappearance in the manner he did in consequence of somethingtold to him by Mr. Menikdiwela, Secretary to the President. In thecourse of his argument Counsel for the defendant stated that therewas in existence an administrative order by the Cabinet that theAttorney-General should not appear for State Corporations, andthat when the . Attorney-General received a directive (through theLand Reform Commission) from the President directing him toappear for the Defendant he was- placed in a dilemma. Counselsubmitted that if the Attorney-General disobeyed such directivehe risked instant removal. Placed as he was in this dilemma he solvedit by marking his appearance as private Counsel. If the Attorney-General found himself in this impasse it was his duty to bringit to the notice of the President and to advise him as to theproper course of action. He is the Chief Legal Adviser to theState. It is extremely unlikely that the President would have actedcontrary to the directive of his own Cabinet nor is there anythingin the record or in the statements made from the Bar to show thatthe President directed the Attorney-General to appear as privateCounsel. How the Attorney-General came to mark his appearance asprivate Counsel remains a mystery. However it is immaterial tothis Court, or to any Court tor that matter, to know the identityof the person high or low, who has directed a State Officer toappear as private Counsel in private litigation. In an original CourtCounsel is only required to state the name of the instructingAttorney whose proxy is on record. This is not a requirementin the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. Name dropping inCourt is therefore unprecedented and uncalled for. I will ieave itat that.
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I will for the purpose of this case proceed on the basis that theAttorney-General (irrespective of who presently holds the office)has marked his appearance as plain Attorney-at-Law (and not inhis official capacity as Attorney-General) instructed by an Attorneywho is also an employee of the Defendant. At the outset I askedCounsel for the Defendant what right he had to espouse the causeof the Attorney-General by way of appeal. He stated that theDefendant had been deprived of the services of the Counsel of hischoice. I cannot see any substance in this complaint. The Defen-dant's right to be represented by Counsel has not been denied. Hecould well have retained other Counsel. Anyway as the matter fordecision is one of importance I shall proceed to record my deci-sion.
Counsel for the Defendant submitted that there was nothingwrong in appearing for the Land Reform Commission becauseit was an organ of State. It might in corporate language be looselydescribed as a "wholly owned subsidiary of the Treasury", butstill it is a juristic person entitled in law to retain its own Counseleven from the private Bar. Besides, if it was an organ or agencyof Government the Attorney-General could have, and would have,marked his appearance in his offical capacity. There would thervhave been no dilemma as he claims there was. I do not think anyfurther comment is necessary as that argument was also intendedto demonstrate that there was no conflict of interests.
It is claimed that a fundamental right of the Attorney-Generalwas infringed by this refusal of the right of audience. Article14(1) (g) of the Constitution of the Republic (1978) is calledin aid. It reads thus—
”14(1) Every citizen is entitled to—
(g) the freedom to engage himself or in association withothers in any lawful occupation, profession, trade,business or enterprise;"
This Article gives a citizen the freedom to engage by himself orin association with others "in any lawful profession". The pro-fession we are concerned with is the legal profession. The Attorney-General has been admitted and enrolled in the legal profession. Hehas acquired that freedom and nobody can deny his general rightto practise that profession as an Attorney-at-Law. The only res-trictions are those that are prescribed by law in relation to theprofessional and other qualifications "necessary for practising"that profession. (Vide Article 15(5) .of the Constitution (1978)).
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For instance rules for that profession are made under Article136(1) (g) and (h) for the admission, enrolment, suspension andremoval of Attorneys-at-Law and for their attire when attendingCourt. These have the force of written law. The State cannot permitunqualified persons to handle the affairs of a citizen in Court and inlegal matters. Hence these laws and rules. (Vide also the provisionsof section 40 and section 42 of the Judicature Act No. 2 of 1978).The refusal of a right of audience in any particular case does notmean a denial of.the fundamental right to engage himself in thelegal profession. The-.ruling in this case is that he cannot appear asan Attoney-at-Law in his private capacity and therefore cannotpractise is a private Attorney. His right to practise his professionas the Chief.Law.Officer of the State in all Courts in the Island hasnot been denied. Indeed it has been conceded in no uncertainterms.
Counsel for the Defendant then referred us to the provisionsof section 41 of the Judicature Act No. 2 of 1978. It reads thus—
“41. (1) Every Attorney-at-Law shall be entitled to assist andadvise clients and to appear, plead or act in every court or otherinstitution established by law for the administration of justiceand every person who is a party to or has or claims to have theright to be heard in any proceeding in any such court or othersuch institution shall be entitled to be represented by an Attor-ney-at-Law.
(2) Every person who is a party to any proceeding beforeany person or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial powers andevery person who has or claims to have the right to be heardbefore any such person or tribunal shall unless otherwise express-ly provided by law be entitledvto be represented by an attorney-at-Law".
Counsel claimed that the section conferred a right on the Attor-ney-at-Law which cannot be denied by a Court and can only.bedenied if he was removed or suspended by the Supreme Court. The“right to be heard" is a right conferred on the party to the proceed-ing in Court. It is not a right conferred on the Attorney-at-Law.It is open to an Attorney-at-Law to appear for the party litigantand to exercise his client's right to be heard on his behalf. The"entitlement" follows and is dependent on the “right" of theparty. They are two different concepts. "The practice of the lawis not a business open to all who wish to engage in it; it is a per-sonal right or privilege limited to selected persons of good charac-ter with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified; itis in the nature of a franchise from the State"
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(per Jayewardene, A. J. in the matter of a Proctor of the SupremeCourt.*1* In the circumstances I hold that the provisions of section41 of the Judicature Act have not been contravened.
Counsel for the Defendant contended that although a Courthad the fundamental right to control its proceedings it had nopower to deny the right of audience to an Attorney-at-Law. Heconceded that a Court could deny that right in case of improperconduct in Court He relied on the provisions of sections 4C, 43and 44 of the Judicature Act. Section 40 empowers the SupremeCourt to enrol Attorneys-at-Law. Section 43 and section 44 dealwith disciplinary enquiries when misconduct is alleged againstany Attorney-at-law. These do not in my opinion affect the in- •herent power of a Court to control its own proceedings. In exercis-ing that power "subject to usage or statutory power Courts orTribunals may exercise a discretion whether they will allowany; and what persons, to act as advocates before them", perLord Pearson in O. Toole vs. Stoff.'2*
In tne case of Collier vs. Hicks *3* the Plaintiff, who was anAttorney, attempted to appear for the informer in a case beforetwo justices hearing the case. He was told by the justices that hecould not appear for the informer as Attorney and Advocate as itwas not their practice to allow such appearance. When the Plaintiffpersisted in his attempt to take part in the proceedings he was,by order of the justices, expelled from the premises into the Street.He complained of trespass for assaulting and turning him out of thepolice office. The Court of King's Bench in appeal held that no oneis entitled, without permission of the magistrates, and as a matter ofright, to attend and take part as an Advocate. Lord Teriterden, C. J.said:
"This was undoubtedly an open Court and the public had aright to be present as in other Courts; but whether any persons,and who shall be allowed to take part in proceedings, mustdepend on the discretion of the Magistrates, who like otherJudges must have the power to regulate their own proceedings."
Littledale J. stated thus:
" The plaintiff, indeed is an attorney of one of the SuperiorCourts, but he can derive no right from that character to act asan advocate in a proceeding before a magistrate. It seems to me,as magistrates have a right to regulate their own proceedings,they must, consequently, have authority to decide whetheradvocates shall not be permitted to plead before them, thoughin cases of difficulty it may be desirable and advisable thatthe liberty should be granted."
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Parker J. stated the general rule thus:
"No person has a right to act as an advocate without the leaveof the Court, which must of necessity have the power of regula-ting its own proceedings in all cases where they are not alreadyregulated by ancient usage."
Lord Pearson's statement of the principle was accepted and repea-ted by Lord Parker C. J. in Simus vs. Moore (4) who stated: "Jus-tices have always had an inherent power to regulate the procedurein their courts in the interests of justice and a fair and expeditioustrial." Our Courts in Sri Lanka have always had that power and Iknow of no law or rule which takes away that power. I thereforehold that the Court of Appeal had the power to refuse the rightof audience to any Attorney-at-Law for good reason..
I now turn to the main question. Has the Attorney-Generalthe right of audience when he appears as private Counsel for aclient while he holds the post of Attorney-General? The officeof Attorney-General has a long history. It is the lineal descendantof the "Advocate Fiscal" which existed under Dutch rule in thiscountry. It continued as such under British rule until 1833 whenit was renamed "King's Advocate". He performed functions simi-lar to the functions performed by the Attorney-General in England.(18 C. L. Rec. CV). By Ordinance 1 of 1883 this designation waschanged to "Attorney-General" and he represented the Crown inall civil and criminal matters. In the year 1898 Bonser, C. J. referredto the post in these terms :-
"The present Attorney-General is the lineal successor of theold Advocate Fiscal, and just as in old days actions against theGovernment were brought against the Advocate Fiscal as represen-ting the local 'Fisc' or Treasury, so they may now be broughtagainst the Attorney-General". Le Mesurier vs. Layard ^
Then came the first Constitution — The Ceylon (Constitution)Order-in-Council 1946 (Chapter 376). By virtue of the provisionsof section 60 the appointment and transfer of the Attorney-Gene-ral was made by the Governor-General. This office was excludedfrom the purview of the Public Service Commission. In 1972 camethe first Republican Constitution which provided that the Attor-ney-General shall be appointed by the President. It is the same inthe 1978 Constitution. [Vide Article 54). The office of the Attor-ney-General is, as recognised by the Constitution, an exalted one.There is no doubt that there was a stage, many years ago, when
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the Attorney-General engaged in private practice. This was thepractice in England and was therefore adopted in this Country. Thelist of cases submitted by the Defendant ranging from1880 andending in 1915 bear testimony to this. Since 1915 the Attorney-General has not engaged in private practice. This has been thetradition built up over 60 years. No doubt it followed the Englishrule which was laid down by a Treasury Minute of June 29, 1894,forbidding the Attorney-General to engage in private practice andmade at the instance of the then Prime Minister. This was a salutaryrule in the interests of the administration of justice and justiceitself. We have been informed that by a government fiat of 23rdJuly, 1980, the Attorney-General and the Legal Officers of hisDepartment have been granted permission to engage in privatepractice. But such arrangements between employer and employeecannot affect the issue if in fact there are legal constraints on theAttorney-General engaging in private practice.
Counsel for the Defendant readily and quite correctly concededthat there is such constraint in the field of criminal law and prac-tice. His powers in this field are vast They extend even to quasijudicial functions. He is empowered to enter into and take overany criminal prosecution in the Island whether they be initiatedby private plaint or by State Officer. He alone can enter a nolleprosequi in a criminal case. I need not labour the point. The Attor-ney-General engaging in private practice in criminal cases is unthin-kable.
What of the civil law? All actions by or against the State mustbe instituted by or against the Attorney-General (section 456Civil Procedure Code Chapter 101). All process issued against theState must be served on the Attorney-General (section 457 CivilProcedure Code ). He has the power to undertake the defence inactions against Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and PublicOfficers (section 463 Civil Procedure Code). Special powers aregiven to him to watch the interests of wards of Court such aspersons of unsound mind (section 556(2), section 572(2), section575(1)) and minors (section 589, section 591, section 592(2) CivilProcedure Code). He is the Chief Legal Officer and Adviser to theState and thereby to the Sovereign and is in that sense an officerof the public. He is the watch-dog of public rights and can intervenein private litigation if public rights are in any way to be affected. Heis vested with power in respect of all public charitable Trusts aridactions alleging breach of any charitable Trust can only be broughtby the Attorney-General or by others with his permission (section101 of Trust Ordinance Chapter 87). He it is who advises the Stateand the Speaker on every Bill tnat is to be presented to Parliament
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(Article 77 of the 1978 Constitution). Counsel for the Parliamentbrought to our notice certain facts connected with this duty whichdemonstrates the evils of the Attorney-General appearing in civilcases. This case was instituted in the District Court of Colombo onthe 21st January, 1981, (Document DP1) and an interlocutoryorder coupled with an enjoining order was issued by the Court on31. 1. 81 (Document DP2). The Defendant made application on 6.2. 81 praying for the dissolution of the enjoining order (DocumentDP3) which application was dismissed by the Court on 20. 2. 81(Document DP5). Application for leave to appeal and for revisionof that order were filed in the Court of Appeal on 23. 2. 81. TheBill to amend the Land Reform Commission Law was presented tothe Supreme Court on 18. 2. 81 (Document DP1D) and notice interms of Article 134 of the Constitution was issued on the Attor-ney-General on 19. 2. 81 (Document DP9). The Bill was taken upfor Consideration by the Supreme Court on 24. 2. 81 and Mr. SivaPasupati as the Attorney General, himself appeared and tenderedhis ppinion to the Supreme Court. The Plaintiff was also repre-sented by Counsel who made submissions which went counter tothose of the Attorney-General. The Supreme Court tendered itsadvice to the President and Speaker on the same day. The Court ofAppeal heard tne applications beginning on 3. 3. 81. At that timethe Bills had not been passed by Parliament. No doubt long before18.2.81 the Attorney-General would have, acting under powersconferred by Article 77 of the Constitution, tendered his adviceto the State on the provisions of the Bill. It is relevant at this stageto take note of the position taken up by his client before the Courtof Appeal set out in its written submissions-
I
"In view of the fact that the plaintiff-respondent has nowresiled from the agreement to sell the said lands as evidencedby the Plaintiff-Respondent's present action and conduct, theGovernment has taken steps to enact amendments to the LandReform Law as was contemplated in 1976, which would havethe effect of vesting the Plaintiff-Respondent's estate Lands, inOctober 1975. The Bill for enacting the necessary amendmentshas been certified by the Cabinet of Ministers under Article 122of the Constitution as being urgent in the national interest andthe Registrar of the Supreme Court has served notice on theAttorney-General that the said Bill would be considered by theSupreme Court, in terms of Article 122 of the Constitution, onthe 24th of February, 1981. The Defendant-Petitioner annexeshereto marked 'DP. 9' a true copy of the said notice and marked'DP. 10', a true copy of the said Bill which was forwarded withthe said notice."
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"In the premises, the Defendant-Petitioner states that irrepara-ble loss and damage will be caused if the said Enjoinina Orderdated 30th January 1981 and the Order of the learned DistrictJudge made on the 20th February, 1981, affirming the saidEnjoining Order are aliowed to stand."
What is the effect of these? They expose the Attorney-General tothe charge that he was partisan and biased when he tendered hisadvice on the Bill and when he made submissions on the Bill to theSupreme Court. There is an appearance of conflict between his dutyto Court, his duty to the State and the legislature, and his duty tothe client.The age-old concept that the Attorney-General is impar-tial and decides equally between State and subject would have beensuspect. The eventual sufferer must necessarily be the administra-tion of justice and justice itself.
In the course of the argument Counsel for the Defendant wasasked what would the Attorney-General do if, when appearing forone of the claimants in a partition case, he discovered in the courseof the case or in the course of receiving instructions that the Statehad a claim to the lands claimed by his client. His answer was thatthe Attorney-General would immediately cease his appearance forthe client, advise the State on the basis of the knowledge so gainedby him and then appear for, the State. This contention cannot beaccepted. It would be improper for him to jettison his client in thatway. Unless he has his client's express consent, he would be actingin breach of the confidence reposed in him and also contrary to theprovisions of section 125 of Evidence Ordinance which expresslyforbids any Attorney-at-Law to disclose any knowledge acquired byhim in the course of his professional employment. In short he willbe guilty of professional misconduct and malpractice the conse-quences of which are serious in the extreme.
Counsel for the Defendant made another submission whichI mention omy because it was made. He said that the Attorney-General appears in his official capacity when he is nominative,that is when he is a party, and secondly when he is served withnotice as required by law and in all other instances, eg. when hetakes over the defence of a Minister or Public Servant, he doesnot appear in his official capacity but as plain Attorney-at-Law.
I cannot agree. He cannot shed his office as and when the circums-tances suit him. The law does not permit the Attorney-Generalto play Jekyll and Hyde. He had taken his oath of office as requiredby the provisions of the Constitution. Once an Attoney-Generalalways the Attorney-General until he relinquishes office.
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The Attorney-General of his Country is the leader of the Barand the highest Legal Officer of the State. As Attorney-Generalhe has a duty to Court, to the State and to the subject to be whollydetached, wholly independent and to act impartially with thesoie object of establishing the truth. It is for that reason thatall Courts in this Island request the appearance of the Attorney-General as amicus curiae when the Court requires assistance, whichassistance has in the past been readily given. That image will cer-tainly be tarnished if he takes part in private litigation arising out -of private disputes. I cannot but agree with the judgment of theCourt of Appeal that there are constraints on the Attorney-Generalengaging in private practice in the civil law as well as the criminallaw. It is regrettable that the State has sought to act counter totradition, (prudence and propriety) in granting the Attorney-General and his law officers the right of private practice. Justiceis the loser thereby. No man can serve two masters. For either he•will hate the one and iove the other: or he will hold to one and dis-pise the other. No Attorney-General can serve both State and pri-vate litigant. I would dismiss the appeal with costs. I desire to re-cord our appreciation of the valuable assistance given to us byCounsel for all parties and more especially to Counsel for the BarAssociation who gave also of their valuable time.
ISMAIL, J.I agree
WEERARATNE, J.I agree
SHARVANANDA, J. I agreeWANASUNDERA, J. I agree
Appeal dismissed