075-NLR-NLR-V-77-S.-V.-OMAR-KATHA-Appellant-and-B.-SEDERA-Respondent.pdf
Omar Katha v. Sedera
*76
1074 Present: Udalagama, J., and Sharvananda, J.
S. V. OMAR KATHA, Appellant, and B. SEDERA,Respondent
S. C. 820/73—M. C. Matale, 38484
Paddy Lands Act No. 1 of 1958—Transfer of paddy field by landlord—•Whether he ceases to be landlord then—Section 4 (I A) (d) (ii) —Liability of landlord to pay damages thereunder—Evidence thatshould be led by evicted tenant as condition precedent.
The fact that a landlord transferred his paddy field to anotherperson and ceased to be owner of it does not preclude him fromcontinuing to be the landlord within the meaning of the provisionsof the Paddy Lands Act. But he is not liable to be punished undersection 4 (1A) (d) (ii) of the Act unless the evicted tenant leadsevidence establishing that the landlord continued to occupy the fieldafter he was ordered to restore possession of the field to the tenant.
Appeal
from an order of the Magistrate’s Court, Matale.
D. R. P. Goonetilleke, with Luke Ratnayake, for the respondent-appellant.
Applicant-respondent absent and unrepresented.
Cur. adv. vult.
i 7.1 N.L.n. us.
376
SHARVANANDA, JOmar Katha v. Sedera
March 28, 1974. Shabvananqa, J.—
The applicant-respondant complained to Court that therespondent-appellant who was alleged to be the landlord of thefield called Durakame Kumbura situated in the Matale District,although he was duly served with a notice in writing dated23rd May 1970 signed by the Assistant Commissioner of AgrarianServices, Matale, under the provisions erf Section 4 (1) (a) (d)(ii> of the Paddy Lands Act directing the appellant to hand overthe said field on or before the 23rd day of July 1970, failed tohand over the possession of the said field to the applicant andthat the respondent-appellant had rendered himself liable to paythe applicant a sum of Its. 1,710 in terms of the provisions ofSection 4 (,1) (a) (d) (ii) of the Paddy Lands Act, No. 1 of 1958.The learned Magistrate has on the evidence come to thefollowing conclusion: —
“ The applicant had worked the field as ande cultivatorunder the respondent for over 20 years. He was evicted fromthe field on 15.3.67. He made an application to be restoredto possession on 20.7.67. The complaint was inquired into andan order for restoration was made on 23.1.68 and parties wereinformed of the order. The respondent appealed against theorder unsuccessfully. The respondent was ordered to handover the field to the applicant on 22.7.70. This notice wasserved on the respondent but the respondent failed to complywith the order. Possession of the field was handed over tothe applicant on 7.2.71 by the Fiscal by order of this Court inCase No. 35926. ”
The appellant in the course of his evidence took up the legalobjection that he had ceased to be the landlord from 1967 as hehad transferred the field to his daughter by deed No. 34083 dated11th March, 1967. In our view the fact that the appellant hadceased to be the owner of the field from 1967 does not precludehim from continuing to be the landlord within the meaning of theprovisions of the Paddy Lands Act. In the course of his evidencethe appellant also stated that after the aforesaid transfer he hadceased to be in possession of the field. As against this evidencethe applicant has not led any evidence to show that the appellantwas in occupation of the said field at the relevant time after thereceipt of the Commissioner’s order that the applicant be restoredto possession as from 22.7.70.
The applicant has come into Court on a statutory cause ofaction and it is for him to establish to the satisfaction of Courtthe relevant ingredients of the said cause of action. In thiscase the applicant has failed to lead any evidence whatsoever toshow that the appellant continued to occupy the field after 22.7.70,
Municipal Council oj Colombo v. Subramaniath
377
the relevant date in terms of Section 4(1) (a) (d) (ii). All partiesin the lower court appear to have overlooked this aspect of thematter, and the learned Magistrate has not recorded any findingon this aspect of the case. The word “ occupation ” inSection 4(1) (a) (d) (ii) in our view means physical or construc-tive occupation resulting in some material benefit to the personso occupying. In the circumstances we are of the view that theapplicant has failed to establish the relevant ingredients in termsof Section 4 (1) (a) (d) (ii) of the Paddy Lands Act. Hence hisclaim fails. We accordingly set aside the order of the learnedMagistrate directing the appellant to pay the sum of jRs. 1,710 ascompensation to the applicant in terms of Section 4 (1) (a) (d)(ii) and dismiss the application of the applicant-respondent. Wemake no order as to costs both in the lower court and in appeal.
Udalagama, J.—I agree.
Order set aside.