072-NLR-NLR-V-51-SANGARALINGAM-PILLAI-et-al-Appellants-and-MOHAMADU-Respondent.pdf
JAYETILEKE S.P.J.—Sangaralingam PiUai v. Mohamadu
297
Present: Jayetileke S.P.J. and Pulle J.SANGARALINGAM PILLAI et al.t Appellants, and MOHAMADU,Respondent
8. C. 509—D. C. Colombo, 16,589
Rent Restriction Ordinance—Premises of which a director of a company is owner—Tenant cannot be ejected to expand business of the company—Ordinance .Vo. 60 of1942, Section S (e).
A director of a company is its paid servant and cannot avail himself of theprovisions of section 8 (c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance to claim abuilding, which is owned by himself, for tho purpose of carrying on thebusiness of tho company therein.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Colombo.
A. Hayley, K.C., with V. A., Kandiah, for plaintiffs appellants.
8. J. V.respondent.
Chdvanayagam, K.C., with M. H, A. Aziz, for defendant
Cur. adv. vult.
February 22, I960. Jayetileke S.P.J.—
This is a case arising under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60of 1942. The plaintiffs who are the owners of premises No. 235, NorrisRoad, Colombo, sued the defendant, who is carrying on business in the
1*J. N. A 80949 (4/50)
%98 JAYETILEKE S.P.J.—Sangaralingam Pillai v. Mohamadu
said premises as dealer in rubber, for ejectment from the said premises.The plaintiffs’ case is based upon the allegation that the said premisesare “ reasonably required for the purposes of their business ” within themeaning of s. 8 of the Ordinance. The evidence of the 2nd plaintiffshows that he and the other plaintiff are the directors of A. S. S.Sangaralingam & Co., an incorporated company, with limited liability,which carries on business at premises Nos. 213/215, Norris Koad, Colombo,in motor accessories and groceries, and that the premises occupied bythe defendant are required for the purpose of expanding the business ofthe company. The learned Additional District Judge took the viewthat the premises were not required by the plaintiffs for their own businessbut for the business of the company and that the case did not comewithin the terms of s. 8 of the Ordinance. Ho accordingly dismissed theplaintiffs’ action with costs. The present appeal is against that judgment.At the argument before us, Mr. Hayley contended that a company isincapable of carrying on business physically and that its business isordinarily managed by the directors. He contended further that thebusiness of the plaintiffs is to manage the business of the company. It iscorrect to say that one of the duties of a director of a trading companyis to manage the business. But what is the true position of a director XIn rc Faure Electric Accumulator Company1 Kay J. said “The officeof director is that of a paid servant of a company ”.
I shall now turn to the Ordinance to see whether the business carriedon by a paid servant of a company comes within the terms of s. 8. Thesection reads:—
8. Notwithstanding anything in any other law, no action orproceedings for the ejectment of the tenant of any premises to whichthis Ordinance applies shall be instituted in or entertained by anycourt, unless the Assessment Board, on the application of the landlord,has in writing authorised the institution of such action or proceedings :
Provided, however, that the authorisation of the Board shall notbe necessary in any case where—
(а)rent has been in arrear for one month after it has become due ; or
(б)the tenant has given notice to quit; or
(c) the premises are, in the opinion of the Court, reasonably requiredfor occupation as a residence for the landlord or any memberof the family of the landlord or for the purposes of his trade,business, profession, vocation or employment;
The material words are “ the premises are reasonably required ….for the purposes of his (landlord's) business.” These words seem to meto refer to the landlord’s own business. Strange results would followif that were not so. For instance the manager of every business mightsay that he requires a building owned by himself for the purpose ofcarrying on the business of which he is the manager. I am clearly ofopinion that such a case could not possibly be within the terms of s. 8.The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Polls J.—1 agree.
1 (1888) 40 Ch. Div. 141.
Appeal dismissed.