050-NLR-NLR-V-51-VEDIN-SINGHO-Appellant-and-MENCY-NONA-Respondent.pdf
N AGALINGAM J.— VedinSinghov. Mency Nona
Present:Nagalingam and Basnayake JJ.
VEDIN SINGHO, Appellant, and MENCY NONA, Respondent8. C, 491—D. C. Balapitiya, 39
Seduction~—Corroboration of plaintiff's evidence necessary.
In an action to recover damages for seduction the evidence of theplaintiff must be corroborated in some material particular.
^LPPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge, Balapitiya.
A. Jaynsundera, for defendant appellant.
K. C. de Silva, for petitioner respondent.
October 25,1948. Nagalingam J.—
The first plaintiff is a minor. Acting by her next friend, the secondplaintiff, she instituted this action claiming damages on the ground thatthe defendant had seduced her under promise of marriage. After trial,the learned judge entered judgment for tho first plaintiff in a sum ofRs. 750.
On appeal, it has been contended that there is no evidence whichwould show that the evidence of the first plaintiff has been corroboratedin any material particular, which is made a requirement under our lawbefore an action of this nature can succeed. The learned judge baarelied upon one circumstance as showing corroboration of the first
» Sth td. 1919.
• A. I. B. 1925 Patna 576.
210
HASNAYAKE J.— Vedin Singko v. Mtncy Nona
plaintiff’s testimony, and that is this. He says whether the first plaintiffwent to the house of the defendant of her own accord or at the requestof her parents or at the request of the defendant was immaterial, butthe fact that she did go to the house was in itself corroboration of hertestimony, because, unless the defendant- had something to do with thefirst plaintiff, she would not have gone to his house. That is a piece ofreasoning with which I find it difficult to agree.
Corroboration must arise from some conduct or from some circumstanceother than that of the bare conduct of the first plaintiff herself whichin this case is certainly at a date very much later than the alleged actof seduction. The fact that the first plaintiff entered the house of thedefendant after a period of fourteen months cannot be regarded as show-ing that the defendant, by hig conduct or by any other method, conductedhimself in such a manner as to make any one believe that he had some-thing to do with the first plaintiff herself. Tho most that can he said is,as the learned trial judge himself remarked, probably tho defendant hadsomething to do with the first plaintiff', but what it is that he did or towhat extent he had anything to do with tho first plaintiff, are matterson which there is no evidence available in this case, or on which it canbe said that corroboration has been furnished.
In Grange v. Perera 1 two possible methods of corroboration wereindicated. The conduct of a defendant was there stressed in the secondmethod that was said to be available to a plaintiff who sought to establisha case against a defendant. In this case, os I have remarked, there isno evidence at all of any conduct on the part of the defendant from whichit could be said that corroboration of the plaintiff’s testimony is proved.
Counsel for the plaintiff contended that there was other conduct onthe part of the defendant, upon which, however, the learned judgehimself lias not relied to sustain his judgment. Counsel contended thatthe defendant, when he received information of the visit of the first-plaintiff to his house, did not make a complaint to the headman, hut theevidence is that he did in fact go and make a complaint to the police,and that the police had to come and take the first plaintiff away. Sothat even that conduct that- counsel sought to rely upon docs not exist.
In the circumstances, in view of the fact that there is no corroborationof the first plaintiff’s testimony, the judgment of the learned judgecannot be allowed to stand. The appeal, is, therefore, allowed and thoplaintiff’s action is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
November 9, 1948. Rasnayake J.—
I agree that this appeal should be allowed.
In a contested action for damages on the ground of seduction the ruleis that, when the oath of the plaintiff is contradicted by that of thedefendant, and there is no evidence aliunde., there must be judgmentfor the defendant2.
In this case the plaintiff’s evidence is contradicted by the defendant.The plaintiff cannot therefore succeed as there is no evidence aliunde
1 1929 31 A l. It. 85.
* Urotius, 3.35.8—Lee's Translation, Vol. I, p. 479.
WINDHAM J.—Abdul Farecd v. Tribunal of Appeal, Motor Transport 211
to support her. By evidenco aliunde is meant evidence circumstantialor otherwise apart from the plaintiff’s evidence which is relevant andleads one to believe the plaintiff and reject the defendant’s evidence1.Even a false statement by the defendant may in certain circumstancesafford the necessary corroboration. 2
Appeal allowed.