072-NLR-NLR-V-16-PALANIAPPA-CHETTY-v.-DE-JONG-et-al.pdf
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Present: Lascelles C.J. and Wood Benton J.PALANIAPPA CHETTY v. DE JONG et al.
1M3.
27—D. C. Kandy, 21,590.
Principal and agent—Liability of owner of estate for debts incurred bythe superintendent for the estate.
Superintendents of planting estates in Ceylon have no generalauthority as such to pledge the credit of their employers; thequestion whether any particular superintendent has such authority,and how far such authority extends, depends upon the circum-stances of each particular case.
'p h k facts appear sufficiently from the judgment.
H. A. Jayewardene, for the plaintiff, appellant.—Toussaintwas defendants’ superintendent. He borrowed money and boughtrice for the estate of the defendants. The defendants did notadvance money for the upkeep of the estate. They allowed thesuperintendent to borrow money and get goods on credit for theestate. The amount sued for was advanced for the defendants’estate. Under similar circumstances it was held in Sirjudin v.Walker 1 and in Sinniah Chetty v. Henderson 2 that the estate ownerwas liable for the debt of the superintendent. Even if Toussaintcommitted a fraud in borrowing, the defendants are liable (Lloyd v.Orace, Smith & Co.3).
A. St. V. Jayewardene (with him De Jong), for the defendants-respondents.—The facts in the cases cited are different, and thecases therefore do not apply to this case. Here the defendants gavethe superintendent funds.
Moreover, the District Judge is not satisfied that the goods, &c.,were bought for the defendants’ estate.
Counsel cited, Suppramaniam Chktty v. White.4
H. A. Jayewardene, in reply.—It is not possible for the plaintiffto make sure for what use the superintendent puts the goods.
fCur. ado. cult.
March 4, 1913. Wood Benton J.—
The plaintiff-appellant sues the defendants-respondents in thisaction for a sum of Bs. 1,134.96 for rice sold to and money borrowedby them through one Toussaint, their superintendent on Wewal-maditte estate. The respondents admitted in their answer that
i (m2) 5 N. L. R. $71.a (1878)28. C.C.S4.
(1912) A. C. 716.
(1902) 6 N. L. R. 182.
1018.
WoodKenton J.
PalaniappaChetty «.deJong
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they were the proprietors of W ewalmaditte estate and that Toussaintwas their superintendent, but denied that he had any authorityto buy rice or borrow money on their behalf in his capacity assuperintendent, and pleaded that, under their agreement withhim, he himself supplied the necessaries for . carrying on the workof the estate, while they on their part paid his accounts in full atthe end of each month. The respondents say, and the fact isnot disputed, that Toussaint was supplied by them with fundssufficient for the payment of all the accounts rendered to hisemployers during the whole period of his employment. Theybecame proprietors of Wewalmaditte estate in February, 1910,and dispensed with Toussaint’s semces on October 29, 1911.Toussaint is now dead. There was a plea in the answer that heand the appellant had been acting fraudulently and in collusion,but no attempt was made to substantiate it at the trial. Thelearned District Judge has dismissed the appellant’s action withcosts, holding that Toussaint had no authority to pledge therespondents’ credit; that the appellant had not shown that therice sold and the money lent by him to Toussaint, who was alsothe superintendent of another estate with which they were uncon-nected, were supplied for the use of the respondents' estate; andthat as they in terms of their agreement with him had at all times,as his accounts up to the date of his leaving the estate showed,supplied him with the funds necessary for carrying it on, theappellant had no remedy against them.
It is clearly settled that the superintendent of an estate has not,merely by virtue of his office, authority to pledge his employer’scredit. On the other hand, an employer who puts a superintendentin charge of an estate without any payment of funds in advancemust be taken to have been aware of the fact that the superinten-dent would obtain rice on credit and borrow money for the paymentof wages. The general custom throughout the Colony—a customto which the respondents in the present case conformed—is forthe superintendent to render, and the employer to pay, the accountsfor such purchases and advances at the end of each month. Therespondents, in my opinion, are clearly liable to the appellant forat least one month’s dealings between Toussaint and him. Althoughthey have admitted, as I have said, in their answer that Toussaintwas their superintendent, they presented him to the Court at thetrial merely* as a conductor remunerated at – a small salary '. Ifthat were so, it is all the clearer that when they left him in solecharge of Wewalmaditte estafte they must have known that hewould pledge their credit both for rice and for coolies’ wages. The .appellant, on the other hand, is a Chetty who is not unfamiliarwith the custom of estates in the Colony, and when he found thathis accounts were not being paid, as they were not paid, regularly;he ought at once either to have called for payment, or to have
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brought himself into touch with Toussaint’s employers. I do notthink that the appellant’s action should have been dismissedaltogether. But . I would give him judgment only for the amountof the last month's dealings between himself and the respondents.Strictly speaking, only the amount of the first month’s dealingsshould be recoverable, but a question of prescription might perhaps. be raised in regard to such a claim, and as the appellant’s accountwith Wewalmaditte estate is a continuous one, I would propose thatthe decree of the District Judge, dismissing the appellant’s action,should be set aside, and that judgment should be entered for theappellant for the amount appearing from his books to be due tohim by the respondents between September 29 and October 29,1911. I would leave each side to pay its own costs of the actionand of the appeal.
The District Judge has said that the appellant has not provedthat the goods and money supplied by him to Toussaint were forthe use of the respondent's estate. Apart, however, from theevidence of the appellant’s kanakapulle, whom the District Judgeregards as an untrustworthy witness, there are the appellant’sbooks which were produced at the trial, and which have not beenchallenged as fictitious.
iota.
WoodBbnton J.
PalaniappmChetty *.deJong
Lascelles C.J.—
The question for decision is with regard to the extent, ifany, to which the defendants-respondents are liable for debtsincurred by one Toussaint, who was the superintendent of theirestate.
It is well settled by a long series of decisions of this Court thatsuperintendents of planting estates in Ceylon have no generalauthority as such to pledge the credit of their employers; but thatthe question whether any particular superintendent has suchauthority, and how far such authority extends, depends upon thecircumstances of each particular case.
In the present case Toussaint was employed on a salary of Bs. 50a month under an arrangement by which he was to procure therice which was required for the estate and render monthly accountsof his expenses, which were to be settled in the course of the followingmonth. Toussaint did in fact render monthly accounts of hisexpenditure, which were regularly met by the defendants' cheques.The position of Toussaint was that he was in a position to pledgethe credit of his employers fear rice for one month. He was in aposition which is well recognized in Ceylon, and there is proof ofno circumstance which would entitle the plaintiff'to believe thatToussaint had any general power to pledge his employers’ credit.When Toussaint’s accounts with the plaintiff were not regularlymet, the latter gave Toussaint further credit at his own risk.
1913.
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XtASOELLBS
O.J. . .
PalaniappaChetty «*de Jong
Ordinary prudence would have suggested some communicationwith Toussaint’s employers, and all the more so as Toussaint wasthe superintendent of a small estate and drawing a small salary. .
It is, I think, clear that the plainitff was entitled to deal withToussaint on the footing that he had authority to pledge the creditof the estate for one month, and for this reason I concur in thejudgment of my brother.
*~Set aside.